Energy security and transition investment

Rapid growth targets are forcing revisions to energy planning and grid investments. New frameworks—such as a two-part tariff for battery energy storage (effective Jan 2026)—aim to attract private capital, reduce curtailment, and improve reliability, affecting industrial uptime and PPA economics.

Platform takedowns for illegal promotions

FCA’s High Court action against HTX seeks UK blocking via Apple/Google app stores and social platforms, signalling tougher cross-border enforcement of financial promotions and raising distribution and marketing risk for offshore investing and crypto apps.

Coal output controls, export risk

Jakarta is signaling coal production limits for 2026 (proposal: 600m tons vs 790m in 2025), though top miners may be exempt. Annual RKAB approvals create uncertainty, thinning spot liquidity and complicating long-term export contracts for Asia’s import-dependent buyers.

Economic-security industrial policy intensifies

Taiwan is deepening “economic security” cooperation with partners, prioritizing trusted supply chains in AI, chips, drones, and critical inputs. This favors vetted vendors and data-governance discipline, but increases screening, documentation, and resilience requirements for cross-border projects and M&A.

Semiconductor-led growth and policy concentration

Exports remain chip-driven, deepening a “K-shaped” economy where semiconductors outperform domestic-demand sectors. For investors and suppliers, this concentrates opportunity and risk in advanced-node ecosystems, while prompting closer alignment with allied export-control and supply-chain security priorities.

Tariff volatility and litigation

Aggressive, frequently revised tariffs—often justified under emergency authorities—are raising input costs and retail prices while chilling capex. Ongoing court challenges, including a pending Supreme Court ruling, create material uncertainty for exporters, importers, and contract pricing through 2026.

Trade controls and anti-circumvention squeeze

Sanctions are broadening beyond energy to metals, chemicals, critical minerals (over €570m cited), plus export bans on dual-use goods and services. New anti-circumvention tools may restrict exports to high‑risk transshipment hubs, tightening supply of machinery, radios, and industrial inputs to Russia-linked supply chains.

Rupee volatility and policy trilemma

The RBI balances growth-supportive rates with capital flows and currency stability amid heavy government borrowing (gross ~₹17.2 lakh crore planned for FY27). A gradually weaker rupee may aid exporters but raises import costs and FX-hedging needs for firms with dollar inputs or debt.

Policy disruption from shutdown risks

Repeated funding standoffs—recent partial shutdowns and DHS funding cliffs—delay economic data releases, create operational uncertainty for agencies affecting travel, disaster response, and cybersecurity, and inject timing risk into regulated processes and government-dependent contracts for international firms.

Currency strength amid weak growth

The rand has rallied roughly 13% year-on-year despite sub-50 manufacturing PMI readings, reflecting global liquidity and carry dynamics more than domestic fundamentals. For multinationals, volatility risk remains: earnings translation, import costs and hedging needs can shift quickly on risk-off shocks.

Iran confrontation escalation overhang

Fragile US–Iran diplomacy and Israel’s demands on missiles/proxies keep conflict risk elevated. Any renewed strikes could trigger missile, cyber, or maritime retaliation affecting regional energy flows, aviation routes, investor risk appetite, and compliance screening for counterparties.

Logistics corridors and inland waterways

Budget 2026 prioritizes freight connectivity: new Dedicated Freight Corridor (Dankuni–Surat), 20 National Waterways, coastal cargo promotion, and ship-repair ecosystems. Goal is lower logistics friction and rerouting resilience after Red Sea disruptions, improving lead times and inventory strategy.

MSCI downgrade and market access

MSCI flagged Indonesia’s equity market “investability” risks, freezing index changes and threatening a downgrade. Authorities raised minimum free float to 15% and discussed disclosure reforms. Persistent volatility can raise funding costs, complicate exits, and deter portfolio and FDI inflows.

Oil exports via shadow fleet

Iran sustains crude exports through opaque “dark fleet” logistics, ship-to-ship transfers, and transponder manipulation, with China absorbing most volumes. Intensifying interdictions and seizures increase freight, insurance, and counterparty risk, threatening sudden disruption for traders, refiners, and shippers.

Energy grid attacks and rationing

Sustained Russian strikes on 750kV/330kV substations and plants are “islanding” the grid, driving nationwide outages and forcing nuclear units to reduce output. Power deficits disrupt factories, ports, and rail operations, raise operating costs, and delay investment timelines.

BEG subsidies and budget risk

Federal BEG/BAFA support is critical to Wärmewende economics, but annual budget ceilings and frequent program adjustments create stop‑start ordering behavior. International suppliers face higher payment-cycle uncertainty, while investors must model demand cliffs, compliance documentation, and administrative throughput constraints.

5G/6G and private networks

Nokia-led investment in 5G Advanced, edge automation and forthcoming 6G trials underpins private wireless deployments for factories, ports and training sites. International operators and vendors can partner, but must plan for interoperability, cybersecurity certification and long R&D-to-revenue cycles.

China-De-Risking und Rohstoffabhängigkeiten

Die EU bleibt durch chinesische Exportkontrollen bei Seltenen Erden verwundbar (ca. 60% Förderung, 90% Verarbeitung). Deutschlands Unternehmen müssen Beschaffung diversifizieren, Lager aufbauen und Substitution beschleunigen. Gleichzeitig wächst politischer Druck, Handelsrisiken mit Investitionszugang und Marktchancen auszubalancieren.

