Mission Grey Daily Brief - January 30, 2025
Summary of the Global Situation for Businesses and Investors
The world is witnessing a new era of Trump, with the second administration of President Donald Trump beginning in the United States on January 20, 2025. Trump's campaign slogan, "Make America Great Again (MAGA)," signifies a focus on revitalizing the domestic economy and maximizing American economic interests by ceasing to act as "the world's policeman" and reconstructing "American hegemony." This has led to a shift in global circumstances, with China and Russia viewed as critical issues and potential threats. Trump's unpredictable negotiation-focused approach has raised questions about international society's reaction and China's engagement with it.
Trump's Second Term and its Global Implications
The Trump administration has designated China as the greatest threat, citing Beijing's long-term and strategic pursuit of global hegemony by 2049. Xi Jinping's "100-year plan" aims for "The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation", surpassing other countries economically and militarily. China's Belt and Road Initiative is expanding in Asia, Africa, and South America, constructing an independent economic system for military superiority. China's domestic economy shows signs of slowing down, but its focus on innovation suggests continued near-term expansion.
Trump's negotiation-focused approach is highly unpredictable, making it difficult to forecast international society's reaction and China's engagement with it. Some countries may strengthen ties with the U.S. based on economic interests, while others may experience cooling relationships. Withdrawal from multilateralism and divergence from internationally agreed "rule-based governance" are anticipated, particularly on issues like Palestine and climate change.
Rising Tensions in the Middle East and Asia
The West's victory in the Israel-Iran conflict, centred on Gaza, has demonstrated the U.S. and its allies' ability to prevail while managing multiple conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas War. This capability to mobilise and deploy vast political, economic, military, and intelligence assets has prompted a major attitudinal shift among key Middle Eastern powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. New agreements for Western firms in Iraq indicate a potential shift in regional dynamics.
Trump's Aggressive Stance on Immigration and its Impact on Latin America
Trump's standoff with Colombia over migrant deportations has sent ripples through Latin America, with Colombia ultimately conceding to U.S. demands. This aggressive posture and willingness to weaponize immigration and tariffs threaten regional economic balance and erode trust in U.S.-Latin American relations. Left-leaning governments advocating for policies misaligned with Washington's priorities may face heightened scrutiny and pressure. Smaller economies reliant on U.S. trade and investment are at high risk, and some countries may be pushed to strengthen ties with U.S. competitors like China and Russia.
Red Sea Shipping Route Disruptions
An explosion on a Hong Kong-flagged container ship in the Red Sea has forced the crew to abandon the vessel, sparking a major fire. The Red Sea is a crucial route for energy shipments and cargo between Asia and Europe, with $1 trillion worth of trade passing through annually. Houthi attacks have halved the number of ships using the route, and shippers are avoiding it due to risks, despite Houthi pledges to limit assaults. This disruption has significant implications for global trade and supply chains.
Further Reading:
Does A Rush Of New Agreements Mean The West Is Regaining Its Influence In Iraq - OilPrice.com
Explosion forces crew to abandon Hong Kong-flagged container ship in the Red Sea - The Independent
How a trade war and U.S. tariffs could hit Canada’s housing market - Global News Toronto
The U.S.-China Struggle and Japan's Strategic Direction - 笹川平和財団
What Hegseth thinks of Russia and China as he takes the Pentagon reins - Axios
Themes around the World:
Санкции и вторичные риски
20-й пакет ЕС расширяет санкции: полный запрет морских услуг для российской нефти, +43 судна «теневого флота» (640), ограничения на банки и криптоплатформы, новые импорт/экспорт‑запреты. Растут риски вторичных санкций и комплаенса для глобальных цепочек поставок.
BRICS payments push sanctions exposure
Brazil’s joint statement with Russia criticising unilateral sanctions and promoting local-currency settlement comes as bilateral trade reached US$10.9bn in 2025. Firms must strengthen sanctions screening, banking counterparties and shipping/insurance checks to avoid secondary-sanctions and compliance disruptions.
Border, visa and immigration digitisation
Home Affairs is expanding Electronic Travel Authorisation and pursuing a digital immigration overhaul using biometrics and AI to cut fraud and delays. If implemented well, it eases executive mobility and tourism; if not, it can create compliance bottlenecks and privacy litigation risk.
US–Indonesia reciprocal tariff deal
Jakarta and Washington say negotiations on a reciprocal tariff agreement are complete and await presidential signing. Reports indicate US duties on Indonesian exports fall from 32% to 19%, while Indonesia removes tariffs on most US goods and may accept clauses affecting digital trade and sanctions alignment.
