Central bank gold buying program

Bank of Uganda plans domestic gold purchases from March–June 2026, targeting at least 100kg, partnering with refineries for purity. This can bolster reserves and shilling stability, but increases AML/supply-chain due diligence expectations for bullion-linked traders and banks.

Tech exports: recovery with churn

Tech remains a core export engine (about 57% of exports; 17% of GDP), with 2025 funding rising to roughly $15.6bn. Yet job seekers doubled to 16,300 and talent outflows persist, affecting hiring, delivery risk, and investment underwriting for R&D-heavy operations.

Suez Canal security volatility

Red Sea conflict dynamics keep Suez transits highly uncertain: major liners have alternated between returning and rerouting via the Cape, depressing foreign-currency toll income (about $9.6bn in 2023 to ~$3.6bn in 2024) and disrupting lead times, freight rates, and insurance costs.

China tech controls and licensing

U.S. policy on advanced semiconductors and AI exports to China is increasingly conditional and politically contested, with licensing, tariffs, and potential congressional tightening. Multinationals face uncertainty in product design, China revenue exposure, and allied supply-chain coordination requirements.

Immigration tightening pressures labor supply

Crackdowns on illegal immigration and prospective H‑1B prevailing-wage hikes raise labor costs and constrain hiring in tech, healthcare and services. Firms should reassess location strategy, automation plans, and visa-dependent staffing models while preparing for slower onboarding and compliance checks.

Missile and drone reconstitution push

Despite strikes, Iran is rebuilding missile/UAV capacity through dispersed production, hardened sites, and procurement networks abroad. OFAC actions highlight machinery and precursor-chemical sourcing. For business, this sustains long-tail regional risk, complicates investment horizons, and keeps air/sea corridors unstable.

State-backed semiconductor industrial policy

Tokyo is deepening intervention to rebuild domestic chip capacity: government bought 40% of Rapidus for ¥100bn and holds a “golden share,” with plans to raise voting rights up to ~60%. Subsidies and guarantees reshape supplier location, IP partnerships, and geopolitical exposure.

Escalating sanctions and enforcement

EU and UK continue widening Russia measures, targeting banks, ports and third‑country facilitators; new packages aim to close loopholes in shipping, crypto and re-exports. Compliance costs rise sharply, with higher secondary‑sanctions exposure for traders, insurers, banks and logistics providers.

Fiscal rules and investment capacity

Debate over reforming Germany’s debt brake shapes the scale and timing of infrastructure, climate, and security spending. Coalition tension creates policy uncertainty for public procurement, PPP pipelines, and tax/fee trajectories—affecting investment planning, demand outlook, and funding availability.

Foreign investment concentration in EEC

January 2026 saw 113 foreign investor permits worth 33.8bn baht; 43% went to the Eastern Economic Corridor, led by Chinese, Singaporean and Japanese capital. Clustering supports supplier ecosystems, but heightens exposure to local power, labour and infrastructure constraints.

US investment pledges and localisation

Seoul’s large US investment commitments (reported $350bn framework) and potential LNG terminal participation (>$10bn discussed) may reshape capital allocation, procurement, and localisation requirements. Multinationals should anticipate US-centric supply commitments and political conditionality.

Critical minerals re-shoring push

Canberra is accelerating onshore processing and ‘strategic reserve’ policies for critical minerals, backed by allied frameworks and subsidies. Recent antimony shipments highlight momentum, while lithium refining faces cost pressure. Expect incentives, permitting scrutiny, and partner-linked offtake deals.

Cross‑strait security and blockade risk

Elevated China–Taiwan tensions and recurring PLA exercises keep contingency risk high for Taiwan Strait shipping, aviation routes, and insurance. Businesses should stress-test just‑in‑time models, diversify logistics corridors, and tighten crisis governance for Taiwan-dependent operations.

Expanded Russia sanctions enforcement

The UK announced its broadest Russia sanctions since 2022, targeting Transneft (moving >80% of Russia’s crude exports) plus 48 shadow-fleet tankers and 2Rivers-linked entities. Firms face heightened compliance, shipping/insurance constraints and secondary exposure risks in energy trade.

Expansion of national-security tariffs

Administration is considering new Section 232 investigations on additional industries (e.g., batteries, chemicals, grid/telecom equipment) while keeping steel/aluminum/copper/autos measures. Sectoral duties can reshape sourcing and production footprints, raising input costs and accelerating supplier localization or diversification.

Internet shutdowns and cyber risk

Iran’s periodic internet restrictions and heightened cyber activity during crises disrupt communications, cloud access, payments, and remote operations. Firms reliant on digital workflows face downtime, data-security exposure, and continuity planning needs, including alternative connectivity and localization measures.

EU Climate Trade Rules (CBAM)

The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism tightens reporting and cost exposure for imports of carbon-intensive inputs (e.g., steel, cement, aluminum). Germany-based manufacturers and importers face compliance upgrades, supplier switching, and pricing impacts as definitive-phase obligations expand.

Rising deception and trade opacity

Investigations uncovered a network of ~48 shell entities shipping over $90bn of Russian crude using shared infrastructure, short-lived firms, and opaque labeling. Compliance teams should expect higher documentation fraud, beneficial-ownership complexity, and elevated contractual and reputational risk.

