Economic-security industrial policy expansion

Tokyo is using subsidies and “economic security” framing to steer strategic sectors (chips, AI, defense-linked tech). This can crowd-in foreign investment and partnerships, but increases compliance complexity around sensitive technologies and state-aid conditions.

Incertitude politique sur l’énergie

La PPE3 est politiquement inflammable: critiques RN/LR sur coûts et renouvelables, publication par décret, objectifs révisables dès l’an prochain. Pour les entreprises: risque de changements de règles d’appels d’offres, volatilité de subventions, planification CAPEX complexe.

Supply-chain exposure to sectoral probes

Even as some broad tariffs were struck down, U.S. Section 232 investigations into additional sectors (e.g., aircraft, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals) keep Canadian exporters at risk. Companies should scenario-plan for sudden duty changes, certification requirements and localization pressures.

Critical minerals processing incentives

India plans incentives for lithium and nickel processing, including ~15% capex subsidies from April 2026 and capped sales-linked support, initially for four projects. This reshapes EV-battery and clean-tech sourcing, reducing China dependence but requiring partners with technology, ESG compliance, and long lead times.

Nuclear talks and snapback risk

Intermittent Iran–U.S. negotiations in Oman coexist with new sanctions and demands like “zero enrichment,” keeping escalation risk high. EU “snapback”/UN sanctions restoration threats would broaden prohibitions, trigger compliance resets, and deter long-cycle investment and technology transfer.

Mining law and licensing uncertainty

The Mineral Resources Development Amendment Bill has been criticized for ambiguity, while debates over BEE conditions, beneficiation and application timelines continue. Exploration spend fell to about R781m in 2024 (from R6.2bn in 2006), constraining future output and investor appetite.

Geoeconomic diversification toward Gulf

Berlin is accelerating diversification of energy and strategic inputs, courting Qatar/Saudi/UAE for LNG and green ammonia. LNG was ~10% of German gas imports in 2025, ~96% from the US, raising concentration risk. New corridors affect contracting and infrastructure plans.

USMCA review and North America risk

A July 1 USMCA mandatory review, White House criticism of “flaws,” and periodic Canada/Mexico tariff threats elevate uncertainty for deeply integrated auto, agri-food, and industrial supply chains. Companies should stress-test rules-of-origin compliance, nearshoring plans, and contingency sourcing.

Labor-law rewrite raises hiring risk

Parliament plans to enact a revised labor law before October 2026 following Constitutional Court mandates to amend the Job Creation/omnibus framework. Firms should prepare for changes in severance, contracting, and dispute resolution that could affect labor-intensive manufacturing competitiveness and investment planning.

Electrification push alters cost base

Government plans aim for electricity to reach ~60% of final energy consumption by 2030, reducing fossil dependence reportedly costing ~€60bn annually in oil and gas imports. Transition incentives may reshape fleet, heat and process investments, affecting capex timing and energy contracts.

Maritime logistics and port resilience

With major ports like Kaohsiung exposed to coercion scenarios, businesses face higher lead-time variance, inventory buffers, and contingency routing needs. Rising regional military activity and inspections risk intermittent delays even without full conflict, pressuring just‑in‑time models.

Power surplus, price volatility risk

Weak demand and rising renewables increase periods of low/negative prices and force nuclear output modulation; EDF warns higher maintenance needs and added costs (≈€30m/year) if electrification lags. Volatility affects PPAs, hedging strategies, and industrial competitiveness planning.

USMCA review and tariff volatility

Mandatory USMCA review by July 1 is becoming contentious; Washington is openly weighing withdrawal and has threatened extreme tariffs and sector levies. Heightened uncertainty disrupts pricing, contract terms, and cross-border auto, metals, agriculture, and services supply chains.

Energy exports shifting to gas

Aramco’s $100bn Jafurah unconventional gas project has begun condensate exports (4–6 cargoes/month, ~500k barrels each), aiming for 2 Bcf/d gas by 2030. Gas-for-power could free ~1 mb/d crude for export, reshaping feedstock costs and regional supply balances.

Critical minerals export leverage

Beijing is tightening oversight of rare earths and other strategic inputs, where it controls roughly 70% of mining and ~90% of processing. Export licensing, reporting and informal guidance can abruptly reprice magnets, EVs, electronics and defence supply chains, accelerating costly diversification efforts.

Rising industrial power cost squeeze

Despite reduced load-shedding, electricity tariffs for large users reportedly rose ~970% since 2007, triggering smelter closures and weaker competitiveness. Expected further annual increases amplify pressure on mining, metals and manufacturing, accelerating self-generation and relocation decisions.

Organised crime and infrastructure security

Government plans to deploy the army to support police against organised crime in Gauteng and Western Cape. Persistent vandalism and cable theft raise logistics and utilities downtime, elevate insurance and security costs, and can deter private participation in rail and grid projects.

Data protection compliance tightening

Draft DPDP rules and proposed faster compliance timelines raise near-term operational and legal burdens, especially for multinationals and potential “Significant Data Fiduciaries.” Unclear thresholds and cross-border transfer mechanisms increase compliance risk, contract renegotiations, and potential localization-style costs.

