Mission Grey Daily Brief - November 01, 2024
Summary of the Global Situation for Businesses and Investors
The 2024 US presidential election is gripping the world's attention and could have a significant impact on the global economy. The Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking advantage of a distracted and divided United States to push for pro-Kremlin electoral outcomes in Georgia and Moldova and bring North Korean soldiers to Russia to fight Ukraine. China's military incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ and crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait have skyrocketed, creating a dangerous new normal. China has imposed sanctions on the US drone supplier to Ukraine, Skydio, banning Chinese companies from providing critical components to the firm. Attackers set fire to the headquarters of a Bangladesh party that supported the country's ousted leader Sheikh Hasina on Thursday night. US airstrikes targeted multiple sites in Syria, killing up to 35 Islamic State militants. The UN General Assembly has condemned the US economic embargo of Cuba for a 32nd year.
US Presidential Election
The 2024 US presidential election is gripping the world's attention and could have a significant impact on the global economy. The vote, held on 5 November, could also have major consequences on international issues ranging from the climate crisis to the reorientation of global supply chains. The Republican candidate is former President Donald Trump and the Democratic candidate is current Vice President Kamala Harris. In China, where election news is filtered through heavily censored state and social media, the focus has been more on spectacle than substance – with a sense that no matter who wins, the tensions of the US-China relationship will remain. People in China have seen their economic prospects dim as the country has struggled to fully rebound following its stringent pandemic controls amid a wider slowdown and property market crisis, among other challenges. Interest in the candidates and their policies appears muted compared with past US elections.
Russia-Ukraine War
The Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking advantage of a distracted and divided United States to push for pro-Kremlin electoral outcomes in Georgia and Moldova and bring North Korean soldiers to Russia to fight Ukraine. New NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed this week that North Korean military units have been deployed to Russia’s Kursk region for potential battle with Ukrainian troops, who have seized territory there. Pentagon officials estimate that as many as ten thousand North Korean soldiers have been sent to Russia for military training, among them the country’s elite special forces. Even as Russia escalates militarily against Ukraine, it has deployed disinformation, influence operations, and money in Moldova and Georgia, working to turn back pro-Western majorities in both countries that favour eventual integration into the European Union (EU) and other Western institutions.
China-Taiwan Tensions
China's military incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ and crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait have skyrocketed, creating a dangerous new normal. Crossings of the median line have become increasingly common since August 2022, when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi controversially visited Taiwan, and China has been steadily erasing it altogether. In a recent drill surrounding Taiwan, 111 Chinese warplanes crossed it, marking a single-day high. A nation's ADIZ extends far beyond its territorial airspace, but the area is closely monitored for national security purposes. When Chinese aircraft enter Taiwan's de facto ADIZ, it dispatches combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft in response. In 2021, the Chinese military flew 972 aircraft into Taiwan's ADIZ, and that number nearly doubled in 2022. 1,703 aircraft were recorded in 2023. And 2024 looks to have a record-breaking number, with over 2,000 aircraft documented as of September. They're also no longer limited to a corner of the ADIZ.
China Sanctions US Drone Supplier to Ukraine
China has imposed sanctions on the US drone supplier to Ukraine, Skydio, banning Chinese companies from providing critical components to the firm. Skydio is currently looking for alternative suppliers because of the sanctions, which have also blocked the supply of batteries from the company's sole supplier. The company has asked the Biden administration for help. US officials are concerned that China could undermine US supply chains and make it harder to supply drones used for intelligence gathering in Ukraine. Skydio's crisis highlights the risks faced by US companies dependent on China and comes as foreign businesses worry about China's use of security laws to detain local workers and conduct corporate raids. On 11 October, China imposed sanctions on several US companies, including Skydio which is a private company, in response to Washington's approval of the sale of combat drones to Taiwan. Skydio was recently awarded a contract with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency. The sanctions were imposed before Skydio could find alternative suppliers. One of the sources said that the Chinese authorities had visited Skydio's suppliers, including Dongguan Poweramp, a subsidiary of Japan's TDK that makes batteries for drones, and ordered them to stop working with Skydio. On 30 October, Skydio notified its customers that it was limiting the number of batteries it ships with its drones due to Chinese sanctions and warned that new suppliers are not expected to come on stream until spring. Skydio is discussing the situation with companies in Asia, particularly in Taiwan. One source said that US officials had reached out to Asian allies to discuss ways to support the company. Skydio has also been in contact with Taiwan's Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim on the issue. The San Mateo-based company serves corporate and government clients, including the US military. It said it has sent more than 1,000 drones to Ukraine to gather intelligence and help record Russia's war crimes. Skydio said its newest model, the X10, was the first US drone to pass Ukraine's electronic warfare tests, which makes it harder to jam, and Kyiv has ordered thousands of such drones. China's actions come as the US Congress is considering a bill to ban Americans from using drones made by DJI, the Chinese company that dominates the global commercial drone market.
