Domestic demand fragility and policy swings

Weak property and local-government finance dynamics keep domestic demand uneven, encouraging policy stimulus and sector interventions. For foreign investors, this raises forecasting error, payment and counterparty risk, and the likelihood of sudden regulatory actions targeting pricing, procurement, or competition.

Election outcome and policy clarity

The February 2026 election and constitutional-rewrite mandate shape near-term policy continuity, regulatory predictability, and reform pace. Markets rallied on reduced instability risk, but coalition bargaining can delay budgets, incentives, and infrastructure decisions crucial for foreign investors and contractors.

Ports and logistics labor uncertainty

U.S. supply chains remain exposed to port and transport labor negotiations and anti-automation disputes, increasing disruption risk at key gateways. Importers may diversify ports, adjust routing, and carry higher safety stock, especially when tariff timing triggers demand spikes and front-loading behavior.

Baht strength and monetary easing

The Bank of Thailand signals accommodative policy and more active FX management amid baht appreciation and election-linked volatility. A potential cut toward 1.00% and tighter controls on gold-linked flows affect exporters’ margins, import costs, hedging needs and repatriation planning.

Tariff volatility as negotiation tool

The administration is using tariff threats—up to 100% on Canadian goods and shifting rates for key partners—as leverage in broader negotiations. This raises landed-cost uncertainty, complicates pricing and contracting, and incentivizes nearshoring, dual sourcing, and inventory buffers for import-dependent firms.

Tariff refunds and cashflow uncertainty

With IEEPA tariffs invalidated, thousands of importers may seek refunds potentially totaling $160–$175bn, but courts must define processes and timelines (often 12–18+ months). Companies face liquidity planning challenges, liquidation deadlines, and uneven outcomes between large and small firms.

Global trade remedies against overcapacity

Rising anti-dumping and safeguard actions targeting China-made steel and other industrial goods reflect persistent overcapacity and subsidization concerns. More tariffs, quotas, and investigations increase landed costs, disrupt procurement, and heighten retaliation risk across unrelated sectors, including commodities.

FX regime and liquidity risks

Despite stronger reserves, businesses still face exposure to FX volatility, repatriation timing, and episodic liquidity squeezes as reforms deepen. Pricing, hedging, and local sourcing strategies remain critical, especially for import-intensive sectors and foreign-funded projects.

US–Taiwan reciprocal trade deal

The new U.S.–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade locks a 15% U.S. tariff on Taiwanese goods while Taiwan cuts most U.S. import tariffs and tackles non‑tariff barriers. It reshapes sourcing, compliance, pricing, and investment decisions across agriculture, autos, pharma, and advanced manufacturing.

Trade frictions and border infrastructure

Political escalation is spilling into infrastructure and customs risk, highlighted by threats to block the Gordie Howe Detroit–Windsor bridge opening unless terms change. Any disruption at key crossings would materially affect just-in-time manufacturing, warehousing costs, and delivery reliability.

Carbon pricing and green finance ramp

Thailand is building carbon-market infrastructure: cabinet cleared carbon credits/allowances as TFEX derivatives references, while IEAT secured a US$100m World Bank-backed program targeting 2.33m tonnes CO2 cuts and premium credits. Exporters gain CBAM hedges, but MRV and reporting burdens rise.

China-border trade integration risks

Northern localities and China’s Guangxi are expanding cross-border trade, e-commerce and agri flows; Guangxi-Vietnam agri trade reached ~CNY18.23bn in 2025. Benefits include faster market access, but firms must manage geopolitical exposure, border policy shifts, and compliance with origin/traceability.

Escalating Taiwan Strait grey-zone risk

China’s sustained air and naval activity and blockade-style drills raise probabilities of disruption without formal conflict. Firms face higher marine insurance, rerouting and inventory buffers, plus heightened contingency planning for ports, aviation, and regional logistics hubs.

Reforma tributária em transição

A migração para IVA dual (CBS/IBS) cria riscos de implementação, cumulatividade temporária e disputas de créditos, especialmente em cadeias longas e operações interestaduais. Multinacionais devem reavaliar preços, contratos, sistemas fiscais e estruturas de importação/distribuição para evitar custos e autuações.

Dollar hedging costs surge

Foreign investors are increasing USD hedge ratios, amplifying dollar swings even without mass Treasury selling. Higher FX-hedging costs reshape portfolio allocation, pricing of long-term supply contracts, and can reduce inward investment appetite while raising working-capital volatility for importers.

Defense localization and offset requirements

Saudi Arabia is expanding defense industrialization, targeting over 50% localization of defense spending by 2030; localization reached 24.89% by end‑2024. New SAMI subsidiaries and industrial complexes increase requirements for local content, technology transfer, and Saudi supplier development across programs.

SOE reform momentum and policy execution

Business confidence has improved but remains fragile, with reform progress uneven across Eskom and Transnet. Slippage on rail legislation, ports corporatisation and electricity unbundling timelines creates execution risk for PPPs, project finance, and long-horizon capex decisions.

Secondary sanctions and “tariff sanctions”

The U.S. is expanding extraterritorial pressure via secondary sanctions and even tariff penalties tied to dealings with sanctioned states (notably Iran). Firms trading through third countries face higher legal exposure, payment friction, disrupted shipping, and forced counterparties screening.

