Mission Grey Daily Brief - February 12, 2026
Executive summary
The global operating environment is being shaped by three forces that are reinforcing each other: US political volatility with a renewed partial shutdown threat centered on Homeland Security funding; an uneasy but potentially meaningful easing of Red Sea/Suez disruption as major carriers prepare to re-enter the corridor; and a new phase of “tech-geopolitics,” as Washington tightens the practical terms of advanced AI-chip exports to China even when headline policy appears to thaw. Meanwhile, two active conflict systems—Ukraine’s energy-targeting strike cycle and the Gaza ceasefire’s fragile “Phase Two” architecture—continue to generate second-order business risks, from commodity and freight volatility to sanctions, compliance, and security of personnel and assets. [1]. [2]. [3]. [4]. [5]
Analysis
1) Washington’s DHS funding cliff: a business risk, not just a political one
The US is heading into another funding showdown with a February 13 deadline for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Negotiations are stalled on Democratic demands for tighter controls over ICE/CBP conduct—judicial warrants, identification requirements, body-worn cameras, and restrictions on masking—after fatal incidents in Minneapolis. Democratic leaders publicly rejected the White House’s counterproposal as “incomplete and insufficient,” increasing the probability of a short, politically charged shutdown episode even if a last-minute continuing resolution ultimately passes. [1]. [6]
For businesses, a DHS-focused shutdown concentrates risk in travel and logistics touchpoints rather than the broader federal apparatus. Even limited disruptions at TSA, Coast Guard functions, and FEMA readiness can degrade supply chain reliability and raise operational friction, especially for time-sensitive cargo and executive travel. The more strategic issue is that repeated shutdown brinkmanship is becoming a persistent feature of the US political risk landscape, elevating uncertainty premiums in planning assumptions (contracts, staffing, and delivery schedules) rather than producing a single “event risk.”. [1]. [7]
What to watch next: whether Senate leadership can pass a short-term extension before members depart for the Munich Security Conference (which collides with the deadline), and whether DHS funding becomes a proxy battlefield for broader immigration politics ahead of midterm positioning. [8]. [7]
2) Red Sea/Suez: signs of normalization, but the “risk price” may not fully unwind
A notable supply-chain signal: the Gemini Cooperation (Maersk + Hapag-Lloyd) is preparing a gradual return to the Red Sea and Suez Canal from mid-February, with “naval assistance” framed as a prerequisite. This suggests carriers see the risk of disruption as manageable again—at least for selected services—after a period of reduced confirmed attacks. If this restart holds, it could meaningfully shorten Asia–Europe transit times versus Cape rerouting, easing working-capital pressure for importers and dampening fuel and freight cost inflation. [2]
But the commercial environment is shifting simultaneously toward oversupply and weaker rates. Drewry-linked commentary points to a “structural reset” in container shipping as new capacity arrives and pandemic-era pricing power fades; freight markets are already reflecting this downshift. Hapag-Lloyd’s preliminary figures illustrate the squeeze: Q4 revenue down 7.4% to about $5 billion and pre-tax earnings down roughly 75% to about $200 million, despite volumes rising 6.5% to 3.3 million TEUs—because average freight rates fell 16.2% year-on-year to $1,310/TEU. [9]. [10]
The implication for shippers is nuanced: lower headline rates are likely, but reliability and war-risk add-ons will remain episodic. Insurers and carriers will not price the corridor as “pre-2023 normal” until threat expectations compress for longer, and the operational reality (convoys, routing flexibility, last-minute diversion clauses) will continue to impose hidden costs in planning and inventory buffers. [2]. [10]
What to watch next: whether re-entry expands beyond “pilot” loops into broader network normalization, and whether any renewed incidents force another rapid swing back to Cape routing—creating a whipsaw in capacity availability and spot rates. [2]. [10]
3) Tech-geopolitics hardens: Nvidia’s China exposure remains constrained even amid détente optics
Even where US–China tensions appear tactically eased, the operational reality for strategic technology is tightening. US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick signaled that Nvidia’s licensing terms for selling H200 AI chips to China are “detailed and non-negotiable,” and explicitly tied to preventing Chinese military access. The reporting suggests approvals remain subject to national-security review and conditions Nvidia has not fully accepted, while Chinese buyers are reportedly already adapting through black-market channels and domestic substitutes—at a significant premium for illicit supply. [3]