Further Reading:
Americans are going to the polls. Here’s how the US election works - World Economic Forum
China imposes sanctions on US drone supplier to Ukraine - Ukrainska Pravda
China’s watching the US election – but doesn’t see much hope for better ties - CNN
Luxembourg grain company still profiting despite Ukraine war - Luxembourg Times
Putin is making the most of a distracted and divided United States - Atlantic Council
UN General Assembly condemns the US economic embargo of Cuba for a 32nd year - Toronto Star
Themes around the World:
Energy revenues and fiscal strain
Sanctions and enforcement are compressing Russia’s hydrocarbon cashflows: January oil-and-gas tax revenue fell to 393bn rubles, down from 587bn in December and 1.12tr a year earlier. Moscow is raising VAT to 22% and borrowing more, worsening domestic demand and payment risk.
Regulatory divergence in product standards
Ongoing UK–EU divergence—covering conformity marking (UKCA/CE), product safety and sector rules—creates dual-compliance costs. Exporters must manage parallel documentation, testing and labeling, while Northern Ireland arrangements add complexity for distribution models across Great Britain and the EU.
Defense buildup and dual-use compliance
Faster defense spending toward ~2% of GDP and deeper aerospace/space programs increase procurement opportunities but tighten export-control, ITAR-style and dual-use compliance across primes and suppliers, especially those with China-linked inputs or sales.
Domestic fiscal tightening and taxes
To offset revenue losses, Russia is raising VAT to 22% and leaning on domestic bank borrowing while inflation remains elevated and rates restrictive. This raises operating costs, weakens consumer demand, and increases FX/repayment risks for firms with ruble exposures or local supply chains.
U.S. tariffs and USMCA review
Ongoing U.S. Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum and autos, plus uncertainty ahead of the USMCA/CUSMA review, are reshaping pricing, investment and sourcing decisions. Court action narrowed some emergency tariffs, but new U.S. tools keep policy volatility high.
Power market reform execution risk
Government is unbundling Eskom and establishing an independent transmission system operator ahead of wholesale market rollout from April 2026, but timelines, market rules, wheeling and tariff design remain contested. Delays raise outage and cost risks for industry and investors.
Defense-tech boom and controls
War-driven demand is accelerating Israel’s defense-tech ecosystem (defense startups reportedly rising from 160 to 312). This supports growth but increases scrutiny of dual-use exports, compliance burdens, and reputational considerations for partners, investors, and supply chains touching defense.
Security, vandalism and criminality risks
Persistent cable theft and rail vandalism raise insurance, security and maintenance costs and deter private participation in logistics. Broader crime elevates risk for warehousing, trucking and staff mobility, requiring fortified facilities, vetted contractors and robust business-continuity planning.
External financing rollover dependence
Short-term bilateral rollovers (e.g., UAE’s $2bn deposit extended at 6.5% to April 2026) underscore fragile external buffers. Debt-service needs and refinancing risk can trigger FX volatility, capital controls, delayed profit repatriation, and higher country risk premia.
