Mission Grey Daily Brief - November 11, 2024
Summary of the Global Situation for Businesses and Investors
The election of Donald Trump as the next US President has sent shockwaves through the global economy, with markets and businesses bracing for the impact of his policies. Trump's protectionist stance and threat of tariffs on imports from China and Europe have raised concerns about a potential trade war, with Asia and Ireland particularly exposed. Meanwhile, Taiwan welcomed Trump's victory, but analysts warn of potential risks to its relationship with the US and China.
Trump's Tariff Plan and the Global Economy
Donald Trump's election as the next US President has sent shockwaves through the global economy, with markets and businesses bracing for the impact of his policies. Trump has threatened tariffs of up to 60% on imports from China and 10-20% on imports from Europe, which could trigger a global trade war. Asia, which contributes the largest share of global growth, is particularly exposed, with production chains closely linked to China and significant investment from Beijing. Ireland, with its large exposure to the US market, is also vulnerable, as 75% of its goods exports to the US are chemical or pharma products produced by US multinationals operating in the country.
Taiwan's Relationship with the US and China
Taiwan has publicly hailed Trump's victory, but analysts warn of potential risks to its relationship with the US and China. Trump has suggested that Taiwan should pay the US for its defence and accused the island of stealing the US semiconductor industry. Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te has expressed confidence in continued US support, but analysts say that Trump's policy on Taiwan is highly uncertain. Taiwan could be caught in the middle of a trade war between the US and China, and any miscalculation by the Trump administration could be costly.
Indonesia's Trade Concerns
Indonesia's businesses are concerned about the impact of Trump's protectionist policies on their access to the US market and competition with Chinese producers. Chinese producers may reroute their goods to Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, if they face similar barriers to the US market. Indonesia's exports to the US could also be affected by Trump's policies, as the US is the second-largest export market for Indonesian goods. Indonesia's government is considering actions to minimise the negative impact, including pushing for trade deals, diversifying export markets, and improving competitiveness.
Trump's Approach to the EU and UK
Trump is expected to target the EU over the UK in a potential trade war, as he wants to see a successful Brexit. Trump is likely to give a preferential trade deal to the UK, while tariffs will more greatly affect the EU than the UK. Trump believes in the special relationship between the US and the UK and wants to help with a successful Brexit. The UK chancellor is expected to promote free and open trade between nations as a cornerstone of UK economic policy, calling for continued partnerships with Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the US.
Further Reading:
Asia, the world's economic engine, prepares for Trump shock - Japan Today
Eoin Burke-Kennedy: Ireland’s €54bn exposure to Trump’s tariff plan - The Irish Times
Indonesia’s businesses fear deluge of Chinese goods after Trump takes office - asianews.network
Turkey Deports 325 Afghan Nationals In 48 Hours - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
Themes around the World:
BEG subsidies and budget risk
Federal BEG/BAFA support is critical to Wärmewende economics, but annual budget ceilings and frequent program adjustments create stop‑start ordering behavior. International suppliers face higher payment-cycle uncertainty, while investors must model demand cliffs, compliance documentation, and administrative throughput constraints.
Immobilien-, Bau- und Projektpipeline-Risiko
Hohe Finanzierungskosten bremsen Bau und Real Estate: Hypothekenzinsen lagen Ende 2025 bei ca. 3,9% (10 Jahre), Neubaufinanzierungen schwächer. Der Bau-PMI fiel Januar 2026 auf 44,7. Auswirkungen: Standortverfügbarkeit, Werks-/Logistikflächenpreise, Lieferantenaufträge und Investitions-Timings.
Critical minerals and battery supply chains
Canada is positioning itself as a “trusted supplier” of critical minerals, supporting mining, processing and battery ecosystems. This creates opportunities in offtakes and JV processing, but permitting timelines, Indigenous consultation, and infrastructure constraints can delay projects and cashflows.
Secondary sanctions via tariffs
New executive authority threatens ~25% additional tariffs on imports from countries trading with Iran, alongside expanded “shadow fleet” designations. This blurs sanctions and trade policy, raising counterparty screening demands, shipping/insurance costs, and retaliation risk for firms operating across US-linked markets.
US interim trade reset
A new US–India interim framework cuts peak US tariffs to ~18% on many Indian goods, with some lines moving to zero, while India lowers duties on US industrial and select farm products. Expect near-term export uplift but ongoing uncertainty around Section 232 outcomes.
