Red Sea chokepoint security risk

Saudi reliance on Red Sea exports increases exposure to Bab el‑Mandeb disruption if Yemen’s Houthis escalate. Advisories warn capability and intent remain, and renewed attacks could remove remaining “escape routes,” amplifying oil price volatility, war-risk premiums, and delivery delays for Asia-bound cargo.

Port Throughput Growth And Connectivity

Saudi ports are recording strong operational momentum: February container handling rose 20.89% y/y to 667,882 TEUs, with transshipment up 28.09%. Mawani also added Hapag-Lloyd’s SE4 to Jeddah with vessels up to 17,000 TEU, improving Asia trade connectivity.

Infrastructure funding and PPP push

Government is pivoting to crowd in private capital via guarantees and new PPP rules. A World Bank-supported credit-guarantee vehicle ($350m; aims to mobilise ~$10bn) targets transmission lines (14,000km; R440bn). National infrastructure spend is R1.07trn over three years, easing bottlenecks but execution risk remains.

Power-grid expansion and LNG buildout

Rapid electricity demand is driving major grid and generation projects: GE Vernova plans a US$200m HVDC transformer plant in Hai Phong by 2028 and new LNG capacity (e.g., 1,600MW Hai Phong LNG targeting 2030). Grid readiness and fuel security will shape industrial reliability.

Automotive and manufacturing competitiveness squeeze

Deindustrialisation pressures are rising as imports from China/India replace local output. Locally made cars fell from 80% of domestic sales (2000) to ~33% recently; localisation dropped to 35% in 2025. Manufacturers consider plant-sharing, pauses, or exits amid costs/logistics.

Mining export expansion and corridor shifts

South Africa, a leading seaborne manganese supplier, is moving exports from Port Elizabeth to a larger Ngqura terminal targeting 16Mt/year, alongside rail upgrades. Opportunities grow for miners, EPCs and shippers, but corridor reliability remains critical.

Cross-strait maritime disruption risk

China’s expanding “gray-zone” activity—including large fishing flotillas and intensified drills—raises the probability of localized incidents and higher war-risk premiums. Businesses should expect routing changes, longer lead times, and elevated insurance and freight costs for Taiwan-linked shipments and transshipments.

Sanctions expansion and enforcement

US/EU sanctions remain the primary constraint on Iran exposure, with intensified enforcement targeting entities, ships, and intermediaries supporting illicit oil sales. Companies face heightened secondary-sanctions risk, stricter due diligence on counterparties, and greater compliance burdens across trade, finance, and insurance.

Power-Sector Reform and Reliability

IMF-linked requirements to curb circular debt and limit subsidies drive tariff increases and restructuring of distribution companies. This elevates operating costs and creates outage risk. Investors must model power-price volatility, payment discipline and contract enforceability in energy-intensive sectors.

Fiscal slippage and election risk

Brazil’s 2026 fiscal outlook is contested: the government targets a 0.25% of GDP primary surplus, while the Senate’s fiscal watchdog projects a ~0.7% deficit, citing tax waivers, court-ordered liabilities, and election-year spending pressures that can raise funding costs.

Political-security environment and project risk

Security concerns have already disrupted IMF mission travel, underscoring operational risk for staff mobility and project timelines. For infrastructure, mining and CPEC-linked activity, firms face higher security costs, insurance premiums, and force-majeure risks, especially outside major cities.

Tariff Regime Legal Volatility

Supreme Court limits on broad presidential tariffs have not reduced trade risk; Washington shifted to temporary 10%-15% Section 122 duties and accelerated Section 301 probes. Importers face refund disputes, pricing instability, and fast-changing sourcing economics through mid-2026.

Governance crackdowns and financial sector fallout

Asset liquidations tied to Vietnam’s largest fraud case (SCB/Truong My Lan) are ongoing, with courts ordering $27B repayment and authorities returning VND10T to bondholders. Continued enforcement strengthens governance but can tighten credit, slow real estate, and increase counterparty diligence requirements.

China trade exposure and de-risking

Australia remains highly exposed to China demand and policy signals across commodities and refined-fuel sourcing (notably jet fuel). Recent China export curbs on diesel/petrol/jet fuel highlight concentration risk, accelerating supplier diversification to the US and Africa and reshaping freight routes.

Transition auto: volatilité EV et subventions

Le revirement de Stellantis, avec 22,3 Md€ de perte 2025 et réduction de projets électriques, illustre l’incertitude de la demande et des politiques EV. Risques pour fournisseurs, batteries, investissements industriels et planification de capacités, avec retour partiel au thermique.

Verteidigungsausgaben und Industriehochlauf

Europäischer Sicherheitsdruck treibt deutsche Verteidigungsbudgets und Beschaffung; Marktbericht nennt 2026‑Verteidigungsetat ~€82,7 Mrd (+25% y/y) und ambitionierte Mehrjahrespläne, während Rüstungsaufträge/Backlogs wachsen. Chancen/Risiken: Exportkontrollen, Kapazitätsengpässe, Dual‑use‑Compliance, Lieferketten.

Rare earth price floors and contracts

New offtake structures, including a ~$110/kg NdPr floor price and long-duration supply commitments through 2038, aim to stabilize investment economics outside China. Japanese buyers secure supply but may face structurally higher magnet costs, altering EV, electronics, and defense bill-of-materials.

Privatisation and SOE governance reform

IMF-backed plans to privatise/restructure state firms and “right-size” government (54,000 positions slated for abolition by end-2025) could unlock opportunities, but repeated delays and legal changes create execution risk, affecting deal timelines, valuations and market entry strategies.