Fraud warnings pressure onboarding controls
Recurring FCA warnings on unauthorised online trading sites highlight persistent retail fraud. Regulated platforms face rising expectations on KYC, scam detection, customer communications and complaints handling, while banks and PSPs may tighten de-risking of higher-risk flows.
Critical minerals supply-chain buildout
Government funding, tax incentives and US partnership are accelerating Australian mining-to-processing capacity (e.g., strategic reserve, new prospectus projects, antimony output). This reshapes EV, semiconductor and defence inputs, and raises permitting, ESG and offtake-competition dynamics.
Banking hidden risks and real-estate spillovers
Banks’ loan guarantees rose 19% to VND 52 trillion in the first nine months, outpacing equity growth and increasing off-balance-sheet exposure (e.g., SBLCs). Thin capital buffers heighten systemic risk; credit tightening could hit construction, suppliers and consumer demand.
Post‑Brexit border digitisation setbacks
The government has halted/delayed the Single Trade Window after roughly £110m spent, keeping duplicative customs processes in place. With import declarations estimated to cost up to £4bn annually, firms face higher compliance costs, slower clearance, and planning uncertainty.
High-tech FDI and semiconductors
FDI remains resilient and shifts toward higher-value electronics and semiconductors, with 2025 registered FDI at US$38.42bn and realized US$27.62bn; early-2026 approvals exceed US$1bn in key northern provinces. This supports supply-chain diversification but increases competition for talent and sites.
Nuclear talks, snapback uncertainty
Iran–US nuclear diplomacy restarted via Oman/Türkiye but remains fragile, with disputes over uranium enrichment, missiles and scope. Missing highly enriched uranium and IAEA scrutiny sustain “snapback”/renewed UN measures risk, complicating long-term investment and trade planning.
Energy transition: nuclear plus renewables
Seoul plans two new nuclear reactors by 2038 alongside renewables to cut coal/LNG reliance, responding to strong public support. This reshapes power-price trajectories and grid investment needs, influencing energy-intensive manufacturing costs and long-term decarbonization compliance.
Treasury demand and credibility strain
Reports of Chinese regulators urging banks to curb US Treasury buying, alongside elevated issuance, steepen the yield curve and raise term premia. Higher US rates lift global funding costs, hit EM dollar borrowers, and reprice project finance and M&A hurdles.
Geoeconomic diversification toward Gulf
Berlin is accelerating diversification of energy and strategic inputs, courting Qatar/Saudi/UAE for LNG and green ammonia. LNG was ~10% of German gas imports in 2025, ~96% from the US, raising concentration risk. New corridors affect contracting and infrastructure plans.
War-driven fiscal and labor strain
Bank of Israel estimates Gaza-war economic cost at ~352bn shekels (~$113bn), with defense outlays and reserve mobilization disrupting labor availability. Higher deficits and taxes risk tighter procurement, slower project timelines, and elevated country risk premiums for investors.
Secondary tariffs and sanctions extraterritoriality
Washington is expanding secondary measures, including tariffs on countries trading with Iran and pressure on partners over Russia-linked commerce. This raises third-country compliance burdens, increases tracing requirements across multi-tier supply chains, and elevates retaliation and WTO-dispute risks for multinationals.
CFIUS and investment screening expansion
Greater scrutiny of inbound acquisitions and sensitive data/technology deals, plus evolving outbound investment screening, increases deal uncertainty for foreign investors. Transactions may require mitigation, governance controls, or divestitures, affecting timelines and valuations in semiconductors, AI, telecom, and defense-adjacent sectors.
Tariff volatility as negotiation tool
The administration is using tariff threats—up to 100% on Canadian goods and shifting rates for key partners—as leverage in broader negotiations. This raises landed-cost uncertainty, complicates pricing and contracting, and incentivizes nearshoring, dual sourcing, and inventory buffers for import-dependent firms.
Semiconductor tariffs and controls
A tightening blend of Section 232 chip tariffs, case-by-case export licensing, and enforcement actions (e.g., a $252m Applied Materials settlement) is reshaping cross-border tech trade, raising compliance costs, and accelerating supply-chain diversification away from China.
Energy grid attacks, rationing risk
Sustained missile and drone strikes are damaging transmission lines, substations and thermal plants, triggering nationwide outages and forcing nuclear units to reduce load. Expect operational downtime, higher generator/backup costs, constrained production schedules, and rising insurance/security requirements.
China tech listings and blacklists
The Pentagon’s 1260H “PLA-linked” list changes—briefly adding firms like Alibaba, BYD and Baidu—highlight fast-moving US-China tech restrictions. Even provisional designations can trigger investor pullback, procurement exclusions, and pre-sanctions derisking across capital markets and partnerships.
