China tech controls and licensing

U.S. policy on advanced semiconductors and AI exports to China is increasingly conditional and politically contested, with licensing, tariffs, and potential congressional tightening. Multinationals face uncertainty in product design, China revenue exposure, and allied supply-chain coordination requirements.

USMCA review and tariff risk

Bilateral Mexico–U.S. talks start March 16 ahead of the 2026 USMCA review, with Washington pushing tighter rules of origin, anti-transshipment measures and supply-chain security. Remaining tariffs (e.g., 50% metals; 17% tomatoes) raise planning uncertainty.

AI sovereignty push and datacentre scrutiny

Government is funding frontier AI research (£40m) and promoting “sovereign” AI infrastructure, but high-profile datacentre pledges face scrutiny over delivery timelines and site control. Investors should expect tighter due diligence, planning and grid-connection bottlenecks, plus evolving requirements for compute, resilience and data governance.

Energy security and clean-power reform

Power availability remains a binding constraint for factories, while Vietnam is rebooting direct clean-power purchase mechanisms and accelerating LNG and grid projects. Large energy users may gain better access to renewable supply, but should plan for price volatility, curtailment, and permitting risk.

Supply-chain reorientation to “friendly” hubs

Trade increasingly routes through China, Turkey, UAE and Central Asia via parallel imports and intermediary logistics. This diversifies access to inputs but increases compliance complexity, lead times, and exposure to sudden controls, seizures, or partner-bank de-risking.

Foreign investment screening intensifies

CFIUS scrutiny and sectoral industrial-policy priorities are raising execution risk for cross-border M&A, minority stakes, and greenfield projects in sensitive technologies and infrastructure. Longer timelines, mitigation agreements, and potential deal abandonments impact capital allocation and market-entry strategies.

Critical minerals securitization drive

The Pentagon and trade agencies are pushing domestic mining, processing and recycling for minerals like graphite, germanium, tungsten and yttrium, with potential $100m–$500m project funding and allied “preferential trade zone” discussions. This may alter sourcing, permitting, ESG scrutiny and price dynamics.

Energy policy and LNG trade shifts

US energy policy choices—LNG export approvals, pipeline constraints, and emissions rules—directly affect global gas balances and power costs. Volatile regulatory signals influence long-term offtake contracting, industrial siting decisions, and energy-intensive supply chains across allied markets.

Political transition and policy continuity

Election results have been certified, enabling parliament to convene and a new coalition to form by April. Near-term regulatory and budget priorities may shift under a Bhumjaithai-led cabinet, affecting investor confidence, public spending timelines and sector policy execution.

China iron ore pricing leverage

China’s state-backed buyer CMRG is pressing miners for better iron-ore terms in the US$132bn seaborne market, even banning some BHP brands. Treasury estimates a US$10/t price move shifts 2025-26 receipts by about A$500bn, amplifying macro risk.

Import surge narrows trade buffers

January trade surplus fell to $950m as imports rose 18.21% YoY, outpacing 3.39% export growth. Narrower external buffers increase sensitivity to commodity cycles, global risk-off moves, and fuel-price shocks—affecting hedging needs, working capital, and profit repatriation planning.

Sanctions enforcement and compliance burden

Canada continues tightening Russia-related sanctions, including measures targeting shadow-fleet shipping and lowering the Russian crude price cap. Multinationals face heightened screening of counterparties, vessels, and cargo documentation, plus higher legal and operational costs for trade finance, insurance, and logistics.

Semiconductor supply-chain security scrutiny

Congressional pressure is rising on US chipmakers’ links to China-tied suppliers (e.g., Intel testing tools with China exposure). Expect stricter vendor vetting, facility access controls, and contracting constraints—impacting equipment makers, fab operators, and foreign partners reliant on US semiconductor ecosystems.

Political consolidation and anti-corruption drive

National Assembly elections remain overwhelmingly party-dominated (~93% party candidates), while leadership signals intensified anti-corruption focus. This supports governance credibility but can slow approvals, heighten enforcement uncertainty and increase compliance demands for licensing, procurement and local partnerships.

China Exposure and Derisking

Germany’s trade with China rebounded to ~€251bn in 2025, but with a large deficit and rising policy risk. Firms face tighter scrutiny, rare-earth export curbs, and tougher EU trade defenses, reshaping sourcing, market access, and investment decisions.

Energiepreise und Stromsubventionen

Deutschlands hohe Stromkosten treiben Standort- und Lieferkettenrisiken. 2026 gilt ein CO2-Fixpreis von 65 €/t; ab 2028 droht EU-ETS-Volatilität (Schätzungen 40–400 €/t). Gleichzeitig werden Industriestrompreise mit >3 Mrd. €/Jahr subventioniert und neue 10–12 GW Gaskraftwerke diskutiert.

Transnet logistics bottlenecks and reform

Transnet’s rail/port constraints, high debt (~R144bn) and locomotive shortfalls keep export corridors volatile. While PPPs and corridor upgrades (e.g., coal/iron-ore) progress, congestion, vandalism and maintenance backlogs elevate shipping delays, costs, and inventory buffers.

Currency instability and import controls

High inflation and rial depreciation increase input-cost volatility and drive periodic import restrictions, multiple exchange rates, and ad hoc licensing. Multinationals face pricing challenges, payment delays, inventory buffering needs, and higher working-capital requirements for Iran-linked supply chains.

