Investment screening and outbound limits

CFIUS scrutiny remains high while Treasury advances process changes (e.g., “Known Investor” concepts) and the outbound investment regime for sensitive technologies expands. Cross-border M&A, joint ventures, and greenfield projects face longer approvals, mitigation requirements, and valuation discounts.

Forestry downturn and lumber dispute

Softwood lumber faces punishing U.S. import taxes around 45%, pressuring mills, employment and rural logistics. Provincial relief programs aim to ease cash flow, but prolonged trade friction raises counterparty risk for timber supply contracts and construction-material supply chains.

Gümrük rejimi değişimi ve e-ticaret

6 Şubat 2026’da 30 avro altı basitleştirilmiş gümrük uygulaması kaldırıldı; tüm gönderilerde detaylı beyan zorunlu. Temu, yerel ithalatçı modeliyle geri döndü ve 580 TL alt limit koydu. De minimis reformu KOBİ ithalatçıları, e-ticaret lojistiği ve maliyet yapısını kalıcı değiştiriyor.

USMCA renegotiation and exit risk

With the mandatory USMCA review approaching, Washington is signaling tougher rules of origin and reshoring demands, while President Trump has mused about withdrawal. This uncertainty raises tariff and compliance risk across North American supply chains, investment plans, and cross-border pricing.

Lira Volatility and FX Liquidity

Structurally weak long-term capital inflows and limited buffers keep USD/TRY risk elevated, raising import costs and FX debt-service burdens. Market surveys still price ~51–52 USD/TRY horizons, implying ongoing hedging needs, tighter treasury controls, and higher working-capital requirements for import-dependent sectors.

USMCA review and North America risk

A July 1 USMCA mandatory review, White House criticism of “flaws,” and periodic Canada/Mexico tariff threats elevate uncertainty for deeply integrated auto, agri-food, and industrial supply chains. Companies should stress-test rules-of-origin compliance, nearshoring plans, and contingency sourcing.

Sanctions, compliance, crypto enforcement

Ukraine is expanding sanctions against entities and individuals supporting Russia’s defence and financial networks, including crypto payment and mining channels linked to component procurement. This raises counterparty, KYC/AML and re-export control burdens for regional traders and service providers, especially across hubs like UAE and Hong Kong.

Industrial policy subsidies reshaping FDI

CHIPS- and clean-energy-linked incentives, paired with conditional tariff exemptions tied to U.S. production capacity, are redirecting foreign investment into U.S. fabs, batteries, and critical materials. Global firms must weigh subsidy capture against localization costs, labor constraints, and policy durability.

Secondary tariffs and sanctions extraterritoriality

Washington is expanding secondary measures, including tariffs on countries trading with Iran and pressure on partners over Russia-linked commerce. This raises third-country compliance burdens, increases tracing requirements across multi-tier supply chains, and elevates retaliation and WTO-dispute risks for multinationals.

Makroihtiyati kredi sıkılaştırması

BDDK ve TCMB, kredi kartı limitleri ile kredili mevduat hesaplarına büyüme sınırları getiriyor; yabancı para kredilerde limit %0,5’e indirildi. Şirketler için işletme sermayesi, tüketim talebi ve tahsilat riskleri değişebilir; tedarikçilere vade ve stok politikaları yeniden ayarlanmalı.

Logistics upgrades and multimodal corridors

Dedicated Freight Corridors, Gati Shakti cargo terminals, port connectivity and new national waterways aim to reduce transit times and logistics costs. Firms can redesign distribution networks, but should factor land acquisition delays, last-mile bottlenecks, and regulatory fragmentation.

Green hydrogen export corridors

Projects like ACWA’s Yanbu green hydrogen/ammonia hub (FEED due mid-2026; operations targeted 2030) and planned Saudi–Germany ammonia logistics corridors could create new trade flows. Businesses should assess offtake contracts, certification standards, and port-to-port infrastructure readiness.

Industrial relations tightening pressures

Mining majors warn expanded union powers are raising operational friction (BHP cites 400% rise in right-of-entry requests) and could deter capital spending. International operators should model productivity impacts, bargaining complexity and labour-hire cost pass-through.

Power surplus, price volatility risk

Weak demand and rising renewables increase periods of low/negative prices and force nuclear output modulation; EDF warns higher maintenance needs and added costs (≈€30m/year) if electrification lags. Volatility affects PPAs, hedging strategies, and industrial competitiveness planning.

Strategic transport assets under scrutiny

Proposed sale of ZIM to Hapag-Lloyd (~$3.5–4bn) triggered strikes and government review via a “golden share.” Heightened state intervention risk in logistics and critical infrastructure could affect foreign M&A approvals, continuity planning, and emergency supply obligations.

Shadow fleet logistics under scrutiny

Iran’s crude exports rely on AIS manipulation, reflagging, and ship‑to‑ship transfers via hubs such as Malaysia; recent India interdictions highlight rising enforcement spillover. Firms face higher freight/insurance costs, voyage delays, cargo provenance disputes, and elevated KYC/Know‑Your‑Cargo requirements.

Cargo theft and logistics security

Cargo theft remains a material operating risk despite reported declines: industry estimates put 2025 losses above MXN 7 billion, with hotspots in Estado de México and Puebla and key routes like México–Querétaro. High jammer use raises insurance, tracking, and routing costs.

