Automotive industrial policy and import surge

The auto sector—critical to exports—faces deindustrialisation pressure from low-cost imports and slow EV policy execution. Chinese models are ~22% of vehicle imports; local production stagnates below ~640k units/year and component firms are closing, driving tariff and anti-dumping debates.

Wider raw-mineral export bans

Government is considering adding more minerals (e.g., tin) to the raw-export ban list after bauxite, extending the downstreaming model used for nickel. This favors in-country smelter investment but increases policy and contract risk for traders reliant on unprocessed feedstock exports.

Sanctions compliance and leakage risks

Investigations show tens of thousands of sanctioned-brand cars reaching Russia via China, including German models, often reclassified as ‘zero-mileage used’. This heightens legal, reputational and enforcement risk across distributors, logistics and financing; controls must tighten.

Automotive Export Erosion to China

German car exports to China fell about 33% in 2025; cars and parts dropped below €14bn in 2024 from nearly €30bn in 2022. Intensifying China price wars, EV transition costs, and external tariffs raise restructuring risk across suppliers and logistics networks.

Red Sea shipping and security exposure

Saudi ports are positioning for the return of major shipping lines to the Red Sea/Bab al‑Mandab as conditions stabilize, including Jeddah port development discussions. Nevertheless, ongoing regional security volatility can still drive rerouting, insurance premia, and inventory buffering requirements.

Arctic LNG logistics sophistication

Russia is scaling ship-to-ship LNG transfers in Murmansk, including Arctic LNG 2-linked cargoes routed toward China’s Beihai. Complex Arctic logistics can keep volumes moving but raise traceability, insurance, and counterparty risks; EU LNG policy uncertainty remains a key swing factor.

USMCA renegotiation and exit risk

With the mandatory USMCA review approaching, Washington is signaling tougher rules of origin and reshoring demands, while President Trump has mused about withdrawal. This uncertainty raises tariff and compliance risk across North American supply chains, investment plans, and cross-border pricing.

Data centers drive power upgrades

Thailand’s data-center pipeline is scaling quickly: BOI expects 16 new EEC data centers (2026–2030) needing ~3,600MW. Egat is investing THB31bn to raise transmission capacity (to 1,150MW from 600MW in key nodes). Power availability, pricing, and renewable sourcing shape site-selection decisions.

Currency management and hedging conditions

RBI intervention is actively smoothing rupee volatility: net spot/forward sales around $10bn in December and sizable forward positions. For multinationals, this supports planning but reinforces the need for disciplined hedging amid tariff, oil-price, and flow shocks.

Escalating US tariff regime

Average US import tariffs rose to about 13% in 2025 (from ~2.6% in 2024), with studies finding ~90–95% of costs borne domestically. Rapidly shifting sector tariffs (notably metals) heighten pricing volatility, contract risk, and sourcing reconfiguration.

Digital sovereignty and data controls

Russia is tightening internet and data-localisation rules, throttling Telegram and moving to block WhatsApp while promoting state-backed ‘Max’. From 1 Jan 2026, services must retain messages for three years and share on request, raising surveillance, cybersecurity, and operational continuity risks for firms.

Telecom spectrum and 5G economics

Pelelangan spektrum 700 MHz dan 2,6 GHz pada 2026 ditujukan mempercepat 5G; regulator cost di Indonesia ~12,2% pendapatan operator (vs rata-rata ASEAN 8%). Target cakupan 5G 8,5% luas permukiman 2026, sementara 4G ~99% populasi. Biaya spektrum mempengaruhi rollout, IoT industri, dan kualitas layanan.

Fiscal rules and policy volatility

Chancellor Rachel Reeves faces criticism that the UK’s fiscal framework over-emphasizes narrow “headroom,” risking frequent policy tweaks as forecasts move. For investors, this elevates uncertainty around taxes, public spending, infrastructure commitments, and overall macro credibility.

Section 232 national-security tariffs

Section 232 tools remain active beyond steel and aluminum, with investigations spanning pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, critical minerals, aircraft, and more. Even where partner deals grant partial relief, uncertainty around scope and timing complicates long-term supplier selection and U.S. market pricing strategies.

Water scarcity and treaty pressures

Historic drought and Mexico–U.S. water treaty obligations are becoming operational risks, particularly for water-intensive industries in northern hubs. Potential rationing, higher tariffs, and community pushback can disrupt production, requiring water audits, recycling investment, and site selection adjustments.

Supply-chain reallocation to Vietnam

US tariff-driven diversification continues shifting export orders and supplier footprints toward Vietnam, expanding opportunities in electronics, apparel and components. Companies should anticipate capacity tightening, supplier qualification bottlenecks and heightened origin scrutiny as Vietnam gains US import share.

Climate and cotton supply vulnerability

Cotton output recovery to about 5m bales still leaves Pakistan importing $2–3bn annually, pressuring FX and textile margins. Heat, erratic rainfall and pests threaten yields. Apparel supply chains face higher input volatility and potential delivery risks in peak seasons.

US tariff and NTB pressure

Washington is threatening to restore 25% tariffs unless Seoul delivers on a $350bn US investment pledge and eases non-tariff barriers (digital rules, agriculture, auto/pharma certification). Policy uncertainty raises pricing, compliance, and sourcing risks for exporters.