Inbound travel shifts and aviation capacity

Inbound tourism and passenger flows are changing with geopolitics: Narita reported foreign travelers down ~1% y/y in January while China routes fell ~30%. This affects retail, hospitality, aviation, and cargo belly-capacity planning, especially for Asia-focused consumer supply chains.

Nickel production controls and downstreaming

Indonesia is tightening state control over nickel, cutting mining approvals and cracking down on questionable licenses, while keeping raw ore export bans. With ~60% of global supply, policy shifts can swing prices, disrupt EV/stainless supply chains, and deter miners.

Procurement access tied to regional HQ

Saudi Arabia has relaxed its rule barring government contracts for firms without a regional headquarters, allowing exceptions via the Etimad platform to protect project delivery. This opens near-term tender access, but compliance, pricing thresholds, and localization expectations still shape bid competitiveness and operating models.

Risco fiscal e execução orçamentária

Contas federais iniciaram 2026 com superávit primário de R$86,9 bi, mas despesas crescem mais que receitas e o arcabouço permite exclusões que podem mascarar déficit (~R$23,3 bi). Orçamento de R$6,54 tri amplia emendas (R$61 bi), elevando incerteza regulatória e de projetos.

Sanctions compliance and trade diplomacy

US tariff and sanctions signalling around Russian oil purchases creates material uncertainty for exporters and investors. India secured temporary relief via an interim trade framework and OFAC licence, but legal clarity on sanctioned counterparties remains murky, elevating banking, insurance, and contracting risk.

Semiconductor export controls tightening

Taiwan’s chip sector faces intensifying geopolitics: proposed legislative oversight of advanced chip-technology exports and expanding US global AI-chip licensing could constrain shipments, complicate end-user verification, and reshape fab location decisions—affecting capacity allocation, lead times, and customer qualification processes.

EU “Made in EU” access

EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act would treat Turkish goods/components as “Made in EU” via the Customs Union, supporting autos, steel, cement and net‑zero supply chains. Benefits include eligibility for subsidies/auctions, but reciprocity limits direct tender access and may raise compliance obligations.

Tightening China tech decoupling

U.S.-China semiconductor controls remain fluid: Nvidia paused China-bound H200 production amid anticipated new curbs, while licensing and tariffs shift. Companies face disrupted China revenue, supply allocation changes at TSMC, and higher compliance risk for dual-use technologies.

Energy price pass-through inflation

Oil and LNG price spikes quickly feed Korea’s power and industrial costs; LNG is ~28% of electricity generation. Higher JKM and crude-indexed contracts can lift wholesale power prices and strain Kepco/Kogas finances, increasing probability of tariff hikes and cost-push inflation.

Market-opening, agri SPS politics

The US-Taiwan deal envisages broad tariff cuts on US goods and reduced non-tariff barriers, while Taiwan protects sensitive agriculture (e.g., 27 items kept tax-free). Importers/exporters should anticipate evolving SPS rules, labeling, and sector-specific compliance burdens in food and retail.

Maritime and logistics rerouting shocks

Regional and Middle East security events have prompted Taiwanese carriers to suspend some routes and raise operational caution, increasing lead times and freight costs. Exporters/importers should plan alternative lanes, diversify forwarders, and renegotiate Incoterms and force‑majeure clauses.

US Tariff Volatility for Textiles

US tariff shifts and parity disputes with India/Bangladesh create order uncertainty for Pakistan’s largest export market. With textiles dominant in exports, small tariff differentials can redirect sourcing. Firms should diversify markets and build flexibility into contracts and inventory planning.

China–EU EV trade frictions

European scrutiny of Chinese EVs and subsidies—alongside broader EU instruments like the Foreign Subsidies Regulation—raises tariff and compliance exposure for automakers, battery makers, and downstream distributors. Firms should expect localization pressure, documentation burdens, and potential retaliatory measures affecting market access.

Power supply constraints for AI

Rising electricity demand from semiconductors and AI data centers could add about 5GW by 2030—roughly enough for 3.75 million homes—tightening reserve margins. This raises operational risk for fabs, escalates power costs, and may influence siting of data centers and packaging capacity.

Sectoral national-security tariffs widen

Section 232 tariffs on steel/aluminum/autos remain, with additional probes floated for semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and other strategic sectors. Higher, product-specific duties and expanding ‘derivative’ coverage complicate origin and content calculations, increasing compliance costs and supply-chain redesign pressure.

Critical minerals supply-chain pivot

Australia is deepening ‘trusted’ critical-minerals ties, including joining the G7 production alliance and building a strategic reserve (starting antimony, gallium). This accelerates downstream refining and contract opportunities, but raises policy, permitting, and infrastructure execution risk.

Industrial degradation and import substitution gaps

Import substitution often remains “formal”: final assembly localizes, but critical components (e.g., CNC systems, sensors) stay imported, with quality and productivity falling. Firms face higher costs and limited “friendly” supply, reducing reliability for industrial buyers and increasing warranty/continuity risks.

Baht volatility and hedging pressure

The baht is experiencing high volatility driven by USD moves, gold-price swings, capital flows, and domestic politics. Banks warn SMEs hedging only ~50% of FX liabilities may be insufficient amid 7–8% volatility; BOT intervention nears 1.8–1.9% of GDP, nearing scrutiny thresholds.