US Trade Friction Risks

Trade relations with Washington remain commercially significant but politically sensitive. U.S. officials say treatment of American firms is impeding a bilateral trade deal, while Seoul’s $350 billion U.S. investment pledge remains linked to tariff relief, affecting market access and board-level planning.

US-China tech controls tightening

The United States is hardening semiconductor and AI export controls on China, including closing overseas-subsidiary loopholes for advanced chips. Businesses in electronics, cloud, and advanced manufacturing face higher licensing risk, stricter due diligence, and growing pressure to regionalize sensitive supply chains.

Hormuz Disruption Reshapes Trade

Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is the dominant business risk, lifting Brent toward about $94, raising insurance and freight costs, and pressuring regional supply chains. Saudi resilience is stronger than peers, but exporters still face volatility, rerouting costs, and delayed investment decisions.

Energy Export Diversification Push

Ottawa is accelerating LNG, oil, electricity and pipeline expansion to diversify beyond the U.S. Prime Minister Carney targets doubling non-U.S. exports this decade, while South Korea plans to raise Canadian crude imports from 4.88 million barrels in 2025 to as much as 16 million in 2026.

OPEC+ Output and Price Volatility

OPEC+ agreed another 188,000 barrel-per-day output increase from July 2026, reinforcing Saudi influence over global oil supply. For international businesses, changing quotas and war-driven price swings complicate procurement, transport budgeting, inflation planning, and energy-intensive investment decisions across sectors.

Industrial Shielding Against China

France is pushing faster EU trade defenses and ‘European preference’ measures against Chinese competition, especially in EVs, steel, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. This supports local manufacturing and selective investment, but also raises sourcing complexity, compliance burdens and possible retaliatory trade friction.

Resilient Growth Amid Regional Conflict

Despite regional war spillovers, Saudi Arabia is still expected to grow about 3.1% in 2026, outperforming most Gulf peers. Low public debt, ample reserves, inflation below 2%, and strong banking liquidity support business continuity, though medium-term investment confidence remains vulnerable.

Banking Stress And Payment Workarounds

Sanctions pressure on nearly 90 banks and warnings of latent banking strain complicate cross-border settlement. Even as Russia-China payments are reportedly functioning again through clearing and offset arrangements, businesses still face high transaction friction, limited channels and elevated financial intermediation risk.

Ralentissement économique et coûts énergétiques

La Commission européenne anticipe seulement 0,8% de croissance en 2026, avec inflation à 2,4% et chômage à 8,7% en 2027. Pour les entreprises, cela implique une demande intérieure plus faible, une sensibilité accrue aux chocs énergétiques et des marges sous pression.

Defense Exports, Industrial Upside

Turkey’s defense exports exceeded $10 billion in 2025, with about $5.6 billion going to Europe and the United States, and Ankara aims to double exports within two years. The sector offers high-value manufacturing upside, though EU political barriers and governance concerns remain material risks.

China Plus One Acceleration

Recent disruptions are accelerating diversification toward Australia, India, Southeast Asia and other alternative sourcing bases, especially for minerals, magnets and advanced manufacturing inputs. Companies that move early can reduce concentration risk, but transition costs, qualification delays and infrastructure gaps will keep China central in the near term.

Japan-UK Tech Security Expands

Japan and Britain signed an economic security declaration and frontier technology partnership covering semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, energy and supply chains. With associated projects cited at over $24 billion, the partnership strengthens friend-shoring opportunities but may intensify competitive standard-setting across allied markets.

IMF-Tied Fiscal Tightening

Pakistan’s FY2026-27 budget keeps the $7 billion IMF programme on track through higher taxes, stricter compliance and spending restraint. With debt servicing consuming a large budget share, businesses face tighter enforcement, potential mini-budget risk, and constrained domestic demand.

Forced-Labor Rules Globalize Compliance

The proposed U.S. tariffs tied to foreign forced-labor enforcement would extend trade pressure well beyond direct import bans, affecting suppliers across Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Multinationals need deeper traceability, third-country sourcing reviews, and stronger human-rights due diligence to preserve U.S. market access.

Reconstruction and Foreign Capital Constraints

Draft proposals mention reconstruction support potentially reaching $300 billion, yet implementation is highly uncertain and politically contested. Even with a deal, damaged infrastructure, opaque governance, corruption, and unresolved security guarantees will deter foreign investors and delay market re-entry decisions.

Vietnam Competition and Integration

Thailand is deepening economic coordination with Vietnam, targeting bilateral trade of US$25 billion within four years from roughly US$8.6 billion in the first four months of 2026. The partnership supports electronics and semiconductor supply chains, but also intensifies regional competition for FDI.

Logistics Bottlenecks and Port Risks

Persistent rail, port and border inefficiencies continue to constrain exports and imports. Border authorities say ports of entry operate at roughly 25% capacity, while corruption cases and weak freight performance raise costs, delays and inventory risk for regional supply chains.

Cross-Border Infrastructure Bottlenecks

The completed Gordie Howe bridge remains delayed amid wider trade friction, highlighting how politics can disrupt critical logistics assets. The crossing is expected to handle about 400 commercial vehicles hourly and save 850,000 trucking hours, making delays costly for just-in-time manufacturing and regional distribution networks.

