Energy security LNG chokepoints

Taiwan’s power mix is ~50% gas; about one-third of its gas and 60% of oil transit the Strait of Hormuz. Gas stockpiles are ~11 days (planned 14 by 2027). Disruptions would threaten semiconductor uptime and raise costs via coal fallback.

Energy export diversification to Asia

Canadian firms are expanding west-coast energy export capacity, with LPG exports to Asia already significant and terminal expansions planned through 2026. Diversifying beyond the U.S. supports price realization and resilience, but requires port, rail, and regulatory reliability plus long-term offtake contracts.

Domestic unrest and instability

Economic stress has fueled widespread protests and heavy crackdowns, increasing operational disruption risks. Businesses face strikes, transport interruptions, internet restrictions, and security concerns. Political uncertainty also increases regulatory unpredictability, payment delays, and expropriation or forced-localization pressures.

Selic alta e crédito restrito

Com Selic em torno de 15% a.a., o custo financeiro pressiona consumo e investimento, reduz fôlego de empresas e encarece hedge cambial. A expectativa de cortes depende de inflação e credibilidade fiscal, afetando decisões de capex, estoques e financiamento de comércio exterior.

Black Sea export corridor volatility

Ukraine’s maritime corridor via Odesa–Chornomorsk–Pivdennyi stays open but under intensified attacks on ports and shipping. Volumes swing sharply and insurance premiums remain elevated, complicating contract fulfillment for grain, metals, and containerized cargo and increasing lead-time uncertainty.

Infra logística do Arco Norte

Exportações agrícolas migram para corredores do Arco Norte: 37,2% da soja e 41,3% do milho (jan–out 2025), totalizando 49,7 Mt via portos do Norte. O crescimento eleva demanda por cabotagem e hidrovias, mas seca, custos de combustível e gargalos portuários afetam lead time e fretes.

US entity designation compliance risk

US defense‑related listing actions (e.g., brief Pentagon 1260H additions of Alibaba/Baidu/BYD) signal reputational and contracting risk even without immediate sanctions. Firms should enhance counterparty screening, government‑customer segregation, and contingency plans for sudden designation reversals.

Canada trade diversification pivot

Ottawa is actively reducing reliance on the US via new commercial openings with Asia, including China-linked market access changes and outreach to Korea. Diversification improves optionality for exporters, but heightens geopolitical scrutiny, reputational risk, and the chance of US retaliation affecting Canada-based multinationals.

Foreign-backed infrastructure dealmaking

Mota-Engil is in advanced talks to assume Bahia’s Fiol rail, Porto Sul port, and Caetité mine in a ~R$15bn package, reportedly financed via China-linked capital. This signals renewed concession momentum, but adds geopolitically sensitive financing, governance, and execution considerations.

Cybersecurity and retaliation risk

China’s restrictions on foreign cybersecurity vendors and the chilling effect on attribution highlight regulatory and political exposure. Firms should anticipate procurement bans, inspections, data-access limits, and heightened espionage risk, requiring stronger segmentation, incident response and China-specific controls.

Power grid and CFE investment gap

Electricity availability and interconnection delays increasingly constrain industrial expansions. Reports of reduced CFE investment and grid stress elevate outage and curtailment risk, pushing firms toward onsite generation, energy-efficiency capex, and more complex PPAs and permitting.

Sanctions, geopolitics and compliance risk

Middle East escalation is driving route changes around the Cape; South African ports may see diversion opportunities but weather and capacity constraints persist. Separately, perceived ties to sanctioned states elevate secondary‑sanctions and banking de‑risking concerns for cross‑border transactions.

Sanctions enforcement and shadow fleets

U.S. sanctions remain a dominant constraint on trade finance, shipping, and energy logistics, with growing focus on evasion networks and “shadow fleet” facilitation. Businesses face higher KYC/AML expectations, vessel-screening costs, and secondary-sanctions exposure across intermediaries and insurers.

Shadow fleet oil sanctions squeeze

U.S. Treasury has expanded designations against Iran’s “shadow fleet” and intermediaries moving petroleum and petrochemicals, increasing secondary-sanctions exposure for shippers, traders, banks and insurers. Compliance burdens rise while Iran likely doubles down on transshipment, spoofing, and opaque ownership.

Tightening liquidity and credit

The CBRT suspended one‑week repo auctions and introduced lira‑settled FX forward sales to manage market stress, signaling a higher-for-longer stance. Tighter liquidity transmits to higher working-capital costs, slower domestic demand, and more selective bank lending for corporates and projects.

Tourism and visa liberalization

Expanded 60-day visa exemptions for 93 countries, new Destination Thailand Visa options, and broader e-visa/digital arrival processes aim to boost arrivals and service-sector revenues. Benefits include demand for hospitality and retail, but authorities are tightening misuse controls that may affect hiring and operations.

Yaptırım uyumu: İran bağlantıları

ABD, İran’ın ‘gölge filo’ petrol taşımaları ve silah tedarik ağlarıyla bağlantılı Türkiye’deki şirket ve şahıslara yeni yaptırımlar uyguladı. Enerji, lojistik, kimya ve finans işlemlerinde karşı taraf riski yükseliyor; bankacılık uyumu, sigorta ve sevkiyat rotaları maliyet artışı yaratabilir.

Digital taxation constrained but VAT continues

Indonesia pledges not to impose discriminatory Digital Services Taxes on US platforms, potentially limiting future revenue tools and platform regulation leverage. However, non‑discriminatory VAT on e‑services (PPN PMSE) continues, shaping pricing, compliance, and market entry.