Maritime industrial policy and fees

The Maritime Action Plan proposes rebuilding shipyards, expanding US-flag capacity, and considering fees on foreign-built vessels entering US ports to fund a trust. If implemented, ocean freight costs, routing choices, and port-call economics could materially change for importers and carriers.

Gulf-backed mega projects surge

Large Gulf investments (e.g., Ras al-Hekma) and additional multi‑billion deals are boosting liquidity and construction pipelines. Opportunities rise in real estate, ports, and services, but execution risk persists around land, procurement transparency, and crowding-out local private competitors.

Labor shortage, mobilization, demographics

Workforce constraints intensify: roughly three million workers lost to emigration and at least 500,000 mobilized, shrinking the labor pool by about a quarter in government-controlled areas. Firms face wage pressure, skills gaps, relocation needs, and productivity risks.

Chip industrial policy acceleration

A new semiconductor competitiveness law creates a presidential commission, special funding accounts, cluster support, and streamlined permits to expand memory, foundry, packaging, and AI chips. This strengthens Korea’s onshore supply chain but keeps labor-hour flexibility contested for fabs.

Battery storage tariff reform

Circular 62/2025 (effective 26 Jan 2026) introduces a two-part tariff for battery energy storage, paying for availability and delivery. This bankable revenue model can unlock private capital, reduce renewable curtailment, and improve grid stability—benefiting energy-intensive manufacturing and green procurement.

Large infrastructure spend and PPP pipeline

Government plans about R1.07 trillion over three years for transport, energy and water, with revised PPP rules and infrastructure bonds. This creates opportunities for EPC, finance and suppliers, but execution risk, procurement disputes, and governance capacity remain key constraints.

Ports, logistics, and labor dynamics

U.S. port labor negotiations and automation disputes remain a recurring disruption risk for Atlantic/Gulf gateways, even when contracts are reached. Shippers should plan for volatility via routing diversity, buffer inventory, and carrier/terminal optionality to protect service levels and working capital.

Fiscal outlook, debt-market volatility

A dívida bruta ronda 78,7–78,8% do PIB e os juros consumiram ~8,05% do PIB em 12 meses, pressionando risco-país, câmbio e curva longa. Emissões elevadas do Tesouro aumentam custos de capital e incerteza para investimento e M&A.

Agenda ESG e risco Amazônia

Pressão regulatória e de investidores sobre desmatamento e rastreabilidade na cadeia agro-mineral continua elevando due diligence, cláusulas contratuais e risco reputacional. A proximidade de COP30 e instrumentos de carbono reforçam exigências de compliance socioambiental para acesso a mercados.

Mandatory cybersecurity rules broaden

Australia is extending mandatory cybersecurity requirements for connected devices and strengthening incident readiness across critical sectors. Firms selling IoT products or operating essential services must invest in secure-by-design, certification, and breach response—raising compliance costs and vendor scrutiny.

Defense build-up and dual-use constraints

Japan’s expanded defense posture and record budgets intersect with tightening regional controls on dual-use technologies. Companies in aerospace, electronics, materials, and shipbuilding face higher scrutiny on end-use, cybersecurity, and data handling; offsets and trusted supply chains gain value.

Escalating sanctions and enforcement

UK and EU are widening measures against Russian energy logistics, including Transneft, banks and dozens of shadow-fleet tankers. Businesses face heightened secondary-sanctions exposure, tighter compliance expectations, contract frustration risk, and higher costs for screening counterparties, cargoes and beneficial ownership.

Regulatory push to unlock FDI

Government plans “BOI Fast Pass” and an omnibus investment law to streamline land, permits and investor visas, targeting 900bn baht of realised investment from 1.8tn baht applications. Faster approvals aid greenfield projects, but legal changes create transition risk for existing operators.

Investment screening and CFIUS enforcement

Heightened national-security scrutiny is expanding into data-rich assets and tech supply chains. DOJ actions over failed divestment orders and greater sensitivity to China-linked capital raise timelines, mitigation costs, and deal-certainly risk for foreign investors, joint ventures, and M&A in strategic sectors.

Energy Transition Industrial Policy

Budget measures extend customs exemptions for lithium-ion cell inputs, solar-glass materials and nuclear-project goods to 2035, plus aviation components and MRO inputs. These incentives attract manufacturing FDI and localisation, but create policy-dependent cost advantages and compliance complexity.

Energy export force majeure risk

Israel’s offshore gas exports face heightened disruption risk during regional conflict; recent force majeure halted roughly 1.1 bcf/d to Egypt. This raises counterparty and price risk for regional buyers and affects petrochemicals, power costs, and investment decisions tied to Eastern Mediterranean energy flows.

Canada–China thaw, security tradeoffs

Canada is expanding trade with China to offset U.S. exposure, but deeper engagement elevates geopolitical, reputational and compliance risks amid foreign-interference concerns and sensitive law-enforcement cooperation. Firms should tighten due diligence, IP controls, and sanctions screening.

Great Nicobar transshipment megaproject

NGT cleared the ~₹90,000+ crore Great Nicobar plan, including a ₹40,040 crore transshipment port targeting 4+ million TEU by 2028 (up to 16 million). It could reduce reliance on Colombo/Singapore; environmental, social, and ownership restrictions add risk.