Foreign investment screening intensifies

CFIUS scrutiny and sectoral industrial-policy priorities are raising execution risk for cross-border M&A, minority stakes, and greenfield projects in sensitive technologies and infrastructure. Longer timelines, mitigation agreements, and potential deal abandonments impact capital allocation and market-entry strategies.

Tightening migration and visa rules

Visa restrictions and proposed longer settlement qualifying periods are cutting foreign student and worker inflows; net migration could fall sharply, even negative. Labour-intensive sectors (care, construction, hospitality) face hiring frictions, wage pressure and project delays; universities’ finances are strained.

China De-risking and Fair Trade

Berlin is recalibrating China ties amid a widening imbalance: 2025 imports rose 8.8% to €170.6bn while exports fell 9.7% to €81.3bn. Policy focus on market access, subsidies, and rare-earth leverage will reshape sourcing, compliance, and investment footprints.

Shale gas scale-up, export capacity

Aramco’s $100bn Jafurah shale gas program began production (Dec 2025) targeting 2 bcfd gas by 2030 and replacing 500,000 bpd of domestic crude burn. This could free crude for export and expand petrochemical feedstock, affecting regional energy competitiveness.

Security, crime, and operational resilience

Organised crime, cargo theft, and periodic unrest elevate costs for logistics, retail, and extractives, influencing site selection and insurance. Government focus on enforcement may help, yet firms should plan for disruption, strengthen supplier security, and build redundancy in distribution networks.

Green transition and carbon markets

Thailand is scaling climate finance and market infrastructure: TFEX can list carbon-credit/allowance derivatives, and IEAT secured a $100m World Bank loan to fund renewables and sell ~1m tCO2e credits. Carbon pricing readiness will affect industrial site selection and operating costs.

EU–Australia FTA endgame

EU–Australia FTA talks are in a decisive phase, with remaining gaps on beef/lamb quotas and regulatory conditions; compromises on geographical indications and Australia’s luxury car tax are in play. A deal could reshape tariffs, compliance, and mobility for firms.

Regional proxy conflict shipping risk

Iran-linked regional hostilities amplify threats to commercial vessels and energy infrastructure, with reported ship damage and LNG disruptions. Elevated security costs, rerouting, and delays affect petrochemicals, metals, and containerized trade, while corporate duty-of-care and force-majeure exposure increase.

Energy supply disruptions and LNG imports

Egypt’s gas balance is structurally tight (production ~4.1 bcf/d versus demand ~6.2 bcf/d) and regional conflict has triggered supply cuts, forcing costly LNG imports (plans for ~75 cargoes, ~$3.75bn) and fuel switching. Industrial uptime, power reliability and energy-intensive investments face volatility.

China dependency and pricing pressure

Iran is heavily dependent on China as the buyer of over 80% of its seaborne crude, largely to Shandong teapot refiners constrained by quotas and margins. Competition from discounted Russian barrels forces deeper Iranian discounts, increasing revenue volatility and counterparty risk for Iran-linked deals.

Regulatory push to unlock FDI

Government plans “BOI Fast Pass” and an omnibus investment law to streamline land, permits and investor visas, targeting 900bn baht of realised investment from 1.8tn baht applications. Faster approvals aid greenfield projects, but legal changes create transition risk for existing operators.

US tariff pact uncertainty

Taiwan’s signed US Agreement on Reciprocal Trade lowers tariffs to 15% and exempts 1,735 categories, but ratification and evolving US legal bases (Sections 122/232/301) create policy volatility. Firms should hedge pricing, routing and contract terms.

Gold-trading curbs reshape FX flows

To reduce speculative baht strength linked to gold transactions, Thailand capped online baht-denominated gold trading at 50m baht per person per platform and tightened payment and account rules. This may lower FX-driven volatility but increases compliance burdens for brokers, fintechs, and corporates.

US tariffs and FTA volatility

Rapidly shifting US tariff regimes after court rulings and temporary 10–15% surcharges are forcing Indian exporters to reprice contracts, diversify markets, and revisit the interim India–US deal; parallel EU FTA opportunities still face heavy non‑tariff measures like CBAM compliance burdens.

Logistics rerouting and delivery delays

Cape-of-Good-Hope diversions add thousands of kilometers and create schedule instability across Asia–Europe and ME/India lanes. Companies should expect longer lead times, higher safety-stock needs, and contract renegotiations for time-sensitive cargo and just-in-time manufacturing.

US–Taiwan tariff and investment deals

Recent Taiwan–US arrangements lowered tariffs (reported 20% to 15%) and tied preferential treatment to market-opening and large investment/procurement pledges. Ongoing US legal and policy shifts create volatility; exporters must model tariff scenarios and compliance obligations.

Maritime security and chokepoints

Iran-linked regional tensions elevate risk around the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Red Sea routing. Even without closure, seizures, drone incidents, and proxy threats can raise freight and war-risk premiums, extend lead times, and force supply chains to reroute and rebuffer.

Port modernization and global operators

APM Terminals will buy 37.5% of Jeddah’s South Container Terminal as DP World retains 62.5%, following a SAR 3 billion upgrade and ~4.1 million TEU capacity. Greater automation and network integration improve reliability for Red Sea trade corridors.

