IMF programme and refinancing cycle

Ongoing IMF EFF/RSF reviews (potential ~$1.2bn disbursement) anchor macro policy, while large rollovers from China/UAE/Saudi and 2026 Eurobond repayments keep refinancing risk high. Any review slippage could trigger import compression, payment delays, and FX stress.

Defence spending surge and reindustrialisation

Rising geopolitical threats are accelerating UK defence outlays and procurement, including a £1bn contract for 23 medium-lift helicopters and debate over further increases toward 3% of GDP. This boosts opportunities for primes and SMEs, but exposes supply-chain capacity constraints, skills shortages and export-control complexity.

Arctic LNG logistics under attack

The explosion and sinking of an Arctic LNG 2-linked carrier highlights physical security risks to Russia’s LNG shadow fleet. Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 is already constrained by limited ships, operating near 30% capacity; rerouting via Cape of Good Hope could add weeks and tighten tonnage.

Investment governance reset under Vision 2030

A new investment minister from the $925bn PIF signals a pivot from headline giga-project spend toward investment-driven growth in logistics, mining and AI. With 2024 FDI inflows at 119.2bn riyals ($32bn) versus a $100bn annual 2030 goal, investors should expect policy recalibration and prioritization.

Foreign investment scrutiny and security

Canada is applying more assertive national-security review to sensitive sectors such as critical minerals, telecom, AI, and defense supply chains. Investors should expect longer timelines, mitigation conditions, and partner-vetting requirements—especially where state-linked capital or dual-use technologies are involved.

US/China geo-economic crosswinds

Australia is tightening trade defenses against subsidised Chinese steel (10% ceiling-frame tariff; interim 35–113% on other products), while China signals potential retaliation and pushes iron-ore pricing changes. Expect volatility in commodities, contract terms, and political-risk premiums.

Auto and EV supply-chain reshaping

U.S. tariffs and softer demand are pressuring Mexico’s auto complex: January 2026 production fell about 2.6% YoY, and exports remain U.S.-heavy. OEMs and suppliers must hedge demand, localize inputs, and manage compliance to keep preferential treatment under USMCA.

Semiconductor concentration and geopolitics

Taiwan remains central to leading-edge chips (often cited around 90% of advanced nodes), making any disruption a systemic shock for electronics, autos, and AI infrastructure. Expect higher resilience costs, dual-sourcing, and strategic stockpiling across supply chains.

Property slump and local debt drag

The prolonged property downturn and local-government debt overhang continue to weigh on demand, financing conditions, and confidence. Policy support remains targeted and uneven, increasing counterparty risk for developers and suppliers, pressuring consumer spending, and complicating site selection and investment timing decisions.

EU gas exit and volatility

Despite continued EU purchases of Russian LNG in the billions of euros, Europe is moving toward a full ban on Russian pipeline gas and LNG by 2027. Firms should plan for abrupt contract and price shifts, infrastructure bottlenecks, and renewed competition for alternative LNG supply.

Market-opening, agri SPS politics

The US-Taiwan deal envisages broad tariff cuts on US goods and reduced non-tariff barriers, while Taiwan protects sensitive agriculture (e.g., 27 items kept tax-free). Importers/exporters should anticipate evolving SPS rules, labeling, and sector-specific compliance burdens in food and retail.

Digital economy regulation and AI

Australia’s copyright, data and AI policy settings are in flux as global AI firms expand locally and lobby for clearer licensing models. Outcomes will affect cloud/data-centre investment, IP compliance costs, and cross-border data governance for multinationals operating in Australia.

Cross-strait military risk volatility

PLA activity around Taiwan has shown abrupt lulls, interpreted as tactical signaling rather than de-escalation. Persistent naval presence and potential renewed air operations sustain tail risks of blockade scenarios, insurance premium spikes, shipping reroutes, and disruption planning for critical components.

Regional war and escalation risk

The Israel–Iran confrontation and spillover from Gaza heighten physical-security, insurance, and continuity risks for sites, staff, and assets. Expect sudden airspace closures, force majeure, and heightened due diligence for project finance, M&A, and long-term contracts.

Large infrastructure spend and PPP pipeline

Government plans about R1.07 trillion over three years for transport, energy and water, with revised PPP rules and infrastructure bonds. This creates opportunities for EPC, finance and suppliers, but execution risk, procurement disputes, and governance capacity remain key constraints.

Indo-Pacific security industrial integration

Defence cooperation with close partners is expanding toward industrial co-production and faster movement of equipment and personnel. This supports secure supply chains for advanced manufacturing and dual-use technology, but raises compliance demands around export controls, cyber security, and partner vetting.

Fiscal Policy Shift and Infrastructure Fund

Germany’s pivot to large, debt-financed infrastructure spending—highlighted by a ~€500bn fund—supports near-term growth and construction demand, but raises medium-term budget trade-offs. Companies should expect intensified competition for capacity, permitting bottlenecks, and procurement changes.

Port modernization and global operators

APM Terminals will buy 37.5% of Jeddah’s South Container Terminal as DP World retains 62.5%, following a SAR 3 billion upgrade and ~4.1 million TEU capacity. Greater automation and network integration improve reliability for Red Sea trade corridors.

