US trade access and tariff volatility

AGOA volatility and US tariff instruments are disrupting exporters. AGOA exports to the US fell 32% (year to Nov 2025) and South African auto shipments to North America dropped nearly 75% in 2025. Although AGOA is extended to end-2026, Section 232 duties and new surcharges keep compliance and demand uncertain.

EU Russian LNG endgame

Despite a planned EU ban from 1 Jan 2027, Europe recently absorbed all Yamal LNG cargoes (about 1.54 million tonnes in Feb across 21 shipments). Businesses face abrupt policy shifts, long‑term contract renegotiations, and infrastructure bottlenecks for alternative supply.

Revisión T-MEC y aranceles 232

La revisión 2026 del T‑MEC arranca con conversaciones México‑EE.UU. (16 marzo) y señales de mayor presión estadounidense en reglas de origen, transbordo y cumplimiento. Persisten aranceles: 25% camiones, 50% acero/aluminio/cobre, 17% tomate; elevan incertidumbre comercial.

Wage pressures and labour-market cooling

Unemployment is rising (around 5%+) while pay growth is moderating, but firms still face higher labour costs from minimum-wage increases and prior NI/employment changes. Margin pressure and skills gaps persist, influencing location decisions, automation, and service-delivery models.

Critical Minerals and Input Security

German industry’s exposure to Chinese-controlled critical inputs (notably rare earths) is now treated as strategic vulnerability. Firms should anticipate tighter due diligence, stockpiling, and multi-sourcing requirements, plus heightened disruption risk if trade disputes trigger export controls or delays.

Expanded national-security trade tools

Greater reliance on Section 232 national-security tariffs—already covering steel, aluminum, autos/parts—creates spillover risk to pharmaceuticals, medical devices, semiconductors and other “strategic” goods. Multinationals face higher duty exposure, rule-of-origin planning, and lobbying/waiver needs.

China tech controls and chips

U.S. semiconductor and AI policy remains mixed: licensing tweaks, tariffs on advanced computing chips, and potential congressional tightening. Export controls, end‑use scrutiny, and allied coordination raise compliance burden and can disrupt electronics, cloud, and industrial automation supply chains.

Banking isolation and payments friction

Iran’s limited integration with global finance drives reliance on intermediaries, barter, and opaque payment channels, elevating fraud and AML risk. Even non-U.S. firms face de-risking by correspondent banks, slower settlement, and higher costs for trade finance and insurance.

Tourism recovery amid policy tightening

Tourism remains a key demand driver but is exposed to geopolitics and immigration changes. Authorities are considering cutting visa-free stays from 60 to 30 days; long-haul travel may soften with higher airfares, while Chinese arrivals show early rebound but remain fragile.

Low growth, rate cuts, baht

Bank of Thailand cut policy rate to 1.0% as growth is forecast around ~2% and uneven. Baht volatility and competitiveness concerns persist, amplified by safe-haven flows and oil prices, affecting exporters, tourism margins, and hedging/treasury strategies for multinationals.

Mining push for critical minerals

Vision 2030 is scaling mining as a third pillar, citing $2.5tn mineral wealth and targeting SR240bn GDP contribution by 2030. Reforms include a mining investment law cutting taxes to 20% from 45% and digital licensing, creating openings in exploration, processing, and related industrial services.

US trade access and tariff uncertainty

US policy volatility is disrupting export planning. Section 301 probes and shifting tariffs have weakened AGOA predictability; South African auto exports to the US fell nearly 75% in 2025, while new levies threaten margins for autos, agriculture and wine, pushing diversification.

Power capacity constraints and grid upgrades

Electricity demand is rising 8–10% annually, tightening reserve margins and raising rationing risk. Analysts warn outages could cut manufacturing output 3–5% and deter FDI. Policy focus is shifting to grid upgrades, LNG, renewables integration and HVDC transmission investment.

Critical minerals supply-chain pivot

Australia is deepening ‘trusted’ critical-minerals ties, including joining the G7 production alliance and building a strategic reserve (starting antimony, gallium). This accelerates downstream refining and contract opportunities, but raises policy, permitting, and infrastructure execution risk.

LNG scarcity and power risks

Asian spot LNG markets tightened after Middle East disruptions, pushing prices sharply higher and leaving some tenders unawarded. Vietnam, a growing LNG buyer for power and industry, faces higher input costs and potential supply constraints, reinforcing the need for hedging and diversified energy sourcing.

China-centric trade dependence and leverage

Sanctions have pushed Iran to route over 80% of exports—especially crude—to China, creating concentrated demand and political leverage. For international firms, this increases exposure to China-linked compliance and pricing dynamics, while limiting Iran’s access to technology, finance and investment needed for stable output.

Marode Schiene belastet Güterlogistik

Deutsche Bahn plant eine Sanierung über zehn Jahre, bis 2036 mehr als 40 Korridore; 2026 Investitionen über €23 Mrd. Vollsperrungen und 28.000 Baustellen erhöhen Umleitungsrisiken. Für Industrie bedeutet das längere Lead Times, höhere Frachtkosten und volatile Netzwerkzuverlässigkeit.

Acordo UE–Mercosul em vigor

A UE decidiu aplicar provisoriamente o acordo UE–Mercosul e o Senado brasileiro aprovou o texto, aguardando assinatura presidencial. O tratado tende a eliminar tarifas para 91% dos bens, alterando competitividade, regras de origem e estratégias de acesso ao mercado europeu.