Domestic unrest and instability

Economic stress has fueled widespread protests and heavy crackdowns, increasing operational disruption risks. Businesses face strikes, transport interruptions, internet restrictions, and security concerns. Political uncertainty also increases regulatory unpredictability, payment delays, and expropriation or forced-localization pressures.

Sanctions enforcement and compliance burden

Treasury’s OFAC expanded designations targeting Iran’s shadow fleet and procurement networks, signaling aggressive secondary-risk posture for shipping, traders and banks. Multinationals face heightened screening needs, shipment delays, higher insurance costs, and greater penalties exposure for facilitation.

Electricity cost, grid stability risks

Load shedding has eased, but Eskom output is declining and tariffs continue rising; municipal arrears exceed R110bn, prompting potential supply interruptions. Businesses face cost volatility, embedded-generation acceleration, and contingency planning needs for facilities in high‑debt municipalities.

Industrial policy reshoring conditions

Implementation of CHIPS and clean-energy incentives is accelerating but includes guardrails, domestic-content expectations, and heightened scrutiny of foreign-entity links. This reshapes site selection, joint ventures, and supplier qualification, favoring North American capacity and compliant upstream sourcing.

Central bank gold buying program

Bank of Uganda plans domestic gold purchases from March–June 2026, targeting at least 100kg, partnering with refineries for purity. This can bolster reserves and shilling stability, but increases AML/supply-chain due diligence expectations for bullion-linked traders and banks.

Macro-financial dependence on donors

An IMF-approved 48‑month EFF of about $8.1B includes an immediate ~$1.5B disbursement and underpins broader packages, including EU financing. Ukraine’s growth outlook is constrained by energy shocks, making budget support, arrears risk, and payment discipline key considerations for suppliers.

Semiconductor concentration and geopolitics

Taiwan remains central to leading-edge chips (often cited around 90% of advanced nodes), making any disruption a systemic shock for electronics, autos, and AI infrastructure. Expect higher resilience costs, dual-sourcing, and strategic stockpiling across supply chains.

Fragile Red Sea de-escalation

Houthi suspension of attacks on Israel-linked shipping is conditional on Gaza ceasefire durability. Any renewed hostilities could quickly restore Red Sea threat levels, keeping MARAD advisories active, sustaining routing uncertainty, and complicating inventory buffers, lead times, and procurement for Israel trade.

Industrial policy and localization incentives

US industrial policy—clean energy and advanced manufacturing incentives—continues to steer investment toward domestic production and allied supply chains. Local-content rules and subsidy eligibility criteria can disadvantage offshore producers while encouraging US siting, JV structures, and retooling.

Industrial relations tightening pressures

Mining majors warn expanded union powers are raising operational friction (BHP cites 400% rise in right-of-entry requests) and could deter capital spending. International operators should model productivity impacts, bargaining complexity and labour-hire cost pass-through.

Middle East conflict energy shock

Escalating regional conflict increases Turkey’s inflation and current-account risk via energy imports. Analysts estimate a 10% oil-price rise could add ~1.1–1.2pp to inflation and widen the external gap, pressuring transport, chemicals, plastics, and other energy‑intensive supply chains.

Broadening sanctions compliance burden

Expanded “maximum pressure” sanctions, including new designations against Iran’s shadow fleet and facilitators, raise exposure to secondary sanctions, shipping disruptions and banking de-risking. Energy, maritime, commodities and trade-finance players need tighter screening, routing controls, and contract clauses.

Critical minerals export controls

Beijing is tightening rare-earth and critical-mineral policy, improving export-control systems and using licensing to manage access. With China processing about 90% of rare earths, supply disruptions and price spikes can hit EV, defense, and electronics supply chains worldwide.

War-driven security disruption risk

Ongoing Russian strikes and frontline volatility create persistent force‑majeure risk for assets, staff, and inventory. Businesses face elevated security, insurance, and continuity costs, periodic outages, and uncertainty around site selection, travel, and project timelines across sectors.

State footprint and privatization

IMF and markets continue pressing Cairo to reduce the state’s economic role and accelerate divestments. Uneven progress signals regulatory uncertainty for strategic sectors, potential competitive distortions, and shifting rules on licensing, local content, and pricing—key for FDI and PPP structuring.

Electronics export incentives in flux

Government is considering extending smartphone PLI (“PLI 2.0”) to sustain export momentum amid shifting US tariff regimes and renewed China competition. Continuation would support supply-chain localisation and capex, while policy uncertainty complicates long-term sourcing, contract pricing, and investment timing.

Kredi koşulları ve makroihtiyati çerçeve

Kredi faizleri yüksek seyrediyor; para politikası aktarımı sınırlı, makroihtiyati tedbirlerin kademeli gevşemesi dezenflasyon hızına bağlı. Kart limitleri gibi adımlar iç talebi etkileyebilir. Şirketler için işletme sermayesi, vadeli satış ve stok finansmanı zorlaşıyor.

Shipping-route disruptions and Cape detours

Middle East instability and threats to Hormuz/Suez raise diversion risk around the Cape of Good Hope, potentially lifting South African port calls. While ports report improved readiness since 2023 reforms, weather constraints (Cape Town winds) and residual congestion remain risks.