For international firms, the takeaway is that “permission” in sensitive tech trade is increasingly conditional, revocable, and compliance-heavy. This pushes risk into procurement certainty, delivery schedules, and downstream liability (including re-export controls, end-use monitoring, and partner due diligence). It also accelerates bifurcation: Chinese firms diversify away from US-origin accelerators where feasible; non-Chinese firms face tighter governance requirements when selling into or collaborating with China-linked ecosystems. [3]
What to watch next: the exact language of licensing conditions (especially end-use verification and on-site audit rights), and whether similar “granular conditionality” becomes the template for other dual-use technologies (EDA, advanced packaging tools, photonics, quantum-adjacent components). [3]
4) Active conflict systems: Ukraine’s energy war and Gaza’s fragile “Phase Two” create persistent tail risks
In Ukraine, Russia’s continued targeting of power and gas infrastructure is deepening winter stress and reinforcing the war’s “civilian systems” dimension. Reports describe large-scale drone and missile waves causing outages across multiple regions as temperatures fall sharply, while European partners mobilize additional support for grid stabilization and emergency energy needs. This pattern keeps regional energy risk elevated (particularly for electricity-intensive manufacturing, logistics hubs, and insurers underwriting political violence and business interruption). [4]
In Gaza, the ceasefire’s second phase remains structurally fragile due to the unresolved disarmament question. Senior Hamas leadership again rejected disarmament publicly, while Israel signals preparations for renewed operations if demilitarization does not occur. Parallel to this, the US-backed “Board of Peace” is attempting to mobilize reconstruction funding, reportedly targeting “several billion dollars” in pledges at a February 19 meeting—yet the central condition (weapons decommissioning) remains politically and operationally contested, and governance arrangements inside Gaza appear constrained and vulnerable. [11]. [12]. [5]
For businesses, these theaters matter less as discrete “headline risk” and more as amplifiers: sanctions exposure, reputational and human-rights due diligence, and supply-chain volatility through energy and shipping channels. They also reinforce the fragmentation of international institutions and the growing role of ad hoc coalitions and executive “boards,” which can change project bankability and compliance requirements quickly. [4]. [5]
Conclusions
February 12’s picture is one of partial normalization (shipping lanes reopening) colliding with structural volatility (US fiscal governance stress, conflict-driven security premiums, and technology decoupling). The key strategic question for international firms is whether their operating model assumes stability as a baseline—or treats instability as the default and designs for resilience.
Which of your critical operations would fail first under (a) a 7–10 day US travel-security disruption, (b) a sudden return of Red Sea diversions, or (c) a surprise tightening of export-control enforcement on high-performance compute?. [1]. [2]. [3]
Further Reading:
Themes around the World:
EU battery regulation compliance burden
EU Batteries Regulation requirements—carbon footprint calculation and disclosure, due diligence and upcoming battery passports—raise data, auditing and IT costs across French supply chains. Non-compliance risks market access, while compliant producers can differentiate via lower-carbon nuclear-powered output.
Nickel quota cuts, ore scarcity
Indonesia is slashing nickel ore RKAB quotas—targeting ~250–260m wet tons vs 379m in 2025—and ordering major mines like Weda Bay to cut output. Smelters may face feedstock deficits, driving imports (15.84m tons in 2025) and price volatility.
Mining regulation and exploration bottlenecks
Mining investment is constrained by slow permitting and regulatory uncertainty. Exploration spend fell to about R781 million in 2024 from R6.2 billion in 2006, and permitting delays reportedly run 18–24 months. This deters greenfield projects, affects critical-mineral supply pipelines.
Cyber resilience as supply-chain risk
Recent disruption highlighted by the Jaguar Land Rover cyber incident continues to shape operational risk expectations. Firms operating in the UK should strengthen vendor security, incident response, and business continuity to protect manufacturing output, logistics flows, and customer delivery commitments.
Data privacy and surveillance constraints
Growing scrutiny of government and commercial data collection is increasing compliance and reputational risk, especially for data brokers, adtech, and cross-border data users. Senators allege ICE buys location and other sensitive data from brokers; efforts to revive the “Fourth Amendment Is Not for Sale Act” could tighten rules.