Renewables investment acceleration

The AR7 auction secured 8.4 GW of offshore wind, a record UK/European procurement, supporting the 2030 low‑carbon power goal. Delivery hinges on planning and grid‑connection reform and financing conditions; supply‑chain opportunities rise, but execution delays remain material.

IMF-linked reforms and price hikes

Under the IMF-backed programme, authorities are accelerating subsidy rationalisation, including fuel increases up to ~30% and tighter energy-demand controls. These measures improve fiscal metrics but raise transport and input costs, affecting consumer demand, wage expectations, and margins across supply chains.

FDI screening may partially ease

Government is reviewing Press Note 3 (FDI from bordering countries) and considering a de minimis threshold for small-ticket approvals, while keeping the regime intact. This could accelerate venture funding and JVs, but leaves heightened national-security scrutiny and deal-timing uncertainty.

Government transition and policy continuity

Post-election coalition formation is underway, with parliament convening and a new cabinet expected by April and policy statement in May. The transition period can slow approvals and regulatory decisions, while new priorities may reshape incentives, infrastructure execution and sectoral support programs.

Stricter trade compliance exposure

Escalation with Iran raises sanctions-screening, end-use controls, and counterparty-risk requirements for firms trading through Israel or the region. Businesses should expect higher compliance costs, greater documentation demands from banks/insurers, and more frequent shipment holds for review.

Business governance consolidation, faster reforms

Government merged the National Competitiveness Center and Saudi Business Center into a single ‘Saudi Center for Competitiveness and Business’ to accelerate issue resolution and regulatory reform. Expect quicker rule updates, streamlined licensing, but also faster compliance cycles for multinationals.

Expanded Section 301 tariff probes

USTR launched broad Section 301 investigations into “structural excess capacity” across major partners and sectors (autos, metals, batteries, solar, semiconductors, ships), plus forced-labor enforcement across ~60 countries. Potential stacked tariffs raise sourcing risk and compliance burdens.

Automotive and manufacturing competitiveness squeeze

Deindustrialisation pressures are rising as imports from China/India replace local output. Locally made cars fell from 80% of domestic sales (2000) to ~33% recently; localisation dropped to 35% in 2025. Manufacturers consider plant-sharing, pauses, or exits amid costs/logistics.

External financing and Gulf support

Egypt’s recovery remains tied to external funding—IMF disbursements and Gulf capital—while financing conditions can tighten quickly during risk-off episodes. Record reserves around $52.7bn provide buffers, yet large import bills and debt refinancing remain sensitive.

Rare-earth supply diversification drive

Japan is negotiating with India to explore hard‑rock rare earth deposits (India cites 1.29m tons REO identified) to reduce China dependence for magnet materials. This may create new offtake, technology-transfer, and processing investments—plus transition frictions.

EV Incentives and Policy Execution Risk

A new EV bonus of up to €6,000 is budgeted at €3bn for up to 800,000 vehicles, but delayed application systems are undermining consumer confidence and dealer outlook. Expect demand timing distortions, inventory risks, and continued price competition in Germany’s EV market.

Sea-to-Air Supply Chain Bridging

Saudia Cargo, Mawani and ZATCA launched sea-to-air corridors from Jeddah Islamic Port, enabling cargo to move under a single customs declaration with pre-clearance and smart inspections. This creates premium contingency capacity for time-sensitive goods, but raises cost and capacity-planning considerations.

Red Sea Logistics Hub Acceleration

Saudi authorities are expanding western-coast capacity and procedures, launching “Logistics Corridors” with ZATCA to redirect GCC and eastern-port cargo to Jeddah and other Red Sea ports; Red Sea ports exceed 18.6m TEUs annual capacity. Expect faster transit, new routing options, and corridor competition.

Energy security pivots to imports

Indonesia plans to absorb oil shocks via larger subsidies and is discussing greater US energy purchases (reported US$15bn) plus LNG contracting (Masela talks narrowed to five global buyers). Volatile prices raise cost risk for industry and for energy-intensive manufacturers.

Tarifas dos EUA pressionam exportadores

Exportações brasileiras aos EUA caíram 20,3% em fevereiro, sétimo mês de queda após sobretaxa de 50% imposta em 2025; o governo estima 22% das exportações ainda atingidas. Empresas recalibram preços, rotas, estoque e diversificação de mercados.

Turbulences budgétaires et notation souveraine

Le déficit reste élevé et la dette augmente, tandis que Fitch maintient la note A+ mais pointe des contraintes politiques limitant l’assainissement. Risques de hausses d’impôts, coupes de dépenses et volatilité des taux, affectant financement, CAPEX et demande intérieure.

Industrial policy and reshoring incentives

CHIPS-style subsidies, ‘America First’ supply-chain security priorities and potential critical-minerals trade initiatives continue to pull manufacturing investment toward the U.S. and trusted partners. Firms should anticipate localization requirements, eligibility constraints, and intensified competition for incentives.

China trade recalibration pressures

Germany is pragmatically re‑engaging China amid stagnation and trade‑war risk. China was top partner in 2025; imports rose to €170.6bn while exports fell to €81.3bn, widening deficits. Firms face dependency management, market access friction and regulatory scrutiny.