Domestic gas reservation and LNG tradeoffs

Policy uncertainty around an east-coast gas reservation scheme from 2027 and tougher state bargaining is reshaping contracts. WA’s Woodside deal trades extra LNG exports for 23 PJ domestic supply by 2029, signalling tighter intervention risk for energy-intensive industry.

Nearshoring e infraestructura industrial

Plan México acelera relocalización: ya operan 20 de 100 parques industriales, con US$711 millones, 3.5 millones m² y 62,000 empleos, en 10 estados. Oportunidad para manufactura y logística, pero requiere servicios, permisos y energía confiable.

Black Sea port and shipping risk

Odesa-region ports remain operational but exposed to drone strikes, including attacks near Chornomorsk and port facilities. Marine insurance premia, security procedures, and voyage planning remain elevated, affecting grain, metals, and container flows and complicating just-in-time supply chains.

Critical minerals industrial-policy surge

Ottawa is accelerating mining and processing to de-risk allied supply chains: a second round of 30 partnerships aims to unlock C$12.1B (C$18.5B total), while ~C$3.6B in new programs adds infrastructure funding and a C$2B sovereign fund.

Energy security and LNG pivot

Middle East disruptions and price volatility are accelerating Korea’s push to diversify gas supply, including a proposed $10bn-plus stake in the Sabine Pass LNG export expansion. Long-term U.S.-linked Henry Hub pricing can stabilize input costs for manufacturers and utilities.

Escalating sanctions and secondary risks

U.S. “maximum pressure” is widening beyond Iran to facilitators, with OFAC designating 12 shadow-fleet tankers and procurement networks across Türkiye and the UAE. Secondary-sanctions exposure is rising for traders, ports, insurers, and banks handling Iran-adjacent flows.

Commodity trade exposure to China

Brazil’s export model remains commodity-heavy, especially oil, soy and iron ore flows tightly linked to Chinese demand and prices. Any China slowdown or trade frictions can quickly impact terms of trade, BRL volatility, and investment planning for mining, agri, and logistics.

Rusya yaptırımları uyum riski

AB/ABD yaptırımlarının çevresinden dolaşımına dair incelemeler sürüyor; araştırmalar Türkiye’de ~300 firmanın Rus savunma zincirine dolaylı tedarikte göründüğünü öne sürüyor. İkincil yaptırım, bankacılık muhabirlikleri, ihracat lisansları ve itibar riski nedeniyle uyum maliyetleri artabilir.

Palm biodiesel mandate volatility

Pemerintah meninjau kembali penerapan B50 pada paruh kedua 2026 atau lebih cepat seiring minyak mentah >US$100/barel. Kenaikan serapan domestik CPO dapat mengurangi ekspor, menaikkan harga global, dan mengubah strategi pasokan bagi food, oleochemical, dan energi.

Trade remedies and duty-evasion probes

US Commerce opened investigations into steel wheels from Vietnam for possible circumvention of China AD/CVD duties. Such cases can trigger retroactive duties, audits, and heightened documentation demands, especially for products with China-origin inputs or minimal transformation in Vietnam.

Critical minerals export controls

Beijing is tightening rare-earth and critical-mineral policy, improving export-control systems and using licensing to manage access. With China processing about 90% of rare earths, supply disruptions and price spikes can hit EV, defense, and electronics supply chains worldwide.

Bahnkorridore: Baustellen und Störungen

Engpässe im Schienennetz belasten Just-in-time-Logistik und Inlandverteilung. Die Sperrung Hamburg–Berlin verzögert sich bis 14. Juni; Fernzüge werden umgeleitet (+45 Minuten) und Regionalverkehre teils per Bus ersetzt. Weitere Korridorsanierungen bis Mitte der 2030er erhöhen Übergangsrisiken.

Strategic planning: 15th Five-Year priorities

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan signals a pragmatic blend of energy security, electrification and tighter control over key sectors, while managing heavy-industry overcapacity and carbon-intensity targets. Policy-driven demand shifts will affect metals, grid equipment, and regulatory expectations for investors and suppliers.

China–Iran trade corridors and bypasses

Iran is testing alternatives to Hormuz such as limited Jask loadings (slow VLCC turnaround) and overland China–Iran rail links to Aprin dry port. These channels help non-crude trade continuity, but capacity constraints and sanctions still limit scalability for global shippers.

IMF-linked reforms and price hikes

Under the IMF-backed programme, authorities are accelerating subsidy rationalisation, including fuel increases up to ~30% and tighter energy-demand controls. These measures improve fiscal metrics but raise transport and input costs, affecting consumer demand, wage expectations, and margins across supply chains.

U.S. tariff and 301 volatility

Seoul faces renewed U.S. trade-policy uncertainty after IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs were struck down, pushing Washington toward Section 232/301 tools. Korea passed a $350bn U.S.-investment law, yet a new USTR 301 probe raises sectoral tariff risk.

EV battery materials scaling setbacks

The liquidation of Viridian Lithium’s ~€295m Alsace refinery project highlights Europe’s difficulty competing with China on battery materials amid slower EV demand. Investors should expect policy churn, consolidation, and greater supply-chain reliance on non‑EU refining in the near term.

Energy export expansion to Asia

Ramped LNG Canada exports and Trans Mountain capacity-optimization plans are increasing Canada’s ability to supply Asian buyers as global energy flows tighten. This supports investment in upstream, terminals and services, but exposes projects to permitting, Indigenous consultation, and operational reliability risks.