Mission Grey Daily Brief - November 15, 2025
Executive summary
The past 24 hours have seen a notably softer tone in US-China economic and diplomatic relations, as both superpowers attempt to cool tensions after a tumultuous year dominated by trade wars and technology decoupling threats. Following high-level discussions between President Trump and President Xi Jinping, both sides agreed to temporary tariff suspensions and the relaxation of critical export controls, marking a fragile trade truce. Meanwhile, Europe is exploring new financial avenues to bolster Ukraine’s resilience against ongoing Russian aggression, including the potential use of frozen Russian assets. Global businesses must remain vigilant, as these developments indicate a world in flux—where “truce” does not yet mean a long-term peace, and structural rivalry persists beneath headline agreements.
Analysis
US-China trade thaw: fragile trust, tactical concessions
After months of escalation, including tit-for-tat tariffs and export controls targeting rare earths and semiconductors, the leaders of the US and China reached a temporary détente in South Korea. Both countries suspended port fees on shipping, rolled back steep tariffs (the US “fentanyl tariff” cut to 10%, China cut duties on US agricultural goods), and opened licensing for critical materials like rare earths, gallium, and germanium—essential for tech manufacturing and defense systems. China also resumed purchases of American soybeans and wheat, with a commitment to buy 12 million metric tons by year-end and 25 million annually for the next three years. However, export controls remain in place for dual-use technologies and military-related items, highlighting ongoing strategic distrust.
The détente has provided short-term relief for global supply chains and commodity markets, especially in agriculture and key minerals. Yet, analysts widely interpret this truce as tactical rather than foundational—negotiations are fluid, enforcement mechanisms are weak, and political rhetoric still emphasizes self-reliance and risk reduction on both sides. Beijing’s new “validated end-user” system could still block exports to US companies linked to military supply chains, hinting at possible future flare-ups. Both sides prioritize de-risking, rather than decoupling, with ongoing efforts to source critical minerals from third countries such as Australia and Argentina. The broader implication for businesses is uncertainty: the competitive equilibrium relies on rolling negotiations and episodic policy shifts, not on stable rules. [1][2][3]
Technology and semiconductor tensions
Despite diplomatic overtures, the export of advanced semiconductors and AI chips remains a red-line in US policy. Former US Ambassador Burns recently reiterated that national security concerns outweigh short-term business gains, citing export controls initially enacted under Biden and maintained by the Trump administration. While US tech firms report losing billions in potential China sales, allowing high-end chip exports would risk military spillover via China’s “civil-military fusion” model. This stance is supported by bipartisan consensus and remains non-negotiable, underlining the enduring divide in critical technology sectors. For companies invested in semiconductor, aerospace, and AI, the reality is ongoing compliance obligations and possibly further tightening when future flare-ups occur. [3]
Europe’s move to use frozen Russian assets for Ukraine
On the Russia front, the latest strategic conversation in Brussels revolves around directing frozen Russian central bank assets, worth over $300 billion, to Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction. European ministers are advancing legal frameworks to reallocate a portion of these funds, representing a potentially game-changing source of aid as Ukraine faces sustained Russian military pressure and American policy uncertainty following US election dynamics. This effort supplements traditional military and economic assistance and signals increased Western resolve to hold Russia accountable for its war of aggression. However, key EU member states remain cautious about the legal ramifications and possible Russian retaliatory measures, so business risk in the region remains high. [3]
Supply chain de-risking and rare earths
Both the US and China are pushing hard to diversify supply chains for strategic minerals and products. The US is increasing partnerships with Australia and Argentina for rare earth minerals, aiming to reduce vulnerability to Chinese export controls. China itself is moving to bolster self-reliance, with large investments in domestic mining, and eyeing alternative sources for food and energy. The tension has drastically accelerated supply chain resiliency strategies for global companies, driving investment away from single-source dependencies and favoring modular, regionally diversified approaches. This trend will likely persist even if temporary trade truces hold, making agility paramount for international investors. [1][3]
Conclusions
The events of the last day underscore the volatility and complexity of global business in 2025. While today’s US-China trade truce delivers breathing room for crucial commodity and technology flows, it is far from an enduring settlement. The rivalry—grounded in incompatible strategic interests and persistent distrust—will continue to define business risks and opportunities, demanding constant adaptation and vigilant monitoring by international firms.