US–Taiwan reciprocal trade deal
The new U.S.–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade locks a 15% U.S. tariff on Taiwanese goods while Taiwan cuts most U.S. import tariffs and tackles non‑tariff barriers. It reshapes sourcing, compliance, pricing, and investment decisions across agriculture, autos, pharma, and advanced manufacturing.
Export controls and origin‑laundering scrutiny
The US–Taiwan framework emphasizes tighter critical-technology export controls, enhanced investment review, and prevention of country‑of‑origin laundering. Firms routing China-linked production through Taiwan face higher compliance burdens, licensing risk, and intensified due diligence requirements across supply chains.
Workforce nationalisation and labour reforms
Saudi authorities are tightening Saudization in selected functions (e.g., sales/marketing mandates reported up to 60% for targeted roles) alongside broader labour-law amendments. Firms must redesign HR operating models, pay structures, and compliance controls to avoid penalties and operational disruption.
Investment screening and national security
U.S. inbound (CFIUS) and outbound investment scrutiny is increasingly tied to economic security, especially for China-linked capital, data, and dual-use tech. Deal timelines, mitigation terms, and ownership structures are becoming decisive for cross-border M&A, JV approvals, and financing certainty.
Control a transbordo y China
EE. UU. presiona por frenar el ‘transshipment’ de bienes chinos vía México. México impuso aranceles de hasta 50% a autos y otros productos asiáticos, pero mantiene diálogo con China. Empresas deben reforzar trazabilidad de origen, compliance aduanero y evaluación de proveedores.
Monetary policy uncertainty and weak growth
Bank of Canada’s 2.25% hold reflects subdued growth, elevated unemployment (around 6.8%) and trade-driven uncertainty. Rate-path unpredictability affects project finance, M&A valuations and consumer demand, while exchange-rate sensitivity complicates cross-border pricing and hedging strategies.
SOE liabilities and privatization pipeline
State-owned enterprises remain a major fiscal drag: SOE support reached about Rs2.079tr in FY25, while power-sector unfunded liabilities exceeded Rs2tr and circular debt neared Rs1.9tr. Privatization and restructuring create openings, but execution, labor resistance and tariff politics drive deal risk.
Tariff refunds and cashflow uncertainty
With IEEPA tariffs invalidated, thousands of importers may seek refunds potentially totaling $160–$175bn, but courts must define processes and timelines (often 12–18+ months). Companies face liquidity planning challenges, liquidation deadlines, and uneven outcomes between large and small firms.
LNG buildout and gas transition
Vietnam is scaling LNG to reduce domestic gas decline and support industry. PV Gas is advancing 1–3 mtpa Bac Trung Bo LNG (Phase 1 around 2029–2030) and investing >VND 100 trillion through 2030. LNG infrastructure reshapes fuel costs, contracting, and port logistics.
BoJ tightening, yen volatility
Japan’s exit from ultra-loose policy is accelerating: markets price further hikes from 0.75% toward ~1% by mid‑2026, with intervention risk near ¥160/$1. FX and rate volatility will affect hedging, funding costs, pricing, and inbound investment returns.
Shadow fleet interdictions rising
Western navies are shifting from monitoring to physical interdiction: boardings, detentions and possible seizures of ‘stateless’ or falsely flagged tankers are increasing. Russia is reflagging vessels; ~640 ships are sanctioned. Shipping, port, and insurance risk premiums are rising materially.
Semiconductor ecosystem and ATMP buildout
India is accelerating chip packaging and ecosystem investments, including the ₹3,700 crore HCL–Foxconn OSAT project and Semiconductor Mission 2.0 funding. Opportunities include supplier clustering and design centers; risks include execution, utilities reliability, and skills constraints.
Central bank pivot and rate path
The Bank of Thailand is shifting from rate-only signalling toward broader measures targeting productivity and inequality, while maintaining accommodative policy. Analysts expect a possible cut toward 1.00% in early 2026. Lower rates help borrowers but may not revive investment without reforms.