Cross-strait grey-zone escalation

China is expanding grey-zone pressure, including drone operations using false transponder identities and broader coercion noted by Taiwan’s NSB. Elevated military and aviation/maritime ambiguity increases logistics, insurance and contingency-planning costs for shipping, aviation and data connectivity.

EU–Mercosur provisional trade opening

The EU will provisionally apply the Mercosur agreement, despite strong French opposition and court review. Likely tariff cuts reshape agri-food and industrial trade flows, intensifying competition while creating export opportunities; safeguards and compliance controls may tighten.

Foreign investor exit and asset security

Western firms continue exiting but face frozen funds, forced discounts, and regulatory hurdles; selective releases occur under tough conditions. Risks include temporary administration, unpredictable approvals, and limited repatriation routes, raising the bar for remaining investors’ governance and downside protection.

Sectoral tariffs on autos, steel

Autos and steel remain prime targets under US national-security tools. Korean automakers already absorbed about 7.2 trillion won in tariff costs last year, while steel faces elevated duties. Firms are accelerating North American sourcing and onshore capacity to protect market access.

Energy Transition Grid Buildout

Saudi Energy Company reports ~24 GW of generation projects under execution, with 12.3 GW renewables connected by end-2025 and 8 GWh battery storage commissioned (14 GWh under development). This drives demand for EPC, grid equipment and O&M, while tightening standards for local content and HSSE compliance.

Sanctions escalation and enforcement tightening

EU and Ukrainian sanctions broaden to banks, metals, chemicals, maritime services and shadow-fleet actors, while enforcement targets third-country facilitators. Businesses must strengthen screening, end-use controls and maritime due diligence to avoid secondary exposure and shipment delays.

Pemex output and crude-export decline

Pemex crude exports fell to ~294,000 bpd in Jan 2026 (lowest since 1990; -44% y/y) amid lower production (~1.65 mbpd) and mandates to refine domestically. This shifts refinery feedstock, fuels trade, and supplier opportunities, but heightens fiscal and execution risk.

China-Derisking und Technologiekontrollen

EU und Berlin verschärfen Sicherheits- und Technologiepolitik gegenüber China, u.a. bei 5G/6G, Cloud und kritischer Infrastruktur; Huawei bleibt dennoch in EU-Forschungsprojekten bis 2027–2030 eingebunden. Unternehmen müssen Compliance, Exportkontrollen, IP-Schutz und Retorsionsrisiken neu bewerten.

Energía y sesgo proestatales

Washington critica medidas que favorecen “campeones nacionales” en petróleo, gas y electricidad, afectando inversionistas. Para empresas intensivas en energía, el marco regulatorio y permisos siguen siendo determinantes para costos, confiabilidad de suministro y viabilidad de proyectos industriales.

Semiconductor build-out accelerates

Semicon Mission 2.0 prioritizes chip design, ecosystem suppliers and talent, alongside new ATMP/OSAT capacity (e.g., Micron Sanand; more plants due by end-2026). This supports electronics supply-chain localization but raises execution, yield and infrastructure risks.

Concessões portuárias e infraestrutura 2026

O governo iniciou leilões de arrendamentos portuários em 2026 (Santana, Natal, Porto Alegre), projetando R$226 milhões em investimentos e anunciando 18 leilões no ano. A agenda pode reduzir gargalos, mas baixa competição e judicialização elevam risco de cronograma.

Recomposition sécuritaire et défense européenne

Paris renforce sa doctrine de dissuasion: hausse annoncée des têtes nucléaires (≈290 aujourd’hui) et coopération avec 7–8 partenaires européens, incluant exercices et éventuel déploiement de Rafale. Impacts: budgets défense, commandes industrielles, exigences de conformité export/ITAR-like.

Tariff volatility and legal limits

Rapid shifts in US tariffs—courts curbing IEEPA-based duties while the administration pivots to Section 122/232/301—keep import costs and pricing unstable. Firms should scenario-plan for sudden rate changes, refund litigation, and compliance-driven sourcing re-optimisation.

Rand strength and capital inflows

A firmer rand, moderating inflation, and attractive real yields have drawn portfolio inflows and improved reserves, lowering funding costs for corporates. However, sensitivity to global risk sentiment, commodity cycles, and geopolitical shocks keeps FX hedging and liquidity planning essential.

Semiconductor reshoring via Rapidus

Japan is scaling public-private backing for Rapidus, with government voting rights and a “golden share,” aiming for 2nm mass production in 2027. Subsidies and guarantees reshape supplier selection, local capacity, and tech-partnership strategies for global chip users.

Operational volatility and domestic stability

Economic strain and political repression can trigger episodic unrest and policy tightening, affecting labor availability, local distribution, and regulatory predictability. For firms operating via local partners, continuity planning must cover sudden inspections, licensing delays, and reputational exposure.

Semiconductor geopolitics and routing

Semiconductors sit at the center of US investigations and potential Section 232 measures, yet direct US-bound Korean chip exports are relatively small and often routed via Taiwan packaging. Still, sudden chip tariffs or controls would disrupt AI supply chains and investment decisions.

Critical minerals concentration risk

U.S. dependence on China for inputs like gallium and other strategic materials remains acute, while Beijing’s export-control suspensions have clear expiry deadlines. Companies should plan dual sourcing, strategic stockpiles, and qualification of non-China suppliers to avoid production stoppages.