At the same time, EU moves to unlock frozen Russian assets signal that the West is refining its response toolkit, potentially setting new precedents for addressing conflict-driven risk. Supply chain security and compliance remain center stage.
For executive consideration: How resilient are your operations to future tariff or sanction surprises? What new opportunities emerge in the transitions towards diversified supply chains for rare earths, semiconductors, or agricultural products? And how should businesses interpret today’s truce—not as a return to “normal”, but as the opening move in a protracted contest for technological and resource dominance?
Further Reading:
Themes around the World:
Multipolar payments infrastructure challenge
Growth in non-dollar payment plumbing—CBDCs, mBridge-type networks, and yuan settlement initiatives—incrementally reduces reliance on USD correspondent banking. Firms face fragmentation of rails, higher integration costs, and strategic decisions on invoicing currencies and liquidity buffers.
Skilled-visa tightening and backlogs
Stricter H-1B vetting, social-media screening, and severe interview backlogs—plus state-level restrictions like Texas pausing new petitions—constrain talent mobility. Impacts include project delays, higher labor costs, expanded nearshore/remote delivery, and relocation of R&D and services work outside the U.S.
Oil pricing and OPEC+ discipline
Saudi Aramco’s repeated OSP cuts for Asia, amid Russian discounts and global surplus concerns, signal tougher competition and market-share defense. Energy-intensive industries should plan for higher price volatility, changing refining margins, and potential policy-driven output adjustments within OPEC+.
CFIUS and investment screening expansion
Greater scrutiny of inbound acquisitions and sensitive data/technology deals, plus evolving outbound investment screening, increases deal uncertainty for foreign investors. Transactions may require mitigation, governance controls, or divestitures, affecting timelines and valuations in semiconductors, AI, telecom, and defense-adjacent sectors.
Business investment drag and policy uncertainty
UK GDP growth was only 0.1% in Q4 2025 and business investment fell nearly 3%, the biggest drop since early 2021, amid budget uncertainty. Multinationals should expect cautious capex, softer demand, and heightened sensitivity to regulatory or political shocks.
FX controls and dong volatility
Vietnam’s USD/VND dynamics remain sensitive to global rates; the SBV set a central rate at 25,098 VND/USD (Jan 27) while authorities prepare stricter penalties for illegal FX trading under Decree 340/2025 (effective Feb 9, 2026). Hedging and repatriation planning matter.
E-Auto-Förderung und Autowandel
Die Regierung reaktiviert E-Auto-Subventionen (1.500–6.000 €, ca. 3 Mrd. €, bis zu 800.000 Fahrzeuge). Das stabilisiert Nachfrage, beeinflusst Flottenentscheidungen und Zulieferketten. Gleichzeitig verschärfen EU-Klimaziele und Konkurrenz aus China Preisdruck, Lokalisierung und Technologietransfer-Debatten.
Defense export surge into Europe
Hanwha Aerospace’s ~$2.1bn Norway deal for the Chunmoo long-range fires system underscores Korea’s growing defense-industry competitiveness and government-backed “Team Korea” diplomacy. It signals expanding European demand, offset/industrial-partnership opportunities, and tighter export-control and compliance requirements.
US tariff shock and AGOA risk
US imposed 30% tariffs on South African exports in 2025, undermining AGOA preferences and creating uncertainty for autos, metals, and agriculture. Exporters face margin compression, potential job losses, and incentives to re-route supply chains or shift production footprints regionally.
Data (Use and Access) Act shift
The DUAA’s main provisions are in force, expanding ICO investigative powers and raising potential PECR fines up to £17.5m or 4% of global turnover. Firms must reassess data-governance, consent, product design, vendor risk and UK‑EU data-transfer posture.