Trade–Security Linkage Uncertainty

Tariff disputes are delaying broader U.S.–Korea security cooperation discussions, including nuclear-powered submarines and expanded nuclear fuel-cycle consultations. Linkage risk increases the chance that commercial negotiations spill into defense and energy projects, complicating long-horizon investment decisions.

Critical minerals leverage and reshoring

U.S. policy increasingly links trade and security to critical minerals and domestic capacity. Officials explicitly frame rare earths and magnets as weaponized supply points, reinforcing incentives for reshoring and allied sourcing, and pressuring firms to redesign inputs and secure non-China supply alternatives.

Talent constraints and migration policy

Hiring plans across strategic industries and demographic pressures are tightening labour markets, increasing competition for engineers, welders, and software/AI profiles. Evolving immigration tools (e.g., Talent Passport thresholds and rules) influence workforce planning, relocation costs, and project delivery risk.

AB FTA’larının asimetrik etkisi

AB’nin üçüncü ülkelerle yaptığı STA’lar, Türkiye’nin Gümrük Birliği nedeniyle tarifeleri uyarlamasına rağmen karşı pazara aynı ayrıcalıkla erişememesi sorununu büyütüyor. Örneğin AB‑Hindistan STA’sı Türkiye lehine işlemiyor; rekabet baskısı ve pazar payı riski yaratıyor.

UK–EU trade frictions persist

Post-Brexit trade remains exposed to SPS checks, rules-of-origin compliance and periodic regulatory updates under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Firms face continuing customs/admin costs, inventory buffers, and re-routing decisions, especially in food, chemicals, automotive and retail.

Export earnings and currency pressure

Port damage is delaying exports of grain and ore, with central bank warnings of lower export revenues and added import needs for fuel and energy equipment. This raises hryvnia volatility and payment risks, impacting pricing, working capital, and hedging strategies for importers/exporters.

Tariffs and China tech controls

Washington is tightening trade defenses via higher tariffs and expanding export controls, especially around semiconductors and China-linked supply chains. Companies should expect cost volatility, licensing risk, and compliance burdens, plus accelerated “friend-shoring” and domestic-content requirements for critical technologies.

Sanctions expansion and secondary exposure

US is intensifying sanctions, particularly on Iran’s oil and petrochemical networks, targeting 15 entities and 14 vessels. Heightened enforcement and secondary-sanctions risk raise due-diligence burdens for shipping, insurers, banks, traders, and commodity buyers with complex counterparties.

Strategic port and infrastructure security

Debate over the China-leased Darwin Port underscores rising security-driven intervention risk in infrastructure. Logistics operators and investors should model contract renegotiation/compensation scenarios, enhanced screening, and potential operational constraints near defence facilities and northern bases.

Long-term LNG security push

Utilities are locking in fuel amid rising power demand from data centers and AI. QatarEnergy signed a 27‑year deal to supply JERA about 3 mtpa from 2028; Mitsui is nearing an equity stake in North Field South (16 mtpa, ~$17.5bn). Destination clauses affect flexibility.

Expanded Sanctions and Secondary Measures

Congress and the administration are widening sanctions tools, including efforts to target Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ and a proposed 25% tariff penalty on countries trading with Iran. This raises counterparty, shipping, and insurance risk and increases compliance costs across global trade corridors.

Foreign investment scrutiny and CFIUS

Elevated national-security screening of foreign acquisitions and sensitive real-estate/technology deals increases transaction timelines and remedies risk. Cross-border investors should expect greater diligence, mitigation agreements, and sectoral red lines in semiconductors, data, defense-adjacent manufacturing, and critical infrastructure.

Trade surplus masks concentration risk

Indonesia posted a US$41.05bn 2025 trade surplus (up from US$31.33bn in 2024), with December exports up 11.64% to US$26.35bn led by palm oil and nickel. Heavy commodity dependence heightens exposure to policy shifts and price cycles.

FX reserves and rupee stability

External buffers improved, with liquid reserves around $21.3bn and SBP reserves near $16.1bn after IMF inflows. Nevertheless, debt repayments and current-account pressures can quickly tighten import financing, raise hedging costs, and disrupt supplier payments and inventory planning.

Geoeconomic diversification toward Gulf

Berlin is accelerating diversification of energy and strategic inputs, courting Qatar/Saudi/UAE for LNG and green ammonia. LNG was ~10% of German gas imports in 2025, ~96% from the US, raising concentration risk. New corridors affect contracting and infrastructure plans.

Semiconductor Tariffs and Industrial Policy

The US is combining higher chip tariffs with conditional exemptions tied to domestic capacity commitments, using firms like TSMC as leverage. A 25% tariff on certain advanced chips raises costs short‑term but accelerates fab investment decisions and reshapes electronics sourcing strategies.

Expanding sanctions and enforcement

EU’s proposed 20th package broadens restrictions on energy, banks, goods and services, adds 43 shadow-fleet vessels (≈640 total), and targets third‑country facilitators. Heightened secondary‑sanctions exposure raises compliance costs and transaction refusal risk for global firms.

Governance, enforcement, and asset risk

Heightened enforcement actions—permit revocations, land seizures, and talk of asset confiscation powers—are raising perceived rule-of-law risk, especially in resources. High-profile mine ownership uncertainty amplifies legal and political risk premiums, affecting M&A, project finance, and long-term operating stability.