Cross-Strait Security Escalation Risk

Chinese maritime and grey-zone operations around Taiwan continue to elevate disruption risk for shipping lanes, insurance costs, and semiconductor logistics. Given Taiwan’s dominant role in advanced chips, even limited coercive activity could trigger inventory hoarding, delivery delays, and global pricing volatility.

Security-first regulatory tightening

Beijing is expanding controls over outbound investment, technology transfers, data flows, and overseas staffing from July 1. This security-driven approach raises compliance burdens for multinationals, complicates cross-border R&D and treasury operations, and increases legal exposure for firms handling sensitive information.

Semiconductor Geopolitical Concentration

Taiwan remains the irreplaceable hub for leading-edge semiconductor fabrication, deepening both its economic leverage and concentration risk. International firms remain exposed to chokepoints in foundry capacity, packaging, and associated ecosystems, reinforcing the need for dual sourcing, inventory buffers, and scenario planning across technology supply chains.

Energy Security Drives Sourcing

Middle East disruption is reinforcing Japan’s energy diversification push. Malaysia will supply 2 million tons of LNG annually from 2028, while Sakhalin-2 still accounted for 8.9% of LNG imports in 2025, shaping procurement, sanctions exposure, and industrial cost stability.

Banking Access Still Constrained

Iran remains heavily restricted from global finance, with banks disconnected from SWIFT and tens of billions in overseas oil revenues frozen. Even with limited waivers, payment settlement, trade finance, dollar access, insurance, and repatriation channels remain unreliable for exporters, investors, and supply-chain operators.

UK-US Deal Near Completion

London and Washington appear close to finalising a trade deal covering tariff relief for British cars, steel and aluminium. If completed, it would improve market access and supply-chain predictability, though unresolved technical points still create short-term planning uncertainty for exporters.

Energy Diversification Investment Drive

Saudi Arabia is accelerating diversification beyond hydrocarbons through renewables and civilian nuclear development. Targets include 50% renewable electricity by 2030 and net zero by 2060, creating opportunities in grids, engineering, storage, nuclear supply chains, and long-term industrial power demand.

Won Weakness Raises Exposure

The won’s depreciation is becoming a material operating issue, prompting Seoul and Washington to coordinate on currency conditions. A weaker won can support exporters’ price competitiveness, but it raises import costs, hedging expenses, inflation pressure and foreign-investor caution.

Won Volatility and Inflation

The won recently fell to its weakest level since 2009, prompting market-stabilization measures, anti-speculation enforcement, and possible levy relief. At the same time, inflation has moved above 3%, increasing import costs, hedging needs, and uncertainty for foreign investors and sourcing operations.

Infrastructure and Logistics Acceleration

Vietnam is accelerating metro, rail, airport, road and port-linked projects in Ho Chi Minh City, Bac Ninh and cross-border corridors, improving supply-chain connectivity. Faster execution would reduce transport bottlenecks, shorten lead times and support manufacturing clusters and regional distribution networks.

Energy transition and power buildout

Indonesia is pushing green energy, biodiesel B50, and large new generation projects, including proposed Rp60-70 trillion investments and roughly 2,000 MW of additional capacity. Improved power supply would benefit industry, but financing, permitting, and policy consistency remain critical for project bankability.

State Ownership and Privatization

The government is advancing a 2026-2030 state ownership policy, wider private-sector participation, and asset recycling deals including major energy projects. This creates openings for foreign investors, but execution quality, valuation transparency, and policy consistency will determine commercial credibility.

Resilient technology investment flows

Foreign investment remains concentrated in Israel’s technology ecosystem, with reports citing roughly $39 billion in 2024 inflows and major expansion plans from global firms. This supports M&A and venture opportunities, though concentration increases exposure to security shocks and talent disruptions.

China Tightens Critical Minerals

China’s export restrictions on dual-use items and rare earths to Japan have intensified supply insecurity. March and April shipments reportedly fell 88% and 82% year on year, threatening semiconductors, medical equipment, electronics, and broader high-value manufacturing supply chains.

Vision 2030 Project Reprioritisation

Saudi authorities are shifting toward more commercially pragmatic Vision 2030 projects as some headline giga-projects are scaled back or delayed. For foreign firms, this favors bankable infrastructure, transport, tourism and industrial opportunities, while raising reassessment risk for speculative real-estate and megacity bets.

Farm Stress Hits Agri Chains

Thailand’s farm economy is under strain from fertiliser costs up over 30%, diesel spikes above 60% at peak, and rice prices near an 18-year low. Debt distress across rural households threatens agricultural supply stability, purchasing power and political pressure for intervention.

Gas Reservation Export Risk

Canberra’s proposed gas-reservation scheme could require LNG exporters to divert up to 20% of annual volumes domestically from 2027, unsettling Asian buyers and investors. The policy raises contract, pricing and sovereign-risk concerns for energy-intensive manufacturers and regional trade partners.

Auto Rules of Origin Shift

Proposed North American auto-content rules would raise regional sourcing requirements to 82%, with 50% reportedly tied to U.S. content. That would reshape supplier qualification, pressure Canadian assemblers and parts makers, and complicate investment decisions across integrated manufacturing networks.