Shipbuilding and LNG carrier upswing

Geopolitical energy reconfiguration is boosting demand for LNG carriers, FLNG and related offshore projects, benefiting Korean yards. However, China is underbidding by ~10% on LNG carriers and gaining early orders, pressuring margins and delivery-slot competition through 2029.

De minimis and import enforcement

Washington is reshaping import enforcement, including curbs or suspension of duty‑free de minimis treatment and tighter screening for forced‑labor and evasion. Cross‑border e‑commerce and consumer goods supply chains should expect longer clearance times, higher landed costs, and expanded documentation demands.

Investment facilitation credibility gap

Pakistan’s SIFC is viewed as a coordination forum without statutory power to bind provinces, regulators or courts, limiting conversion of interest into FDI. Investors face fragmented approvals and weak aftercare, increasing execution risk for greenfield projects, SEZ plans and PPP pipelines.

Digital data sovereignty policy clash

A State Department cable directs diplomats to oppose foreign data-localization and cross-border transfer restrictions, citing AI and cloud impacts. This sets up sharper transatlantic and emerging-market regulatory disputes, affecting where multinationals host data, structure cloud contracts, and manage privacy-transfer compliance.

Long-term LNG contracting, energy security

Jera signed a 27-year deal with QatarEnergy for 3 mtpa LNG from 2028; Japan imported 66.15m tons in 2023. More long-term contracting supports power reliability for data centers and chip fabs but locks in fossil exposure and price-index risks.

China export curbs on Japan

Beijing sanctioned 40 Japanese entities, restricting exports of dual-use goods to 20 and putting 20 more on a watch list. Escalation over security tensions raises supply-chain disruption risk for aerospace, electronics and automotive, plus countermeasure uncertainty.

Transition and decarbonisation investment needs

Grid expansion plans imply roughly R400bn over 10 years and ~14,400km new lines to connect renewables, amid coal plant retirements around 2029–2030. Financing structure and JETP-linked funding conditions will shape ESG exposure, carbon costs, and industrial siting decisions.

Rising political instability risk premium

Government reliance on decrees and recurring no-confidence motions, alongside a credible National Rally path to power, elevates policy reversal risk. Businesses face higher regulatory uncertainty across energy, migration, and industrial policy, complicating stakeholder management, permitting, and long-term contracts.

China tech controls tightening

US export controls on advanced semiconductors and AI systems continue to tighten, with enforcement scrutiny over alleged chip diversion to China. Multinationals must redesign product roadmaps, licensing, and data-center sourcing while managing retaliation risk and compliance exposure.

Tariff whiplash and uncertainty

A Supreme Court ruling invalidated broad IEEPA-based tariffs, but the administration quickly pivoted to a temporary 10–15% global surcharge under Section 122 (150-day limit). Firms face pricing volatility, contract renegotiations, and elevated country-allocation risk.

Energy exports and regional dependency

Eastern Mediterranean gas production and exports underpin power supply and industrial costs; Israel-to-Egypt flows are reported at full pipeline capacity. Yet infrastructure remains exposed to regional security shocks, and counterparties’ payment/contract renegotiation risks can spill over into supply.

Sanctions enforcement and maritime risk

U.S. sanctions and enforcement pressure on Russia, Iran, and evasion networks increases compliance burdens across shipping, insurance, commodities, and finance. Firms must strengthen screening for “dark fleet” activity, origin documentation, and contractual protections against secondary-risk exposure.

Political and security tightening post-election

Post-election tensions around opposition figures and security deployments elevate operational risk: protest disruption, permit uncertainty, and heightened scrutiny of NGOs/media. For investors, governance risk can affect licensing timetables, security costs, and reputational exposure in sensitive sectors.

Resource-license crackdown and land seizures

Authorities report seizures of over 4 million hectares of mines/plantations and US$1.7bn in fines amid anti-illegal mining actions, with more potential seizures. While improving governance, the campaign can disrupt operations, alter ownership, and increase due-diligence and counterpart risk for investors.

Inflation, FX and financing conditions

Inflation accelerated to about 3.35% y/y in February, with oil-price shocks raising downside risks for the dong and interest rates. Vietnam’s central bank signals flexible management. Importers and leveraged investors should tighten FX hedging, working-capital planning, and pricing clauses.

Supply-chain reorientation away China

Tariffs and security policy are accelerating sourcing shifts: China’s share of U.S. non‑oil imports has reportedly fallen below 10% in 2025 as Mexico and Vietnam gain. Companies face dual-sourcing, rules-of-origin complexity, and higher transition costs but improved geopolitical resilience.

Domestic demand management measures

Authorities are balancing disinflation with measures that can restrain consumption, including tighter financial conditions and discussions around household credit constraints. For multinationals, this raises volatility in retail volumes, inventory planning, and pricing power in consumer-facing sectors.

EU-Nachhaltigkeitsregeln und Lieferkettenpflichten

Die Umsetzung/Überarbeitung von EU-CSDDD/„Omnibus“-Paketen und die Verzahnung mit deutschen Sorgfaltspflichten verschieben Compliance-Anforderungen. Fokus auf Tier‑1‑Lieferanten, Haftungsfragen und Berichtspflichten verändern Vertragsgestaltung, Auditprogramme und Lieferantenauswahl; Reputations- und Bußgeldrisiken bleiben.