Trade remedies and sectoral duties
Vietnam faces rising trade-defense actions as exports expand. The US finalized AD/CVD duties on hard empty capsules with Vietnam dumping at 47.12% and subsidies at 2.45%, signaling broader enforcement risk. Companies should strengthen origin documentation, pricing files, and contingency sourcing.
Semiconductor tariffs and reshoring
New U.S. tariffs on advanced AI semiconductors, alongside incentives for domestic fabrication, are reshaping electronics supply chains. Foreign suppliers may face higher landed costs, while OEMs must plan dual-sourcing, redesign bills of materials, and adjust product roadmaps amid policy uncertainty.
Lira Volatility and FX Liquidity
Structurally weak long-term capital inflows and limited buffers keep USD/TRY risk elevated, raising import costs and FX debt-service burdens. Market surveys still price ~51–52 USD/TRY horizons, implying ongoing hedging needs, tighter treasury controls, and higher working-capital requirements for import-dependent sectors.
USMCA renegotiation and North America risk
Rising tariff threats toward Canada and tighter USMCA compliance debates are increasing uncertainty for autos, agriculture, and cross-border manufacturing. Firms should map rules-of-origin exposure, diversify routing, and prepare for disruptive bargaining ahead of formal review timelines.
Ports competitiveness and political scrutiny
French ports face competitive pressure versus Northern European hubs, drawing heightened political attention ahead of elections. Potential reforms and labour relations risks can affect routing choices, lead times, and logistics costs for importers/exporters using Le Havre–Marseille corridors.
Critical minerals leverage and reshoring
U.S. policy increasingly links trade and security to critical minerals and domestic capacity. Officials explicitly frame rare earths and magnets as weaponized supply points, reinforcing incentives for reshoring and allied sourcing, and pressuring firms to redesign inputs and secure non-China supply alternatives.
Financial isolation and FATF blacklisting
FATF renewed Iran’s blacklist status and broadened countermeasures, explicitly flagging virtual assets and urging risk-based scrutiny even for humanitarian flows and remittances. This further constrains correspondent banking, raises settlement friction, and increases reliance on opaque intermediaries—complicating trade finance and compliance for multinationals.
USMCA review and tariff brinkmanship
The mandatory USMCA review and renewed U.S. tariff threats create high uncertainty for North American supply chains, especially autos, metals and agri-food. Firms should stress-test rules-of-origin compliance, pricing, and contingency routing as policy shifts can be abrupt.
Financial system tightening and liquidity
Banking reforms—phasing out credit quotas and moving toward Basel III—may reprice credit and widen gaps between strong and weak lenders. With credit-to-GDP above 140% and periodic liquidity spikes, corporates may face higher working-capital costs and tougher project financing.
Tourism expansion and regulatory easing
Tourism’s GDP share rose from 3.5% (2019) to ~5% (2025), targeting 10% and SAR600bn output, with employment above 1m. Policy signals—such as limited alcohol sales to premium expatriates—support destination competitiveness, boosting hospitality, retail, and aviation demand.
Rare earth magnets domestic push
A ₹7,280 crore scheme targets indigenous rare-earth permanent magnet manufacturing and “mineral corridors,” addressing heavy import reliance and China-linked supply risk. Beneficiaries include EVs, wind, defence and electronics; investors should watch permitting, feedstock security, and offtake structures.
Escalating secondary sanctions pressure
The US is tightening “maximum pressure” through new designations on Iran’s oil/petrochemical networks and vessels, plus threats of blanket tariffs on countries trading with Tehran. This raises compliance, banking, and counterparty risks for global firms and intermediaries.
EU trade defenses and retaliation
EU countervailing duties on China-made EVs are evolving into minimum-price, quota, and EU-investment “undertakings,” while Beijing retaliates with targeted tariffs (e.g., 11.7% on EU dairy). Firms face higher compliance costs, pricing constraints, and fast-moving dispute risk.