Escalating Taiwan Strait grey-zone risk
China’s sustained air and naval activity and blockade-style drills raise probabilities of disruption without formal conflict. Firms face higher marine insurance, rerouting and inventory buffers, plus heightened contingency planning for ports, aviation, and regional logistics hubs.
High energy costs and circular debt
Electricity tariffs remain structurally high, with large capacity-payment burdens and a Rs3.23/unit debt surcharge for up to six years. Despite reform claims, elevated industrial power prices erode export competitiveness, raise production costs, and influence location decisions for energy-intensive manufacturing.
FX volatility and yen defense
Yen weakness and intervention signalling (rate checks, possible US coordination) heighten hedging costs and pricing uncertainty for importers/exporters. Policy risk rises around election-driven fiscal expectations, complicating repatriation, procurement contracts, and Japan-based treasury management.
Risco fiscal e trajetória da dívida
Gastos federais cresceram 3,37% acima do teto real de 2,5% em 2025 e o déficit primário ficou em 0,43% do PIB; a dívida bruta chegou a 78,7% do PIB, elevando risco-país, câmbio e custo de capital.
Energy security and LNG contracting
Shrinking domestic gas output and delayed petroleum-law amendments increase reliance on LNG; gas supplies roughly 60% of power generation. PTT, Egat and Gulf are locking long-term LNG deals (15-year contracts, 0.8–1.0 mtpa). Electricity-price volatility and industrial costs remain key.
Logistics and labor disruption risk
US port throughput remains vulnerable to labor negotiations and regulatory constraints, amplifying shipment lead-time uncertainty. Any East/Gulf or West Coast disruptions would quickly cascade into inland transport, retail inventories, and just-in-time manufacturing, raising safety-stock and premium freight costs.
Semiconductor reshoring accelerates
Japan is deepening economic-security industrial policy around chips. TSMC plans 3‑nanometer production in Kumamoto, with reported investment around $17bn, while Tokyo considers additional subsidies. This strengthens local supply clusters but intensifies competition for land, power, engineers, and suppliers.
Industrial policy subsidies reshaping FDI
CHIPS- and clean-energy-linked incentives, paired with conditional tariff exemptions tied to U.S. production capacity, are redirecting foreign investment into U.S. fabs, batteries, and critical materials. Global firms must weigh subsidy capture against localization costs, labor constraints, and policy durability.
US-linked investment and credit guarantees
Taiwan’s commitment to roughly US$250bn of investment in the US, backed by up to US$250bn in credit guarantees, will redirect corporate capital planning. It may accelerate supplier localization in North America while raising financing, execution, and opportunity-cost considerations at home.
Aid conditionality and fiscal dependence
Ukraine’s budget is heavily war-driven (KSE: 2025 spending US$131.4bn; 71% defence/security; US$39.2bn deficit) and relies on partner financing. EU approved a €90bn loan for 2026–27 and an IMF $8.1bn program is pending, but disbursements hinge on reforms and compliance.
Monetary policy and dollar volatility
Cooling inflation (CPI 2.4% y/y in January; core 2.5%) is shifting expectations toward midyear Fed cuts. Rate and FX swings affect working capital, hedging, and investment hurdle rates, while tariff-driven relative price changes alter import demand and margins.
Cybersecurity and data regulation tightening
Rising cyber and foreign-interference concerns are driving stricter critical-infrastructure security expectations and data-governance requirements. Multinationals should anticipate higher compliance costs, vendor-risk audits, and incident-reporting duties, influencing cloud sourcing, cross-border data flows, and M&A diligence.
China trade frictions, tariffs
Anti-dumping measures on Chinese steel products and broader de-risking pressure increase retaliation risk against flagship exports (iron ore, agriculture, education). Importers face compliance and sourcing shifts; exporters should stress-test China exposure and diversify contracts and logistics routes.
Regional connectivity projects at risk
Strategic infrastructure tied to Iran, such as Chabahar/INSTC routes, faces uncertainty as partners reconsider funding under U.S. pressure and expiring waivers. This threatens diversification of Eurasian supply corridors, increasing reliance on other routes and reducing redundancy for time-sensitive cargo.
Infra Amazon e conflito socioambiental
Bloqueios indígenas afetaram acesso a terminal da Cargill no Tapajós e protestam contra dragagem e privatização de hidrovias, citando riscos de licenciamento e mercúrio. Tensão pode atrasar projetos do Arco Norte, pressionando fretes, seguros, prazos de exportação de grãos.
