FDI screening may partially ease

Government is reviewing Press Note 3 (FDI from bordering countries) and considering a de minimis threshold for small-ticket approvals, while keeping the regime intact. This could accelerate venture funding and JVs, but leaves heightened national-security scrutiny and deal-timing uncertainty.

Volatile rates, inflation, FX

Copom started easing with a cautious 25bp Selic cut to 14.75% after holding 15%, stressing Middle East oil-shock risks. Oil above US$100 can add ~0.25pp per 10% to IPCA, affecting hedging, pricing, and capital flows.

Trade facilitation, tariffs, import controls

The government signals export-led growth via tariff rationalisation and trade facilitation under IMF oversight. However, revenue pressures can revive ad-hoc duties, import compression, or refund delays. This creates uncertainty for customs planning, inventory management, and pricing for multinationals.

US tariff reset, FTA acceleration

US tariffs shifting to a 15% uniform rate for 150 days narrows Thailand’s disadvantage (previously ~19% on some goods), encouraging shipment front-loading. Thailand is accelerating FTAs (EU, Korea, ASEAN-Canada), reshaping market access and sourcing strategies.

Post-election coalition policy direction

A new multi-party coalition around Bhumjaithai is forming after February elections, reducing near-term political deadlock but reshaping ministerial priorities. Watch budget timing, industrial policy, and regulatory continuity, especially for infrastructure approvals and investment promotion decisions impacting FDI pipelines.

Hormuz chokepoint shipping disruption

The Iran conflict has effectively closed or selectively restricted the Strait of Hormuz, backing up hundreds of vessels and tightening global container capacity. Expect higher freight, bunker and “emergency” surcharges, longer transit times, and contract renegotiations favoring carriers across routes.

Power sector reform and costs

Eskom supply has stabilised, but output remains below 2025 levels (13,007 GWh Jan 2026) and tariffs are rising (Nersa 8.76% effective). Grid expansion needs ~14,000 km lines (R440bn). Firms face price volatility, self-generation and wheeling opportunities.

External buffers and debt-market sentiment

Reserves improved to about $16.3bn with a $121m January current-account surplus, but markets react to IMF delays; equities and dollar bonds have dipped on uncertainty. Funding costs, LC availability and counterparty risk remain sensitive to IMF milestones.

Supply-chain labor and port fragility

US logistics remains vulnerable to port labor disputes, rail/trucking constraints, and regulatory bottlenecks, amplifying lead-time variability. Firms reliant on US gateways should diversify ports and modes, increase inventory buffers selectively, and harden contingency plans for peak-season disruptions.

EU-Regeln zu Energieabgaben und CO2-Kosten

EU drängt auf Senkung der Stromsteuer Richtung Mindestniveau (Haushalte potenziell −14%/~€200/Jahr), während CO2‑Kosten steigen: nationaler Fixpreis €65/t (2026), ab 2028 ETS‑Marktpreis mit großer Spanne (Schätzungen 40–400 €/t). Auswirkungen: Opex, Pricing, Dekarbonisierungs‑ROI.

Energy security and LNG pivot

Middle East disruptions and price volatility are accelerating Korea’s push to diversify gas supply, including a proposed $10bn-plus stake in the Sabine Pass LNG export expansion. Long-term U.S.-linked Henry Hub pricing can stabilize input costs for manufacturers and utilities.

China semiconductor self-reliance surge

China is accelerating domestic compute and chip ecosystems, building national AI “computing power” networks and pushing local GPUs, tools and equipment. Reported requirements for higher domestic equipment use and progress toward 7nm capacity reduce foreign vendor share and reshape partnership strategies.

Middle East energy shockwaves

Strait of Hormuz disruptions and Iran conflict have trapped Japan-linked ships and forced emergency oil releases. Japan sources ~95% of crude from the Middle East; Qatar LNG outages cut ~20% of global supply, lifting fuel costs and forcing procurement reshuffles.

Outbound controls and cross-border compliance

China’s export-control framework is expanding beyond minerals to dual-use items and end-user restrictions, with extraterritorial compliance implications for third-country subsidiaries. Companies face heightened screening, documentation, and potential penalties, necessitating stronger trade-compliance and customer due diligence.

US-China Tech Controls Tighten

Export controls on advanced AI chips remain a central commercial constraint despite policy inconsistency. A major smuggling case involving $510 million in restricted AI servers underscores tougher enforcement, higher due-diligence expectations, and rising exposure for semiconductor, server, and cloud supply chains.

External financing and FX liquidity

Pakistan’s reserves depend on rollovers and refinancing (eg $2bn UAE deposit, Chinese loans) plus multilateral flows. Any slippage can revive import controls and payment delays, increasing currency volatility, credit risk, and working-capital needs for foreign suppliers and investors.

Water security and municipal service risk

Water shortages and weak municipal maintenance disrupt operations in major metros and industrial zones. National plans include >R156bn for water/sanitation and a new National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency from 2026, but near-term outages and leak losses persist.

Supply-chain reorientation to “friendly” hubs

Trade increasingly routes through China, Turkey, UAE and Central Asia via parallel imports and intermediary logistics. This diversifies access to inputs but increases compliance complexity, lead times, and exposure to sudden controls, seizures, or partner-bank de-risking.