Monetary easing and credit conditions

The central bank cut rates by 100 bps (deposit 19%, lending 20%) and lowered reserve requirements to 16%, aiming to support growth as inflation moderates. Funding costs may ease, yet FX sensitivity and administered-price reforms can still affect financing and demand forecasts.

Transition and decarbonisation investment needs

Grid expansion plans imply roughly R400bn over 10 years and ~14,400km new lines to connect renewables, amid coal plant retirements around 2029–2030. Financing structure and JETP-linked funding conditions will shape ESG exposure, carbon costs, and industrial siting decisions.

Lira Volatility and FX Liquidity

Structurally weak long-term capital inflows and limited buffers keep USD/TRY risk elevated, raising import costs and FX debt-service burdens. Market surveys still price ~51–52 USD/TRY horizons, implying ongoing hedging needs, tighter treasury controls, and higher working-capital requirements for import-dependent sectors.

LNG permitting accelerates exports

A faster, “regular order” approach to LNG export permits and terminal approvals is boosting long-term contracting (often 15–20 years) with Europe and Asia, shaping global gas pricing, supporting US upstream investment, and offering buyers diversification from geopolitically riskier suppliers.

Saudization tightening in commercial roles

From April 19, 2026, private firms with three or more staff must localize 60% of specified sales and marketing jobs, with minimum Saudi salary thresholds (SAR 5,500). Separate restrictions reserve certain senior/procurement titles for Saudis, raising HR compliance, payroll costs and operating model adjustments.

US–Taiwan tariff pact reshapes trade

A new reciprocal US–Taiwan deal locks a 15% US tariff on Taiwanese imports while Taiwan removes or cuts about 99% of tariff barriers and tackles non-tariff barriers. It shifts pricing, compliance, and market-access assumptions across autos, food, pharma, and electronics.

Workforce nationalisation and labour reforms

Saudi authorities are tightening Saudization in selected functions (e.g., sales/marketing mandates reported up to 60% for targeted roles) alongside broader labour-law amendments. Firms must redesign HR operating models, pay structures, and compliance controls to avoid penalties and operational disruption.

Critical minerals onshoring push

Government co-investment and US-aligned financing are accelerating Australian processing capacity (e.g., Port Pirie antimony after A$135m support; US Ex-Im interest up to US$460m for projects). Expect tighter project scrutiny, faster approvals, and new offtake opportunities for allies.

Infrastructure, labor, and logistics fragility

US supply chains remain exposed to chokepoints across ports, rail, and trucking, with labor negotiations and capacity constraints amplifying disruption risk. Importers should diversify entry points, build buffer inventories for critical inputs, and strengthen real-time visibility and contingency routing.

Regulatory squeeze on stablecoin yields

US negotiations over banning stablecoin ‘interest’ or ‘rewards’ could reshape business models and market liquidity. Restrictions may push activity offshore or into bank-issued tokens, altering payment costs, on-chain treasury management, and vendor settlement options for global commerce.

Minerais críticos e nova geopolítica

Terras raras ganham prioridade: Serra Verde obteve empréstimo de US$565 mi com opção de participação minoritária dos EUA; o setor projeta US$76,9 bi em investimentos 2026–2030, incluindo ~US$2,4 bi em terras raras. Oportunidades crescem, porém com riscos regulatórios e de processamento doméstico.

Weather shocks and Jones Act constraints

Severe freezes can disrupt US oil and gas output (estimates up to 25 Bcf/day), forcing LNG imports despite exporter status; Jones Act limits domestic LNG shipping. International buyers and US-linked supply chains should expect episodic price spikes and logistics bottlenecks.

China tech controls tighten further

Stricter export controls and licensing conditions on advanced semiconductors (e.g., Nvidia H200) and enforcement actions (e.g., Applied Materials $252m penalty for SMIC-linked exports) raise compliance burdens, restrict China revenue, and accelerate redesign, re-routing, and localization of tech supply chains.

Treasury demand and credibility strain

Reports of Chinese regulators urging banks to curb US Treasury buying, alongside elevated issuance, steepen the yield curve and raise term premia. Higher US rates lift global funding costs, hit EM dollar borrowers, and reprice project finance and M&A hurdles.

Critical minerals investment acceleration

Canberra is fast-tracking critical minerals mining and midstream processing to diversify non-China supply chains. The new prospectus highlights 49 mines and 29 processing projects, backed by a A$1.2bn strategic reserve and a A$4bn facility, reshaping sourcing and JV decisions.

Heat-pump demand volatility

Germany’s heat‑pump market remains policy‑sensitive, with demand swinging as subsidy rules and GEG expectations change. This volatility affects foreign manufacturers’ capacity planning, distributor inventory, and installer pipelines, raising risk for long‑term investment and cross‑border component sourcing.

High-tech FDI and semiconductors

Vietnam is moving up the value chain, attracting electronics and semiconductor ecosystems. Bac Ninh hosts 1,140+ Korean projects with US$18.5bn registered capital; 2025 realised FDI reached ~US$27.62bn. Opportunity is strong, but skills shortages and supplier depth constrain localisation.

Strike disruptions across logistics

A renewed strike cycle is hitting transport and services: Lufthansa cancellations reached ~800 flights affecting ~100,000 passengers, while further rail and public‑sector actions are possible from March. Recurrent stoppages raise lead times, logistics costs and contingency needs.