Pemex finances and supply reliability
Pemex reported debt reduced to about $84.5bn and announced multi-year capex to lift crude and gas output, targeting 1.8 mbd oil and 4.5 bcf/d gas. Improved balance sheet helps suppliers, but operational execution and fiscal dependence still affect energy reliability and payments.
Port infrastructure under sustained strikes
A concentrated wave of Russian attacks on ports and ships—Dec 2–Jan 12 made up ~10% of all such strikes since 2022—targets Ukraine’s export backbone. Damage and interruptions raise demurrage and storage costs, deter carriers, and complicate export contracting for agriculture and metals.
BoJ tightening, yen volatility
The Bank of Japan’s post-deflation normalisation (policy rate at 0.75% after December hike) keeps FX and JGB yields volatile, raising hedging costs and repricing M&A and project finance. Authorities also signal readiness to curb disorderly yen moves.
Shareholder activism and governance shifts
Japan’s record M&A cycle and activist pressure are reshaping capital allocation and control structures. Elliott opposed Toyota Industries’ take-private price, while Fuji Media launched a ¥235bn buyback to exit an activist stake. Deal risk, valuation scrutiny, and governance expectations are rising for investors.
Sanctions compliance and Russia payments
Sanctions-related banking frictions persist: Russia and Turkey are preparing new consultations to resolve payment problems. International firms face heightened counterparty and routing risk, longer settlement times, and stricter AML screening when Turkey-linked trade intersects with Russia exposure.
Energy security via LNG contracting
With gas supplying about 60% of power generation and domestic output declining, PTT, Egat and Gulf are locking in long-term LNG contracts (15-year deals, 0.8–1.0 mtpa tranches). Greater price stability supports manufacturing planning but increases exposure to contract and FX risks.
Escalating secondary sanctions pressure
The US is tightening “maximum pressure” through new designations on Iran’s oil/petrochemical networks and vessels, plus threats of blanket tariffs on countries trading with Tehran. This raises compliance, banking, and counterparty risks for global firms and intermediaries.
Electrification push alters cost base
Government plans aim for electricity to reach ~60% of final energy consumption by 2030, reducing fossil dependence reportedly costing ~€60bn annually in oil and gas imports. Transition incentives may reshape fleet, heat and process investments, affecting capex timing and energy contracts.
Падение нефтегазовых доходов
Доходы бюджета от нефти и газа снижаются: в январе 2026 — 393 млрд руб. против 587 млрд в декабре и 1,12 трлн годом ранее; в 2025 падение на 24% до 8,5 трлн руб. Это усиливает налоговое давление и бюджетные риски.
Cross-platform 3D software ecosystem
Finland’s software stack for embedded and real-time 3D—exemplified by Qt-based tooling—supports industrial HMI, visualization and simulation interfaces. This reduces porting friction across devices, benefiting global deployments, though talent competition and valuation cycles can affect supplier stability.
Investment screening and national security
U.S. inbound (CFIUS) and outbound investment scrutiny is increasingly tied to economic security, especially for China-linked capital, data, and dual-use tech. Deal timelines, mitigation terms, and ownership structures are becoming decisive for cross-border M&A, JV approvals, and financing certainty.
Strategic manufacturing: chips and electronics
Budget 2026 expands India Semiconductor Mission 2.0 and doubles electronics component incentives to ₹40,000 crore; customs duties are being rebalanced (e.g., higher display duty, lower components) to deepen local value-add. Impacts site selection, supplier localization, and capex timelines.
Security, vandalism and criminality risks
Persistent cable theft and rail vandalism raise insurance, security and maintenance costs and deter private participation in logistics. Broader crime elevates risk for warehousing, trucking and staff mobility, requiring fortified facilities, vetted contractors and robust business-continuity planning.
Import licensing and quota uncertainty
Businesses report delays and sharp quota cuts in import permits (e.g., frozen beef private quota cut from 180,000 to 30,000 tons), alongside tighter controls on fuel import quotas for private retailers. This heightens operational uncertainty for food, hospitality, and downstream distribution networks.
Import quotas for fuels tighten
Indonesia’s import caps are affecting private retailers, with Shell reporting work with government on 2026 fuel import quotas amid station shortages. Coupled with policy to stop diesel import permits for private stations, firms face supply disruptions, higher working capital needs, and reliance on Pertamina.
Talent constraints and foreign hiring policy
Labor shortages in manufacturing and high-tech intensify competition for engineers and skilled technicians. Policy tweaks to attract foreign talent and expand foreign-worker quotas can help, but firms should plan for wage pressure, retention costs, and slower ramp-ups for new capacity.