Import substitution and tech degradation

Sanctions constrain access to parts, software updates, and advanced components; many firms substitute by lowering quality and efficiency. “Local” products still depend on imported critical systems, increasing downtime and cost inflation, and undermining reliability of industrial supply chains and maintenance regimes.

Labor law expansion raises disruption

The “Yellow Envelope” amendments broaden employer responsibility and subcontractor bargaining rights, triggering large-scale negotiation demands across industries. Businesses face higher risk of overlapping bargaining units, slower restructuring and automation decisions, and increased strike incidence—especially in manufacturing and logistics.

BOJ tightening and yen volatility

With policy rates at 0.75% and debate over March/April hikes amid political pressure and Middle East shocks, the yen remains volatile. FX swings affect import costs, pricing, hedging, and valuation of Japan-based earnings and M&A.

China–Iran trade corridors and bypasses

Iran is testing alternatives to Hormuz such as limited Jask loadings (slow VLCC turnaround) and overland China–Iran rail links to Aprin dry port. These channels help non-crude trade continuity, but capacity constraints and sanctions still limit scalability for global shippers.

Massive tariff refund backlog

Customs estimates ~$166bn of IEEPA duties across 53m entries from 330k importers must be refunded with interest, but systems may take ~45 days to enable processing. Timing of reimbursements affects working capital, pricing resets, and litigation exposure in trade programs.

Defence procurement shifts to IP

Draft Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026 reweights “L1” bidding with credits for indigenous design and IP, aiming for “Owned by India” outcomes and 30–50% faster timelines. Foreign OEMs face stricter localisation, source-code/data expectations, and selective foreign-route clearances affecting partnerships and offsets.

Tech export controls and retaliation

US controls on advanced semiconductors and equipment continue to tighten, while China signals countermeasures affecting imports and approvals. Stop-start licensing for AI chips increases forecasting risk, forces redesigns, and pushes multinationals to reroute R&D and sourcing away from China.

Trade preference and U.S. market exposure

Exporters remain sensitive to uncertainty around U.S. preferential access (AGOA) and broader geopolitical frictions, with outsized exposure in automotive, agriculture and manufactured goods. Firms should diversify markets, scenario-plan tariff shocks, and harden compliance screening.

Fuel price intervention and export levies

To contain diesel inflation, Brasília cut PIS/Cofins on diesel (estimated R$20bn revenue loss), introduced subsidies, and imposed temporary export taxes including 12% on crude and 50% on diesel shipments. Measures reshape margins for refiners, traders, and shippers and raise policy unpredictability.

EU Russian LNG endgame

Despite a planned EU ban from 1 Jan 2027, Europe recently absorbed all Yamal LNG cargoes (about 1.54 million tonnes in Feb across 21 shipments). Businesses face abrupt policy shifts, long‑term contract renegotiations, and infrastructure bottlenecks for alternative supply.

Lira volatility and inflation

Inflation remains elevated (31.5% y/y in February) and geopolitical shocks have forced tight liquidity; Turkey reportedly spent $12bn defending the lira. FX instability raises pricing risk, working-capital needs, hedging costs, and import affordability for energy and inputs.

Ports, roads and logistics competitiveness

Cai Mep–Thi Vai handled 711,429 TEU in Jan 2026 (+9% y/y) with >20 direct US/EU mainline services. New links—Bien Hoa–Vung Tau Expressway (Q2 2026) and Phuoc An Bridge (2027)—should cut truck times to 45–60 minutes, lowering landed costs.

State seizures and property insecurity

Nationalizations and forced asset transfers—illustrated by Domodedovo’s seizure and auction—signal heightened political risk. Foreign residency, “strategic” designations, and prosecutorial actions can trigger expropriation, impaired governance, and limited legal recourse, deterring greenfield and M&A investment.

Tariff volatility and refunds

Court-ordered refunds of illegal IEEPA tariffs (est. US$168–182bn) and a temporary 10–15% global Section 122 tariff create pricing whiplash, contract disputes, and cashflow swings for importers, requiring rapid reclassification, landed-cost resets, and hedging.

Russia sanctions divergence compliance

UK insists it will not ease Russia oil sanctions even as US grants temporary relief for cargoes at sea, creating misalignment across regimes. Banks, shippers and traders face higher compliance risk, due‑diligence burden and potential payment/insurance disruptions.

EU transport integration accelerates

Ukraine is deepening integration with EU logistics through measures like extending “transport visa-free” to 2027, advancing European-gauge rail projects, and rolling out e-freight documentation (e‑TTN). These steps can reduce border friction, but capacity constraints and wartime disruptions persist.

Arctic LNG logistics under attack

Sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 depends on a small, aging carrier set, ship‑to‑ship transfers, and long reroutes. The sinking of a shadow LNG carrier and diversions around Suez raise tonne‑mile costs, delivery uncertainty, and counterparty risk for offtakers, shippers, and terminal operators.

Oil-price-linked inflation transmission

Analysts estimate sustained Brent near US$100 could lift Brazil inflation by ~0.4pp and in extremes 0.8–1.0pp, via fuels, freight, petrochemicals, fertilizers and packaging. This broad pass-through pressures margins, contract indexation, and working-capital needs.