FX liquidity and pound stability

Foreign reserves reached a record $52.6bn (about 6.9 months of imports) and banks forecast USD/EGP around 45–49 in 2026. Improved liquidity supports trade finance, but devaluation risk remains tied to reform execution and external shocks.

BoJ tightening, yen volatility

Japan’s exit from ultra-loose policy is accelerating: markets price further hikes from 0.75% toward ~1% by mid‑2026, with intervention risk near ¥160/$1. FX and rate volatility will affect hedging, funding costs, pricing, and inbound investment returns.

AI chip export controls to China

Policy oscillation on allowing sales of high-performance AI chips to China creates strategic risk for chipmakers and AI users. Companies must manage compliance, customer screening, and geopolitical backlash, while potential future tightening could disrupt revenue, cloud infrastructure, and global AI deployment plans.

Fed easing cycle and dollar swings

Cooling inflation is strengthening expectations for mid‑year Federal Reserve rate cuts, influencing USD direction, funding costs, and risk appetite. International firms should reassess hedging, USD-denominated debt, and pricing strategy, as rate-driven FX and demand conditions can shift quickly.

IMF program and policy conditionality

The IMF board review may unlock about $2.3bn, anchoring exchange-rate flexibility, fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Outcomes influence sovereign risk, access to external financing and FX liquidity, shaping import capacity, profit repatriation, and investor confidence in Egypt.

FDI-led manufacturing expansion cycle

FDI remains the main growth engine, with 2025 registered FDI at US$38.4bn and disbursed US$27.62bn; January 2026 disbursement rose 11.3% YoY. Electronics/semiconductors clusters are deepening, benefiting suppliers but raising concentration and wage-competition risks.

Mining regulatory uncertainty and permitting

Industry criticises the Mineral Resources Development Amendment Bill for ambiguity and shifting obligations, awaiting a revised version in 2026. Uncertainty over beneficiation, residue stockpiles and processing timelines can delay FDI, raise compliance risk, and favour brownfield over greenfield investment.

USMCA review and exit risk

Trump is reportedly weighing withdrawal as the USMCA faces a mandatory July 1 review. Even the threat can chill North American investment, disrupt integrated auto/industrial supply chains, and raise rules-of-origin and localization costs; six-month notice would accelerate contingency planning.

Riesgo marítimo: Hormuz y abordajes

Aumentan las advertencias a navieras por intentos iraníes de abordaje y detención en el Estrecho de Ormuz, un chokepoint crítico. Esto encarece seguros de guerra, exige escoltas/planificación de rutas y aumenta el riesgo de interrupciones repentinas para energía y carga general.

Maritime security and chokepoints

Iran-linked regional tensions elevate risk around the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Red Sea routing. Even without closure, seizures, drone incidents, and proxy threats can raise freight and war-risk premiums, extend lead times, and force supply chains to reroute and rebuffer.

Tightening export controls and investment screening

Taiwan–U.S. cooperation is moving toward stricter export controls on critical technologies and stronger investment review, including preventing origin ‘laundering.’ Multinationals face higher due-diligence burdens, end-user/end-use verification, and potential restrictions on China-linked counterparties in sensitive sectors.

Energy security and LNG repositioning

Japan is locking in long-duration LNG supply, including JERA’s 27-year, 3 mtpa deal from 2028 and potential Mitsui equity in Qatar’s North Field South. Greater Middle East exposure, plus disaster-contingency MOUs, influences power prices, industrial siting and contracting strategies.

Defense-budget gridlock affects deterrence

Domestic political standoffs over a proposed NT$1.25 trillion multi‑year defense package and expiring US LOA timelines risk delaying key capabilities. Heightened scrutiny from Washington can influence trade/investment mood, supplier confidence, and operational continuity assumptions in Taiwan.

Defense industrial expansion and offsets

Large US arms packages and Israel’s push to shift from aid toward joint projects and local production strengthen domestic defense supply chains. This creates opportunities in aerospace, electronics, and dual-use tech, while increasing export-control and end-use scrutiny.

Oil export revenues weakening sharply

January oil-and-gas tax receipts fell to 393bn rubles ($5.1bn) from 587bn in December and 1.12tr in Jan 2025. Wider Urals discounts and disrupted India flows compress margins, increasing fiscal pressure and policy unpredictability for businesses operating in Russia.

Monetary easing amid weak growth

Inflation fell to 3.0% in January (services 4.4%) and unemployment rose to 5.2%, lifting expectations of a March Bank Rate cut from 3.75% to 3.5%. Shifting rates affect GBP, borrowing costs, hedging, and demand forecasts for exporters and investors.

Immigration tightening pressures labor supply

Crackdowns on illegal immigration and prospective H‑1B prevailing-wage hikes raise labor costs and constrain hiring in tech, healthcare and services. Firms should reassess location strategy, automation plans, and visa-dependent staffing models while preparing for slower onboarding and compliance checks.

Critical-minerals downstreaming escalation

Jakarta is considering extending raw export bans beyond nickel and bauxite to minerals like tin, reinforcing ‘hilirisasi’ policy. While processed exports surged (nickel exports ~US$34bn in 2024 vs US$3.3bn in 2017), investors face policy shifts, permitting risk, and local-processing requirements.

EU–Mercosur provisional trade opening

The EU will provisionally apply the Mercosur agreement, despite strong French opposition and court review. Likely tariff cuts reshape agri-food and industrial trade flows, intensifying competition while creating export opportunities; safeguards and compliance controls may tighten.