Red Sea routing volatility persists
Carrier reversals on Suez/Red Sea transits underscore persistent maritime insecurity and schedule unreliability. For U.S. importers and exporters, this implies longer lead times, higher inventory buffers, potential demurrage/warehousing costs, and fluctuating ocean capacity and rates.
Industriekrise und Exportdruck
Deutschlands Wachstum bleibt schwach (2025: +0,2%; Prognose 2026: +1,0%), während die Industrie weiter schrumpft. US-Zölle und stärkere Konkurrenz aus China belasten Exporte und Margen; Investitionen verlagern sich, Lieferketten werden neu ausgerichtet und Kosten steigen.
China trade frictions resurface
Australia’s anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese steel (10% plus earlier 35–113% duties) raise retaliation risks across iron ore, beef and education services. Firms should stress-test China exposure, diversify markets and monitor WTO disputes and safeguard-style measures.
Montée en puissance défense
La base industrielle de défense accélère, avec capacités en hausse et recrutements, tandis que l’UE oriente davantage d’achats vers l’industrie européenne. Effets: opportunités export, exigences de conformité, priorisation des commandes publiques et tensions sur compétences industrielles.
Regulatory push for digital sovereignty cloud
France continues to steer sensitive workloads toward “sovereign” cloud and security certifications (e.g., SecNumCloud), affecting public procurement and regulated sectors. Non-EU hyperscalers may need partnerships or ring-fenced operations; compliance can reshape IT sourcing.
Tight fiscal headroom and tax risk
Economists warn the Chancellor’s budget headroom has already eroded despite about £26bn in tax rises, raising odds of further revenue measures. Corporate planning must factor potential changes to NI, allowances, subsidies, and public procurement priorities.
Digital sovereignty and data controls
Russia is tightening internet and data-localisation rules, throttling Telegram and moving to block WhatsApp while promoting state-backed ‘Max’. From 1 Jan 2026, services must retain messages for three years and share on request, raising surveillance, cybersecurity, and operational continuity risks for firms.
Labor law rewrite by 2026
Parliament plans to finalize a new labor law before October 2026 to comply with Constitutional Court directions and adjust the Omnibus Law framework. Revisions could change hiring, severance, and compliance burdens—material for labor-intensive investors, sourcing decisions, and HR risk.
Border trade decentralization measures
Tehran is delegating exceptional powers to border provinces to secure essential imports via simplified customs and barter-style mechanisms. This may improve resilience for basic goods but increases regulatory fragmentation, corruption exposure, and unpredictability for cross-border traders and distributors.
Digital regulation–trade linkage escalation
Coupang’s data-breach probe has triggered U.S. investor ISDS and Section 301 pressure, showing how privacy, platform and competition enforcement can become trade disputes. Multinationals should expect higher regulatory scrutiny, litigation risk, and bilateral retaliation dynamics in digital markets.
Data protection and digital trade pressure
DPDP Act implementation and India–US digital trade commitments may reshape cross-border data transfers, localization expectations, and platform regulation. Multinationals should prepare governance, consent management, breach response, and contract updates amid evolving rules and enforcement.
China-border trade integration risks
Northern localities and China’s Guangxi are expanding cross-border trade, e-commerce and agri flows; Guangxi-Vietnam agri trade reached ~CNY18.23bn in 2025. Benefits include faster market access, but firms must manage geopolitical exposure, border policy shifts, and compliance with origin/traceability.
Падение нефтегазовых доходов
Доходы бюджета от нефти и газа снижаются: в январе 2026 — 393 млрд руб. против 587 млрд в декабре и 1,12 трлн годом ранее; в 2025 падение на 24% до 8,5 трлн руб. Это усиливает налоговое давление и бюджетные риски.
Nearshoring con cuellos de energía
El nearshoring sigue fuerte por proximidad a EE.UU., pero la expansión industrial choca con límites de red eléctrica, permisos y capacidad de generación. La incertidumbre regulatoria y costos de conexión retrasan proyectos, elevan CAPEX y favorecen ubicaciones con infraestructura disponible.
Trade compliance and reputational exposure
Scrutiny of settlement-linked trade and corporate due diligence is intensifying, including EU labeling and potential restrictions. Companies face heightened sanctions, customs, and reputational risks across logistics, retail, and manufacturing, requiring enhanced screening, traceability, and legal review.
Tariff refunds and cashflow uncertainty
With IEEPA tariffs invalidated, thousands of importers may seek refunds potentially totaling $160–$175bn, but courts must define processes and timelines (often 12–18+ months). Companies face liquidity planning challenges, liquidation deadlines, and uneven outcomes between large and small firms.