Carbon border adjustment momentum

Australia’s Carbon Leakage Review recommends an import-only border carbon adjustment starting with cement/clinker, potentially extending to ammonia, steel and glass. This would mirror the Safeguard Mechanism and reshape landed costs, supplier selection, and emissions data requirements for importers.

Energy import dependence and LNG surge

Taiwan’s trade deal embeds large 2025–2029 purchase commitments, including about US$44.4B in LNG/crude and US$25.2B in power-grid equipment. This signals accelerated energy-security investment but reinforces import exposure, affecting electricity costs, PPAs, and industrial siting decisions.

LNG buildout and Asian markets

Canadian LNG export capacity is advancing through projects such as LNG Canada and Cedar LNG, with long-term supply contracts emerging. This supports upstream and midstream investment, but depends on regulatory certainty, Indigenous agreements, and global LNG pricing.

USMCA review and tariff risk

The July 1 USMCA review is clouded by Washington’s tariff-first posture and reported withdrawal talk. Even partial rollbacks remain uncertain. Expect higher compliance costs, volatile rules-of-origin, and elevated hedging needs for North American supply chains and investors.

Won volatility and FX buffers

Authorities issued $3bn in FX stabilization bonds as reserves fell to about $425.9bn end‑January, signaling concern about won pressures amid global rates and capital outflows. Importers/exporters should tighten hedging, review pricing clauses, and monitor liquidity conditions.

IMF-driven macro stabilization path

An IMF board review (Feb 25) may unlock a $2.3bn tranche, reinforcing exchange-rate flexibility and fiscal consolidation. Record reserves ($52.59bn end‑Jan) and easing inflation (~11.7%) improve import capacity, credit sentiment, and deal-making conditions.

İsrail ticaret kısıtları genişliyor

Ankara’nın İsrail’e yönelik ticaret tedbirlerini Eur-Med tercih belgelerini durdurmaya kadar genişlettiği bildirildi. Bu, gümrükte menşe ve tercihli tarife süreçlerini etkileyebilir. Bölgesel tedarik, ara malı akışı ve kontrat performansı için belirsizlik artar.

US–Indonesia reciprocal tariff reset

A new US–Indonesia reciprocal trade agreement lowers US tariffs on Indonesian goods to ~19% while Indonesia removes tariffs on most US products. Expect near-term changes in market access, compliance requirements, and competitive pressure in textiles, agribusiness, and manufacturing.

War-driven maritime and navigation hazards

The Black Sea operating environment remains high-risk: drone/mine threats, port strikes, and pervasive GNSS spoofing disrupt routing and safety. Attacks on tankers linked to Russian cargoes have expanded beyond the region. Shipping schedules, premiums, and contractual performance risks remain elevated.

Stablecoins become fiscal tool

US policy is positioning Treasury-backed stablecoins as a new buyer base for short-term bills and a lever of dollar reach. This may shift liquidity from bank deposits, alter credit availability, and create new compliance, treasury, and settlement models for multinationals.

US LNG export expansion and contracting

U.S. LNG developers continue signing long-term offtake deals (e.g., 20-year, 1 mtpa agreements) as permitting loosens, supporting major capacity growth into the 2030s. For energy-intensive industries and importers, this reshapes global gas pricing, shipping, and industrial siting decisions.

Critical minerals weaponization risk

China’s dominance in rare-earth processing (often cited near 90%) and other critical inputs sustains leverage via export licensing and controls. Western countermeasures—stockpiles, price floors, and minerals blocs—raise structural fragmentation risk, driving dual sourcing, inventory buffers, and higher input costs.

Sanctions Enforcement and Dual-Use Leakage

Sanctions compliance risk is rising as Ukraine alleges Russian drones source German Infineon transistors via third countries; 137 German components were identified in Russian weapons. Companies face heightened export-control scrutiny, end-use due diligence, and potential penalties for indirect re-exports.

Energy security via US LNG pivot

Taiwan plans major US purchases (2025–2029) including $44.4B LNG/crude, lifting US LNG share toward 25% and reducing reliance on Middle East routes. This reorients energy supply chains, affects power-price risk, and increases the strategic value of resilient terminals and grid investments.

Energy security via LNG contracting

With gas supplying about 60% of power generation and domestic output declining, PTT, Egat and Gulf are locking in long-term LNG contracts (15-year deals, 0.8–1.0 mtpa tranches). Greater price stability supports manufacturing planning but increases exposure to contract and FX risks.

Weak growth, high leverage constraints

Thailand’s macro backdrop remains soft: IMF/AMRO/World Bank sources point to ~1.6–1.9% 2026 growth after ~2% in 2025, with heavy household debt and limited policy space. Demand uncertainty affects retail, autos, credit availability, and capex timing.

US–Taiwan reciprocal trade pact

New US–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade caps US tariffs at 15% and cuts average tariff burden to about 12.33% via 2,072 exemptions, while Taiwan removes/reduces 99% barriers. Ratification risk and standards alignment affect market access planning.

LNG export acceleration and energy leverage

Policy has shifted toward faster approvals and “regular order” for non‑FTA LNG export permits, supporting 15–20 year contracting with Europe and Asia. This boosts US energy geopolitics, but creates competitiveness and price-risk considerations for energy‑intensive manufacturers globally.