Migration and visa integrity tightening
Australia is tightening migration settings and visa oversight, affecting talent pipelines. Skilled visa backlogs and stricter student ‘Genuine Student’ tests are increasing rejection and processing risk, while Home Affairs is considering tougher sponsor vetting after exploitation cases—raising HR compliance demands for employers.
Labour shortages, managed immigration
Severe labour scarcity is pushing wider use of foreign-worker schemes, but with tighter caps and complex visa categories. Proposed limits (e.g., 1.23 million through FY2028) could constrain logistics, construction and services, lifting wages and automation investment while complicating staffing for multinationals.
Nickel quotas reshape supply
Jakarta is tightening nickel mining RKAB quotas, slashing major producers’ 2026 allowances and targeting national output around 260–270 million tons versus 379 million in 2025. Ore shortages may boost imports, alter battery-material supply chains, and raise project execution risk.
Regional security, Hormuz risk
Military build-ups and tit-for-tat maritime actions heighten disruption risk around the Strait of Hormuz, a corridor for roughly one-fifth of seaborne oil. Any escalation could delay shipping, spike premiums, and force rerouting, affecting chemicals, commodities, and container traffic.
Nuclear expansion and export-linked cooperation
Seoul is restarting new reactors (two 1.4GW units plus a 700MW SMR) while pursuing expanded US civil nuclear rights and fuel-cycle cooperation. This reshapes electricity price expectations, industrial siting, and opportunities for EPC, components, and uranium services.
Ports capacity crunch and auction delays
Record port throughput (1.40bn tonnes in 2025, +6.1% y/y) is colliding with investment bottlenecks: 17 private terminals stalled since 2013 (R$36.8bn unrealised). Delays and legal disputes around Tecon Santos 10 raise congestion risk for containers and agro-exports.
PIF giga-project reprioritisation cycle
Vision 2030 mega-projects exceed US$1tn planned value, with ~US$115bn contracts awarded since 2019, but sponsors are recalibrating scope and timelines. This shifts procurement pipelines, payment cycles, and counterparty risk for EPC, materials, and services firms.
Platform takedowns for illegal promotions
FCA’s High Court action against HTX seeks UK blocking via Apple/Google app stores and social platforms, signalling tougher cross-border enforcement of financial promotions and raising distribution and marketing risk for offshore investing and crypto apps.
Border and neighbor-country trade disruptions
Thai-Cambodian tensions and Myanmar instability create episodic border closures, rerouting costs, and inventory risk for agribusiness and manufacturers. Myanmar’s reduced FX conversion requirement (15%) may help liquidity, but security and import controls still threaten cross-border trade reliability.
Freight rail recovery, lingering constraints
Rail performance is improving, supporting commodities exports; Richards Bay coal exports rose ~11% in 2025 to over 57Mt as corridors stabilised. Yet derailments, security incidents, rolling-stock shortages and infrastructure limits persist, elevating logistics risk for bulk and containerised supply chains.
Energy policy and OPEC+ restraint
Saudi-led OPEC+ is keeping output hikes paused through March 2026, maintaining quotas amid surplus concerns and Iran-related volatility. For businesses, oil revenue sensitivity influences public spending, FX liquidity, project pacing, and input costs, especially energy-intensive industries.
Long-term LNG security push
Utilities are locking in fuel amid rising power demand from data centers and AI. QatarEnergy signed a 27‑year deal to supply JERA about 3 mtpa from 2028; Mitsui is nearing an equity stake in North Field South (16 mtpa, ~$17.5bn). Destination clauses affect flexibility.
Risco fiscal e dívida crescente
A dívida bruta pode encerrar o mandato em ~83,6% do PIB e projeções apontam >88% em 2029, pressionando o arcabouço fiscal e a credibilidade. Isso eleva prêmio de risco, encarece financiamento, e aumenta volatilidade cambial e regulatória para investidores.