Energy security via LNG contracting

With gas around 60% of Thailand’s power mix and domestic supply shrinking, PTT, Egat, and Gulf are locking in 15-year LNG contracts (e.g., 1 mtpa and 0.8 mtpa deals starting 2028). Greater price stability supports manufacturers, but contract costs and pass-through remain key.

Robo de carga y costos logísticos

El robo de carga se concentra en Centro (51%) y Bajío (31%), 82% del total en 2025; picos martes‑viernes. Afecta inventarios, seguros y tiempos de entrega, obligando a rediseñar rutas, escoltas, telemetría y estrategias de almacenes más cercanos al cliente.

Reciprocal tariff regime expansion

Executive-order “reciprocal” tariffs are being used as a standing leverage tool, illustrated by the U.S.–India framework moving to an 18% reciprocal rate and conditional removals. Firms face volatile landed costs, origin rules scrutiny, and partner-specific dealmaking risk.

Canada pivots trade diversification

Ottawa is explicitly pursuing deeper trade ties with India, ASEAN and MERCOSUR to reduce U.S. dependence, while managing frictions around China-linked deals. Exporters may see new market access and compliance needs, but also transition costs, partner-risk screening and logistics reorientation.

Investment security screening expands

CFIUS scrutiny and emerging outbound-investment controls increase deal uncertainty in sensitive sectors like semiconductors, AI and advanced manufacturing. Cross-border M&A may require longer timelines, mitigation agreements, or abandonment; investors need earlier national-security due diligence and structural protections.

Sanctions compliance and rerouting risks

Ongoing Russia-related sanctions and rising evidence of gray-market rerouting via third countries increase exposure for Japanese brands and distributors. Companies should tighten end-use checks, dealer controls, and trade-finance screening to avoid enforcement, reputational harm, and shipment seizures.

Defense buildup, industrial mobilisation

Japan’s rapid defense expansion toward 2% of GDP is driving procurement, re-shoring of sensitive manufacturing, and looser defense-export rules. This increases opportunities in aerospace, cyber, shipbuilding and munitions supply chains, but raises compliance, security vetting and capacity-allocation pressures.

Rupee volatility and policy trilemma

The RBI balances growth-supportive rates with capital flows and currency stability amid heavy government borrowing (gross ~₹17.2 lakh crore planned for FY27). A gradually weaker rupee may aid exporters but raises import costs and FX-hedging needs for firms with dollar inputs or debt.

IMF programme and macro conditionality

Late-February IMF review will determine release of a $1bn EFF tranche, shaping FX reserves, taxation, privatisation and monetary policy. Policy slippage risks renewed import controls, payment delays and currency volatility that directly affect trade finance and investor confidence.

Suez Canal security-driven volatility

Red Sea risks remain a first-order supply-chain variable. After a Gaza ceasefire, Suez revenues rose 24.5% and major carriers began returning with naval assistance. Any renewed attacks could again divert vessels around Africa, extending transit times and raising costs.

AI governance in retail finance

FCA’s call for input on AI’s long-term impact to 2030 signals reliance on outcome-based frameworks rather than new rules. Online investing firms must prove model governance, explainability and third‑party controls to deploy AI in advice, nudging and surveillance.

DHS shutdown and border frictions

Repeated funding standoffs risk partial DHS shutdowns, creating operational uncertainty for TSA, Coast Guard, and oversight functions even if ICE/CBP enforcement continues. Cross-border logistics and travel may face delays, staffing disruptions, and heightened scrutiny at ports of entry and airports.

Sanctions escalation, maritime compliance

UK and partners continue expanding Russia-related sanctions and are considering tougher maritime actions against “shadow fleet” tankers. UK measures target LNG shipping services and designated energy firms, raising due-diligence burdens for traders, insurers, shipping, and commodity supply chains.

Energy export squeeze and rerouting

Proposed EU maritime-services bans for Russian crude and tighter LNG tanker/icebreaker maintenance restrictions aim to cut export capacity and revenues (oil and gas revenues reportedly down about 24% in 2025). Buyers rely more on discounted, high-friction routes via India, China, and Türkiye.

Economic security ‘club’ trade blocs

US-led ‘invitation-only’ economic security agreements—starting with critical minerals—are becoming central to market access via subsidies, guaranteed purchases, and possible tariffs on non-members. Australia must balance participation benefits against retaliation risk from excluded major partners.

High-tech FDI and semiconductors

Vietnam is moving up the value chain, attracting electronics and semiconductor ecosystems. Bac Ninh hosts 1,140+ Korean projects with US$18.5bn registered capital; 2025 realised FDI reached ~US$27.62bn. Opportunity is strong, but skills shortages and supplier depth constrain localisation.

Treasury demand and credibility strain

Reports of Chinese regulators urging banks to curb US Treasury buying, alongside elevated issuance, steepen the yield curve and raise term premia. Higher US rates lift global funding costs, hit EM dollar borrowers, and reprice project finance and M&A hurdles.

Fiscal consolidation and debt trajectory

The IMF urges a clearer debt rule as Treasury projects gross debt near 77.9% of GDP. Prospective tightening to reach primary surpluses may constrain infrastructure spending, affect SOE support, and influence taxes and public procurement—key inputs for investor risk pricing.