Secondary tariffs and sanctions extraterritoriality
Washington is expanding secondary measures, including tariffs on countries trading with Iran and pressure on partners over Russia-linked commerce. This raises third-country compliance burdens, increases tracing requirements across multi-tier supply chains, and elevates retaliation and WTO-dispute risks for multinationals.
China trade frictions resurface
Australia’s anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese steel (10% plus earlier 35–113% duties) raise retaliation risks across iron ore, beef and education services. Firms should stress-test China exposure, diversify markets and monitor WTO disputes and safeguard-style measures.
Policy execution and compliance environment
India continues “trust-based” tax and customs process reforms, including integrated systems and reduced litigation measures, while maintaining tighter enforcement in strategic sectors. Multinationals should expect improved digitalized compliance but uneven on-ground implementation across states and agencies.
Escalating energy grid disruption
Sustained Russian missile and drone strikes are driving nationwide power rationing, forcing factory downtime, higher generator and fuel imports, and unstable cold-chain logistics. Grid repairs are slow due to scarce transformers and long lead times, raising operating costs and continuity risk.
Electricity grid reform uncertainty
Eskom’s revised unbundling keeps transmission assets inside Eskom, limiting the new TSO’s ability to raise capital for urgent grid expansion. Business warns this policy “U-turn” could prolong grid constraints, delay renewables connections, and revive supply insecurity for operations.
Critical minerals export leverage
China’s dominance in rare earths and magnet refining (about 70% mining, ~90% processing) increases vulnerability to licensing delays or curbs. US-led “critical minerals bloc” initiatives may accelerate decoupling, raising compliance, sourcing, and price-volatility risks.
Ports and rail logistics bottlenecks
Transnet’s recovery is uneven: rail volumes are improving, but vandalism and underinvestment keep capacity fragile. Port congestion—such as Cape Town’s fruit-export backlog near R1bn—threatens time-sensitive shipments, raises demurrage, and pushes costly rerouting across supply chains.
Escalating Taiwan Strait grey-zone risk
China’s sustained air and naval activity and blockade-style drills raise probabilities of disruption without formal conflict. Firms face higher marine insurance, rerouting and inventory buffers, plus heightened contingency planning for ports, aviation, and regional logistics hubs.
US–Taiwan tariff pact reset
The newly signed US–Taiwan reciprocal trade deal lowers US tariffs on Taiwan to 15% and has Taiwan remove or reduce 99% of tariff barriers on US goods. It reshapes sourcing, pricing, compliance, and market-entry strategies across electronics, machinery, autos, and agriculture.
Anti-corruption enforcement intensifies
A new Party resolution on anti-corruption and wastefulness signals continued enforcement across high-risk sectors, with greater post-audit scrutiny and accountability for agency heads. This can improve governance over time, but near-term raises permitting uncertainty, compliance costs and exposure to investigations.
Power stability, grid bottlenecks
Eskom reports 200+ days without load-shedding and higher availability, boosting operational continuity. However, slow transmission expansion and contested unbundling constrain new generation connections, risking future curtailment for energy-intensive firms and delaying renewable-led decarbonisation plans.
Labour shortages, migration recalibration
Mining, infrastructure and advanced manufacturing face persistent skills shortages; industry is pushing faster skilled-migration pathways while government tightens integrity and conditions in some visa streams. Project schedules, wage costs and compliance burdens are key variables for investors and EPC firms.
Reconstruction pipeline and procurement governance
Large donor-funded rebuilding is expanding tenders via platforms such as Prozorro, but governance and integrity scrutiny remains high. Contractors must prepare for stringent audits, beneficial-ownership transparency, ESG requirements, and delays linked to security conditions and permitting constraints.
Inflación persistente y tasas
Banxico pausó recortes y mantuvo la tasa en 7% tras 12 bajas, elevando pronósticos de inflación y retrasando convergencia al 3% hasta 2T‑2027. Enero marcó 3,79% anual y subyacente 4,52%, afectando costos laborales, demanda y financiamiento corporativo.
Critical minerals onshoring push
Government co-investment and US-aligned financing are accelerating Australian processing capacity (e.g., Port Pirie antimony after A$135m support; US Ex-Im interest up to US$460m for projects). Expect tighter project scrutiny, faster approvals, and new offtake opportunities for allies.
USMCA review and stricter origin
The 2026 USMCA joint review is moving toward tighter rules of origin, stronger enforcement, and more coordination on critical minerals. North American manufacturers should expect compliance burdens, sourcing shifts, and potential disruption to duty-free treatment for borderline products.