Electricity reform and grid bottlenecks
Load-shedding has eased, but transmission expansion is the binding constraint. Eskom’s plan targets ~14,000–14,500km of new lines by 2034 at ~R440bn; slow build rates risk delaying IPP projects, raising tariffs, and constraining industrial investment.
New trade deals and friend-shoring
US is using reciprocal trade agreements to rewire supply chains toward strategic partners. The US–Taiwan deal caps many tariffs at 15%, links chip treatment to US investment, and includes large procurement and investment pledges, influencing regional manufacturing footprints and sourcing decisions.
AB ve üçüncü ülke ticaret önlemleri
AB’nin çelikte kota ve korumacı önlemleri sıkılaşıyor; 1 Haziran’da ürün bazında %50’ye varan kotaların ihracatta yaklaşık 3 milyar $ kayıp yaratabileceği öngörülüyor. İhracatçılar yakın pazarlara yöneliyor. Ticaret sapması riski, sözleşme ve pazar stratejilerini yeniden şekillendiriyor.
Energy security and LNG repositioning
Japan is locking in long-duration LNG supply, including JERA’s 27-year, 3 mtpa deal from 2028 and potential Mitsui equity in Qatar’s North Field South. Greater Middle East exposure, plus disaster-contingency MOUs, influences power prices, industrial siting and contracting strategies.
Defense export surge and offsets
Korean shipbuilders and defense firms are competing for mega-deals (e.g., Canada’s submarine program, Saudi R&D cooperation). Large offsets and local-production demands can redirect capacity, tighten specialized supply chains, and create opportunities for foreign partners in co-production and sustainment.
Importers Registry liberalization
Amendments to the importers’ registry law aim to reduce friction by permitting capital payment in convertible currency and easing registration continuity for firms. For foreign investors, this could streamline market entry and compliance, though implementation consistency will be decisive.
Gaza spillovers and border constraints
Rafah crossing reopening remains tightly controlled, with limited throughput and heightened security frictions. Ongoing regional instability elevates political and security risk, disrupts overland logistics to Levant markets, and can trigger compliance and duty-of-care requirements for firms.
CRE losses constrain regional lenders
Commercial real estate stress—especially office and maturing balloon loans—continues to pressure regional-bank capital and credit quality. As banks retrench, availability and pricing of construction, warehouse, and SME credit worsen, affecting US expansion plans and domestic supply-chain investment.
Immigration and skilled-visa uncertainty
U.S. immigration policy uncertainty is rising, affecting global talent mobility and services delivery. A bill was introduced to end the H‑1B program, while enhanced visa screening is delaying interviews abroad. Companies reliant on cross‑border teams should plan for longer lead times and potential labor cost increases.
Параллельный импорт и серые каналы
Поставки санкционных товаров продолжаются через третьи страны. Пример: десятки тысяч авто западных брендов поступают через Китай как «нулевой пробег, б/у», обходя ограничения; в 2025 почти половина ~130 тыс. таких продаж в РФ была произведена в Китае. Комплаенс усложняется.
Monetary easing amid sticky services
UK inflation fell to 3.0% in January while services inflation stayed elevated near 4.4%, keeping the Bank of England divided on timing of rate cuts. Shifting borrowing costs will affect sterling, financing, consumer demand, and capex planning.
Regulatory tightening in housing finance
Bank of Israel measures cap mortgage maturities at 30 years, tighten repayment ratios, and raise bank capital requirements. This can cool real-estate demand, affect construction supply chains, and influence commercial leasing dynamics as households and developers adjust financing structures and cash flows.
Foreign investment security tightening
Ottawa is balancing growth and national security under the Investment Canada Act, amid debate about allowing greater Chinese state-owned participation in energy and resources. Case-by-case reviews increase deal uncertainty, lengthen timelines, and can impose mitigation conditions for acquirers and JVs.
State asset sales and SOE restructuring
Egypt is preparing 60 state companies—40 for transfer to the Sovereign Fund of Egypt and 20 for stock-market listing—aiming to expand private participation. This creates M&A and PPP opportunities, but governance, valuation, and execution timelines are key risks.