Coal output controls, export risk
Jakarta is signaling coal production limits for 2026 (proposal: 600m tons vs 790m in 2025), though top miners may be exempt. Annual RKAB approvals create uncertainty, thinning spot liquidity and complicating long-term export contracts for Asia’s import-dependent buyers.
Deforestation-linked trade compliance pressure
EU deforestation rules and tighter buyer due diligence raise traceability demands for soy, beef, coffee and wood supply chains. A Brazilian audit flagged irregularities in soybean biodiesel certification, heightening reputational and market-access risks for exporters and downstream multinationals.
Defense rearmament boosts demand
Germany is accelerating procurement, including a €536m first tranche of loitering munitions within a €4.3bn framework and NATO long-range drone initiatives. This supports select industrial orders and dual-use tech investment, but tightens export controls, compliance, and supply competition for components.
Nuclear expansion and export-linked cooperation
Seoul is restarting new reactors (two 1.4GW units plus a 700MW SMR) while pursuing expanded US civil nuclear rights and fuel-cycle cooperation. This reshapes electricity price expectations, industrial siting, and opportunities for EPC, components, and uranium services.
Tax and cost-base reset
Budget-linked measures raise employer National Insurance to 15% (from April 2025) and change pension salary-sacrifice NI from 2029/30, expected to raise £4.8bn initially. Combined with business-rates changes, this tightens margins and alters location, hiring, and pricing strategies.
US–Taiwan tech security partnerships
Deepening cooperation on AI, drones, critical minerals, and supply-chain security signals a shift toward ‘trusted networks’. Companies may gain market access and certification pathways, but face stricter due diligence on China exposure, data governance, and third-country joint projects.
Secondary sanctions via tariffs
New executive authority threatens ~25% additional tariffs on imports from countries trading with Iran, alongside expanded “shadow fleet” designations. This blurs sanctions and trade policy, raising counterparty screening demands, shipping/insurance costs, and retaliation risk for firms operating across US-linked markets.
Balochistan security and CPEC exposure
Militant attacks in Balochistan underscore elevated security risks around CPEC assets, transport corridors, and Gwadar-linked logistics. Higher security costs, insurance premiums, and project delays weigh on FDI appetite, especially for infrastructure, mining, and energy ventures with long payback periods.
US trade deal and tariffs
Vietnam is negotiating a “reciprocal” trade agreement with the US as its 2025 surplus hit about US$133.8bn, raising tariff and transshipment scrutiny. Outcomes will shape market access, rules of origin compliance, and investor decisions on Vietnam-based export platforms.
US tariff uncertainty and exports
Thailand’s 2025 exports rose 12.9% (Dec +16.8%), but 2026 momentum may slow amid US tariff uncertainty (reported 19% rate) and scrutiny of transshipment via Thailand. Firms should stress-test pricing, origin compliance, and buyer commitments.
IMF and EU funding conditionality
Ukraine risks losing over US$115bn linked to IMF ‘benchmarks’ and the EU Ukraine Facility if reforms slip, including customs leadership and public investment management. Any delays could tighten liquidity, slow public payments, and postpone infrastructure and supplier contracts.
EV battery downstream investment surge
Government-backed and foreign-led projects are accelerating integrated battery chains from mining to precursor, cathode, cells and recycling, including a US$7–8bn (Rp117–134tn) 20GW ecosystem. Opportunities are large, but localization, licensing, and offtake qualification requirements are rising.
FX strength and monetary easing
A strong shekel, large reserves (over $220bn cited), and gradual rate cuts support financial stability but squeeze exporters’ margins and pricing. Importers benefit from currency strength, while hedging strategies become critical amid geopolitical headline-driven volatility.
Energy security and LNG logistics
PGN began supplying LNG cargoes from Tangguh Papua to the FSRU Jawa Barat, supporting power and industrial demand with distribution capacity up to 100 MMSCFD. Greater LNG reliance improves near-term supply resilience, but exposes users to shipping, price-indexation, and infrastructure bottlenecks.
Strike disruptions across logistics
A renewed strike cycle is hitting transport and services: Lufthansa cancellations reached ~800 flights affecting ~100,000 passengers, while further rail and public‑sector actions are possible from March. Recurrent stoppages raise lead times, logistics costs and contingency needs.